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Resumo: 
 A indústria farmacêutica tem enfrentado desafios e mudanças em suas atividades de P&D. O 
desafio mais significativo neste setor é a queda de produtividade de suas atividades de pesquisa. Como 
consequência, o setor tenta por meio da incorporação de novas tecnologias aumentar o sucesso de seus 
outputs tecnológicos. Este fato gera, portanto, uma visível mudança na organização da P&D do setor. 
Nos anos recentes, as grandes empresas farmacêuticas têm aumentada suas alianças com pequenas 
empresas de biotecnologia e, ao mesmo tempo, estas grandes empresas tem internalizado novas 
tecnologias oriundas das pequenas empresas por meio de aquisições. Estes fatos deixam evidente que 
as pequenas empresas são fontes de inovação para as grandes empresas que as usam para superar a 
crise de produtividade de sua P&D. Fica claro que as pequenas empresas de biotecnologia contribuem 
com as grandes empresas que as adquiriram ao possibilitarem as mesmas adquirir novas competências 
e tecnologias. Dessa forma, o objetivo deste estudo é estabelecer uma forma geral de como a pequenas 
empresas de biotecnologia adquirida possam contribuir para as grandes empresas farmacêuticas que as 
compraram. Como hipótese, é dito que as pequenas empresas não contribuem todas da mesma forma, 
porém, as grandes empresas capazes de usar o maior número de inventores das pequenas empresas são 
aquelas mais eficientes em incorporar as novas competências e tecnologias adquiridas. Para alcançar o 
objetivo proposto e provar a hipótese do estudo, propõe-se a construção de um processo geral de 
contribuição composto por elementos que podem capturar a incorporação de competências de uma 
empresa pela outra. Baseado na bibliografia o processo geral de contribuição é composto por: (i) 
Contribuição prévia; (ii) Contribuição tecnológica direta; (iii) Contribuição tecnológica indireta e (iv) 
Contribuição em skills. A contribuição prévia é composta pelos acordos de pesquisa realizados pela 
empresa adquirida e a adquirente antes do processo de aquisição, colaborações são importante pois 
neste período as empresas podem desenvolver tecnologias de forma conjunta. Contribuição direta é 
medida quando a grande empresa usa as patentes da pequena empresa adquirida para produzir as 
próprias patentes. A contribuição indireta é uma forma de se medir como a grande empresa 
desenvolveu ao longo do tempo um conhecimento tecnológico similar ao da pequena empresa 
adquirida. Finalmente, contribuição em Skills compreende os inventores que eram da pequena empresa 
de biotecnologia e passaram a patentear pela grande empresa farmacêutica. A metodologia está 
baseada em dados de patentes e em entrevistas. O processo geral de contribuição foi aplicado à 5 
grandes empresas sendo elas: (i) Pfizer, (ii) Merck; (iii) Johnson & Johnson; (iv) Roche e (v) Abbott-
Laboratories. Com três empresas, Pfizer, Merck e Johnson & Johnson foram realizadas entrevistas. O 
estudo concluiu que os componentes do processo geral de contribuição são, realmente, relevantes no 
entendimento do processo de incorporação de competências. A contribuição em Skills  se mostrou um 
importante componente e uma condição inicial para que o processo de contribuição aconteça.  
Palavras-chave: aquisições tecnológicas, indústria farmacêutica, biotecnologia, mudança técnica 
  
  
 
Abstract:  
The pharmaceutical industry has been facing changes and challenges related to its R&D 
activities. The most striking challenge, in this sector, is the productivity crises in the R&D activities. 
As a consequence this sector has been attempting to increase the rate of success in its technological 
outputs. One visible change in the pharmaceutical industry is happening in the industry organization 
and conduction of R&D. In recent years the number of alliances between Big-Pharma and small 
biotech enterprises has deeply increased and at the same time the Big-Pharma are internalizing several 
small enterprises’ technologies through acquisitions. There is no doubt that the small biotech 
enterprises are now important sources of innovation used as an alternative to overcome the 
productivity crises and as consequence changing the way the pharmaceutical industry organize its 
R&D. Small biotech companies can surely contribute in terms of technology to the Big-Pharma that 
acquired them, therefore, the objective of this study is to establish a general view of how the small 
acquired biotech companies can contribute to the large pharmaceutical enterprise that acquired them. 
As a hypothesis the study says that biotech enterprises do not contribute all in the same way, but, the 
large enterprises capable of using the small emprises inventors are the ones that are more efficient on 
incorporating the technologies and competences of the acquired small biotech firm. In order to 
accomplish the proposed objective and to prove the hypothesis, this study propose the construction of 
an overall contribution process composed by elements that can capture the incorporation of 
technologies from one enterprises to another. Based on the bibliography the overall contribution 
process is composed by: (i) Prior contribution; (ii) Direct technical contribution; (iii) Indirect technical 
contribution and (iii) Skills contribution. Prior contribution are the research collaborations established 
by the acquired and the acquiring companies, through collaborations enterprises can develop 
technologies together. Direct technical contribution is when the acquiring enterprises uses acquired 
company’ patents to produce new patents, this feature can be measured by the patent referenced in 
other patents. Indirect technical contribution is an attempt to observe, in the large pharmaceutical 
company, the development of the same technical knowledge possessed by the acquired company. 
Finnaly the skills contributions is measured by the inventors that move from the acquired enterprise to 
the acquiring one. To gather these data, patents were highly used together with interviews. The overall 
contribution process was applied in five Big-Pharma, (i) Pfizer, (ii)Merck, (iii) Johnson & Johnson; 
(iv) Roche and (v) Abbott-Laboratories. The study concluded that the overall contribution components 
are indeed relevant in a process of incorporating technology. Being skills contribution a contribution 
for the contribution to happen  
Keywords: technological acquisitions; pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, technical 
change 
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Introduction  
 
 
The pharmaceutical industry became a high technology sector as its technological 
dynamics started to be generated at the R&D laboratory. It has been evolving in a way in 
which the construction of pharmaceutical compounds and the discovery of new diseases were 
entangled in a coevolution process, encompassing pharmaceutical research and the evolution 
of health sciences.   
As the science moves towards to unveiling and understanding complex diseases, the 
pharmaceutical products also became more intricate as they manage to embrace several 
targets at the same time. To deal with increasing complex diseases and technologies, the 
pharmaceutical industry has relied on external sources of innovation for bringing new 
research possibilities. Nowadays, every large pharmaceutical enterprise has some scouting 
team dedicated to search for new promising technologies outside the enterprise borders.  
There is no doubt that biotechnology has become an outside source of new 
opportunities for drug discovery. In that process, biotech companies became important 
instruments in the pharmaceutical industry’s research activities. From 1988 to 1996, strategic 
alliances, regarding biotech companies, have grown at a 25% rate
1
, totalizing 20,000 
partnerships in the whole period. The small biotech companies and large pharmaceutical 
enterprises established 85 alliances in 1993; 210 in 1994 and 376 in 1995
2
. Although these 
numbers are not recent, they show a trend of how the industry is organizing itself into 
networks.  
Acquisitions, between the biotech companies and the large pharmaceutical enterprises, 
also, have played an important role in pharmaceutical industry strategies. From 2005 to 2012, 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) expenditures totalized 720,856
3
 billion dollars. Just in 
2012, M&A between these two types of enterprises reached the total of US$52,8
4
 billion 
dollars. In the same year, the expenditures on Research and Development (R&D), among the 
                                                 
1
 http://www.strategy-business.com/article/8840 
2
 http://www.strategy-business.com/article/8840 
3
 HBM partners Pharma/Biotec 2013 M&A report 
4
 HBM partners Pharma/Biotec 2013 M&A report 
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Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) members, were about 
US$51,6 billion
5
. R&D and M&A expenditures were almost the same in 2012, this fact makes 
evident that large pharmaceutical enterprises are incorporating biotech companies in its 
structure, making impossible to deny the importance of this kind of M&A in nowadays' 
pharmaceutical industry.  
According to the OECD
6
, in 2013, 67% of the biotech companies in the world had less 
than 50 employees and 72% of the US biotech companies had less than 50 employees. In the 
case of biotech companies, M&A work differently, because these are small enterprises, 
therefore, acquisitions tend to be driven by the relevant technological aspects held by the 
small enterprises. Apparently, small biotech companies are purchased to boost the large 
pharmaceutical enterprises pipeline. At this precise moment, in which M&A are increasing, 
this study aims at understanding how the small business contributes to the R&D of the large 
pharmaceutical companies. To approach this question, this study focuses on the relation 
between the small biotech companies acquired by large pharmaceutical enterprises. The 
possibility to verify that small acquired biotech companies contribute by offering new 
competences and technologies to the pharmaceutical companies’ R&D will indicate a real 
change in the way large pharmaceutical enterprises conduct its R&D activities, because by 
bringing new actors to the R&D process, large pharmaceutical companies are relying on 
external sources to promote innovation. 
The study objective is to establish a general view of how the small acquired biotech 
companies can contribute to the large pharmaceutical enterprise that acquired them; this 
process will be named overall contribution. As an outcome, an overall contribution process 
brings new technological dynamics for the Research and Development activities of the 
acquiring firm. Based on that, this study main hypothesis is that small biotech enterprises do 
not contribute all in the same way, but, the large enterprises capable of using the small 
enterprises’ inventors are the ones that are more efficient on incorporating the technologies 
and competences of the acquired small biotech firm.  
The study is based on a sample composed by five large pharmaceutical companies. 
The methodology encompass collaboration information, patents data, and interviews. 
Collaboration information will indicate any contribution that happened before the acquisition. 
                                                 
5
 According to the PhRMA 2013 industry report  
6
 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2013 indicators on biotechnology updated on july 2015 
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Patents data are the source of contributions related to technological and skills capabilities. 
Finally, the interviews will show one or more successful and unsuccessful cases. These cases 
will be used to establish a “general pattern of success” and to demonstrate the relevance of 
each variable that compose the overall contribution process. 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter sets the theoretical 
background and discusses the changes that occurred in the pharmaceutical industrial since the 
1930’s. It includes the scientific and technological developments in the pharmaceutical 
industry telling a technological history of the drugs' discovery activity. This chapter also 
discusses the changes in the industries' organization, that happened when the small biotech 
companies emerged becoming a new technological opportunity. Therefore, by describing this 
evolution process, chapter 1 establishes the basis of the overall contribution process. 
In chapter 2, the methodology is set out, presenting: (i) the central concepts of this 
study; (ii) how patents and data will be used as source of technical and skill contribution and 
(iii) how the interviews will be employed. 
The third chapter presents the case studies of the large pharmaceutical companies. 
These cases will be developed based on the methodology proposed in chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 will discuss, based on the case studies analyses in the light of the theoretical 
background, each element that composes the overall contribution.  
Finally, the conclusion will be presented  
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Chapter 1 Scientific and Technological Evolution in the Drug Discovery 
Activities.  
 
 
The pharmaceutical industry evolution is marked by the incorporation of new 
technologies derived from chemistry. Later, the process of technical change became more 
dependent on the biotechnology, which brought new possibilities and opportunities to the 
industry. Chapter 1 intends to present this evolution, focused on the development of the drug 
discovery activities and the organizational changes that enabled biotechnology to be 
incorporated into as a new technology.  
The technological evolution of drugs' discovery will show how the pharmaceutical 
industry, over time, could reduce the empirical factor of this same activity. In this process, 
biotechnology played a major role as it improved the pharmaceutical industry competences 
filling some technological gaps that could not be reached by the chemistry technologies alone. 
At the same time, the incorporation of biotechnologies created a mutual dependency between 
the large pharmaceutical enterprises and small biotech companies. 
The research-intensive pharmaceutical industry is a high-tech sector and, therefore, its 
competitiveness and dynamics rely on the ability to innovate
7
. The process that leads to an 
innovation starts by developing a new compound that will pass through animal tests before be 
tested in the human population (clinical trials). Based on the results, the institutions of each 
country, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA, or the National Health 
Surveillance Agency [Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária] (ANVISA) in Brazil, could 
approve or not the drug for production and marketing. 
The process that leads to a new drug production is slow, very complex and highly 
regulated. Usually, it takes around ten years for a patent to become a new drug approved. In 
addition, the market regulation for these products brought exclusive features for the 
pharmaceutical industry R&D. There is a clear cut in the pharmaceutical industry’ R&D, this 
allows it to be divided in two: (i) the initial molecules synthesis (drug discovery)-an activity 
                                                 
7
 The enterprises dedicated to the production of generic drugs or firms that are not able to construct medical 
compounds cannot be included in this affirmation.  
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highly focused in science where large enterprises employ their external sources of innovation 
(Gambardella, 1996; Nightingale, 2000; Drews, 2000 and Schweiser, 2005) and (ii) the 
clinical part of the R&D (clinical trials)- a more routinized set of activities in which financial 
strength is essential (Comanor and Scherer, 2013; Gambardella, 1995 and Schwartzan, 1976).  
The R&D clinical trials include several routine procedures that are highly regulated
8
. 
This process has its competitiveness rooted on the company’s ability to perform tasks 
efficiently. The Clinical trials in the USA are regulated by the FDA and it is composed by 3 
phases and one phase after the drug has been commercialized. Phase 1 encompass the drug 
safety and it is focused on the side effects, during this phase the study is conducted in a 
population that ranges from 20 to 80 people. Phase 2 deals with drug effectiveness, at this 
stage the drug is tested over 100’s persons. Phase 3 gather more information about safety and 
effectiveness by testing the drug in a group of 1000’s people. Finally, phase 4 is a post-
marketing monitoring stage. 
The more tests a company conducts, the more efficient it will be. Thus, the learning-
by-doing component, majorly, determine the R&D competitiveness in this stage (Gambardella 
1995 and Schwartzman, 1976). The impact of the new technologies has little effect on the 
clinical trials, and they are difficult to observe. (Gambardella, 1995). 
The opportunity for the companies to introduce innovations during the clinical trials is 
limited, but the ability to use the information is of extreme importance. (Gambardella, 1995; 
Schwartzman, 1976). The R&D clinical part generates relevant information that is utilized in 
the molecules synthesis stage, in order change compounds that are being tested, or to produce 
new medicines. Another important feature, which will be discussed subsequently, is the 
division of the innovative labor between these two R&D stages. While the R&D’s molecular 
synthesis is where new agents play a major role, the clinical stages are solely conducted by 
the Big-Pharma.   
Regarding the technological efforts, it is during the molecule synthesis that the companies 
comprise the main part of their innovative efforts, then, embracing a big part of the 
technological dynamics of this sector. Therefore, the molecule synthesis or drug discovery 
activities are where the processes of technical change can be better observed and analyzed 
(Gambardella 1995 and Nightingale 2000). It is precisely in the drug discovery activities that 
                                                 
8
 For further knowledge about the steps and the typical clinical trial characteristics, please see: Gambardella, 
1995, Schwartzman, 1976, FDA 1999 e FDA 1990 and the sites: www.clinicaltrials.gov  and www.fda.gov 
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companies employ new technologies from different sectors, in a way of seeking and 
producing more NCEs9 (new chemical entities). 
The theoretical base of this study is focused on the molecule synthesis phase. In this 
stage, two major scientific fields, chemistry, and molecular biology, support the drug 
discovery activities. It is well known that the symbiosis between chemistry and 
pharmaceutical industry were highly successful. These two elements together could originate 
the most significant drugs in the twentieth century. However, the chemical trajectory that 
underlines the pharmaceutical industry seems to be facing a research productivity decline
10
 
(Drews, 2000; Nightingale et al., 2007). According to Nightingale et al. (2007), the failure of 
a chemical trajectory can be attested only when one looks at the innovative process, 
especially, the drug discovery activities. Analyzes focused only on innovation, considered as 
the final product, leads to the conclusion that the new compounds are small molecules related 
to the chemistry paradigm, thereby, the innovative process problem became latent 
(Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale et al. 2007 and Nightingale Madhi, 2006; Nightingale and 
Martin, 2007). 
The changes taking place in the pharmaceutical industry are happening, precisely, in 
the drug discovery activities. The technologies and knowledge that lead to innovation, 
nowadays, based on molecular biology, have been playing an important role in drug discovery 
activities. As will be further detailed, biotechnology was elected as a promising kind of 
technology that now is highly used in the search for new medicines. Indeed, new biotech 
companies, which compose the pharmaceutical industry, can be considered as a highly 
specialized industry branch dedicated to drug discovery (Drews, 2000). The birth of this new 
alliance11 between pharmaceutical and biotechnology, have brought many new possibilities 
and ways to build new molecules. 
The new alliance opened several opportunities for the small biotech companies. These 
new enterprises occupy a position where pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, and drug 
                                                 
9
 NCE are the possible candidates for new drugs, that will be tested through clinical trials 
10
 Pharmaceutical’s research productivity can be summarized as the relation between the number of NCE and 
Money spent to produce those (Gassman et al., 2004). 
11 The birth of this alliance could be traced back to invention of the RNA splicing technique in 1980 when 
Cohen and Boyer issued a patent on recombinant DNA. 
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discovery activities overlap. Those small businesses are, precisely, the ones that are 
incorporated into the innovative process of the major pharmaceutical companies. 
 
1.1 The role of science in the pharmaceutical search activities 
 
The drug discovery activities in the pharmaceutical industry have followed a clear path 
of reducing its empirical factor by improving the scientific basis of these activities (Drews, 
2000; Gambardella, 1995; Gassman et al., 2004; Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale and Madhi, 
2006). But, still, the empirical character has a strong effect on the pharmaceutical research. 
The discovery of new molecules is a highly multidisciplinary step (Drews, 2000 OTA 
1991 Schwartzman, 1976 Gambardella, 1995; Gassman et al., 2004), in which exists a mutual 
reinforcement between science and technology. As an outcome of research, experiment results 
- related to the effect of drugs in the human body- can lead to research on metabolism 
mechanism, enzymes production and other subjects. The use of new technological equipment 
enables the conduction of research on the molecules’ structure; whereas, theoretical advances, 
on the causes of diseases or the effect of enzymes, can be a guiding principle for the 
construction of molecules that held specific objectives. The innovative process has not a 
defined beginning, be it in scientific or technological domains, but both co-evolve and 
reinforce themselves (Gambardella, 1995; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Rosenberg, 2006; 
Schawartzman, 1976; Gassman et al., 2004). 
Scientific theories assist the discovery of new drugs as science plays a major role in 
R&D, especially in high technology industries. Science illuminating technology is a 
terminology given, by Nelson (1999), to explain this peculiar way of conducting and making 
R&D. The author attests that science can offer the most promising routes for technological 
development in high technology sectors. 
In a Science Illuminating Technology dynamics, science enables search activities to be 
carried out more efficiently. One can say that science
12
 carries a dual character, which, on one 
                                                 
12
 The scientific theories are ways to understand the nature and attempts to interpret reality, this set of 
"knowledge" sustains the production of new techniques (Mokyr, 1999 and 2002). For Mokyr (2002) techniques 
derived from an abstract knowledge base that encompasses interpretations of how nature works and science is a 
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hand, makes the search activities more focused on enabling research routes with a greater 
chance of success, while, on the other hand, science is a selection environment where search 
paths that do not fit within the existing theoretical framework are eliminated (Nelson, 1999 
and 2006). In short, science changes the selection environment filtering options of search 
activities (Nelson, 2006). Therefore, in high-technology industries, science is of great 
importance for the production of innovations. Science brings with it the ability to prepare 
better hypotheses and makes empiricism more efficient and productive. Indeed, that is the role 
of scientific research in drug discovery activities (Gambardella, 1995; Schwartzman, 1976). 
First, the pharmaceutical industry derived from chemistry its abstract scientific model 
for discovering molecules (Drews, 2000; Gambardella, 1995 and Schwartzman, 1976). In the 
1930s, the discovery of molecules and their handling were highly based on the principles 
established by the theories arising from the discovery of the benzene’s molecular structure, 
which made room for the use and manipulation of tar and coal as raw materials in drug 
production (Drews, 2000). 
However, the scientific advance brought by Ehrlich’s theory of similarities enabled a 
new way of conceiving the construction and action of pharmaceutical components. Ehrlich's 
research postulated the existence of affinities between elements that determines how they bind 
chemically. Similarly, based on the theory proposed by Ehrlich, microorganisms, and cells 
possess chemical receptors that binds. These binding processes form a similar system to a 
lock and key device (Drews, 2000; Gambardella, 1995; Grabowski and Vernon, 1982; 
Schwartzman, 1976). Following Ehrlich’s theory of affinities, when one expands the 
understanding of a single "lock", probably this allow the construction of a unique "key" for it. 
The scientific theory enables the empiricism reduction in drug discovery activities, 
because, when used as the meaning of understanding the pathological agent, the development 
of medicines becomes more focused. The Ehrlich's theory did not eliminate empiricism in 
                                                                                                                                                        
growing part of this abstract knowledge, this means, that the knowledge base composition is always changing as 
science replaces certain nonscientific knowledge pieces. 
In his study, Mokyr (2002), understands that major events, such as, the spread of Baconian methods of making 
science and the seventeenth century scientific revolution were moments in which science began to spread and to 
replaces bits of nonscientific knowledge among the abstract knowledge base. After these events, the second 
industrial revolution has consolidate this process, as new economic sectors arose from scientific fields, such as, 
chemistry and modern pharmaceuticals (Landes, 1969). 
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drug discovery, but it allowed the development of the better hypothesis, concerning how 
components react in certain pathogens cell receptors. What was seen so far is the relation 
between scientific advance and its use on R&D. This process was a cycle where the progress 
of chemistry was incorporated by the drug discovery activities turning into a more efficient 
operation, therefore following a Science Illuminating Technology dynamics. 
 
1.2 Drug discovery techniques before the biotechnology 
 
1.2.1 Random screening, empiricism and science in drug discovery 
During the 1930s, the pharmaceutical industry started to institutionalize its R&D. In 
the same decade, the industry, as a whole, had also established an R&D department entirely 
dedicated to search activities, which worked in an independent way, whose primary objective 
was to innovate (Mowery, 2006). 
The R&D organization in the pharmaceutical industry brought a systematic way to 
innovate, carried out by the use of random screening methodology. This technique consists of 
testing all possible molecules endlessly in the search for the desired therapeutic effects 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1982; Gambardella, 1995; Schwartzman, 1976). Random screening 
is a drug discovery method that combines empiricism to scientific advances, whose acme 
occurred between the 1940s and 1950s and produced excellent results, given the number of 
NCE generated at the time (see graphic 1.1, pg. 40). 
The random screening success enabled the development of antibiotics and 
antihistamines, which were the set of innovations that defined the industry in the 1930s 
(Achilladelis and Antonakis, 2001). In 1935, at the I.G. Farbeindustrie’s laboratory, was 
discovered that the red dye had a strong action against a particular kind of bacterial infection 
in mice. After repeated manipulation in the original red dye molecule, it was built, through 
trial and error, a new efficient molecule against bacteria, whose side effects to the kidneys 
were significantly lower than the original red dye molecule (Schwartzman, 1976 and Drews 
2000). This process resulted in the invention of sulfonamides.   
Even though the random screening was a highly advanced technique at the time, it is, 
still, a highly empirical method. The discovery of an antibiotic through random screening 
requires numerous attempts. To achieve an efficient sulfonamide 5,000 molecules were tested 
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(Vernon and Grabowsky, 1982), also, "Erlich is said to have synthesized 605 compounds 
before preparing his syphilis remedy"(Schwartzman, 1976, pg 40). In addition, Schwatrzman 
(1976) shows the impressive example of Leerdele Laboratories, which tested 103,000 
chemical compounds to get only a clue of an active compound against tuberculosis, following 
that clue, the company tested another 600 compounds to achieve an efficient product. Indeed, 
the empiricism allied with a continuous trial and error dynamics were the main characteristic 
of random screening technology.  
Although highly laborious, the results obtained through random screening outweighed 
any economic cost within this technique (Gambardella, 1995 Schwartzman, 1976; Vernon and 
Grabowsky, 1982). The whole process had the principle of a "molecular roulette" with a high 
success rate (Nightingale et al. 2007). But, in the 1960s, this procedure started to show some 
exhaustion, and therefore productivity declined (see graphic 1.1, pg. 40) (Schwartzman, 1976; 
Grabowsky and Vernon, 2000; Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale et al. 2007; Gambardella, 
1995; Vernon and Grabowsky, 1982). To solve the drop in random screening’s productivity, 
companies sought to increase the efficiency of drug discovery methods (Nightingale, 2000). 
One possible way to increase the efficiency of drug discovery activities was narrow 
the potential candidates by building better hypothesis on how the new compounds would 
attack the disease. In other words, the industry tried to make the random screening less 
empirical and complement it with other techniques. The pharmaceutical industry sought to 
reduce the empiricism of its methods by increasing the importance of science as an element in 
the drug discovery activities. Indeed, scientific advances allow a better understanding of the 
disease and enable a more efficient design of molecules. However, this process is not obvious 
and much less direct. 
1.2.2 The discovery by design as an attempt to increase the efficiency in drug discovery 
activities. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the pharmaceutical industry witnessed a period of 
low R&D productivity (see graphic 1.1, pg. 40) (Schwartzman, 1976; Grabowsky and 
Vernon, 2000) associated with rising costs for developing new molecules (Grabowsky and 
Vernon, 2000). In this context, the answer sought by pharmaceutical companies was to 
develop ways to design a "perfect" molecule for the desired purposes, instead of randomly test 
numerous candidates. Thus, the Discovery by Design was developed (Grabowsky and 
Vernon, 1982; Gambardella, 1995). 
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The Discovery by design did not mean the end of empiricism in pharmaceutical 
research (Gambardella, 1995; Nightingale, 2000). However, this new method brought closer 
the activities of drug discovery and science (Gambardella, 1995; Grabowski and Vernon, 
1982 and 2000). The Discovery by design allowed to design and built a component 
considering the needed purposes to be achieved, i.e. a molecule was designed to fit perfectly 
to a cell receptor. Therefore, in a drug by design approach, the ability to build better drugs 
relates, closely, to the understanding of how chemical receptors bind. 
This new process allowed an increasing efficiency of existing feedback between 
theory and experiment, as the failures and successes could be judged in the light of theoretical 
advances (Gambardella, 1995). According to Gambardella (1995), the discovery by design 
enables 
“[e]xperiments become more informative, as observations can be 
interpreted using better theoretical frameworks; researchers can associate 
observations about different phenomena, or they can relate observations to more 
general classes of phenomena. In turn, this often helps in perfecting and refining 
theories"(Gambardella, 1995, pg. 24) 
The foundations that supported the development and improvement of discovery by design 
traced back from advances in biology. The double helix discovery in the 1950s, and advances 
in the theory of cell receptors, that date back on the first findings made by Ehrlich on the 
theory of affinities. This approach broaden the understanding of how a molecule binds to a 
cell. The binding effects and its structures generate a different way of seeing and treating the 
diseases (Drews, 2000; Gambardella, 1995; Grabowsky and Vernon, 1982; Nightingale and 
Madhi, 2006 McKelvey, 1987). 
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BOX 1-  TAGAMET EXAMPLE 
As an illustrative example brought by the advance of the discovery by design, 
one can cite the drug for ulcers, developed by SmithKline
13
, called Tagamet. This drug 
opened the way for the construction of some new medicines based on the discovery by 
design technology (Grabowsky and Vernon 2000). The Tagamet was constructed for 
blocking histamine H2 receptor, responsible for activating the acid excretion in the 
stomach, which in turn causes ulcers (Gambardella, 1995; Grabowsky and Vernon, 
2000). The research that leads to the development of Tagamet was originated from the 
understanding that histamine produced by cells stimulated acid secretion in the stomach. 
To deal with this problem, a compound that could block these cell receptors and shut 
down the process of producing histamine was developed (Gambardella, 1995; 
Grabowsky and Vernon, 2000). 
 
Authors such as Grabowsky and Vernon (1982) analyzed the sector, at the time the 
discovery by design was spreading. Based on the work of these authors, there was an apparent 
change in the way of building new molecules brought by this new technique. 
“In old days, the chemists would make a batch of compounds and send 
them over to the biologists to put into animals to see what would happen. In 
contrast, today [1979] the biologists ask the chemists to design molecules to 
accomplish particular effects” (Grabowsky and Vernon, 1982, pg. 308) 
This quote refers to an interview given by Dr. William IH Shedden
14
 for Business Week in 
1979. This paragraph written by Grabowsky and Vernon (1982) highlights some essential 
elements for the technological development of the pharmaceutical industry. In just a few 
sentences, two important turning points in the pharmaceutical industry are highlighted. The 
first one is the empirical factor decrease in new molecule construction, when one mentioned 
that a drug is specifically designed for a purpose. Through discovery by design, it is possible 
to define "a priori" how molecules and compounds will bind, as a way to attack the cause of 
the disease. The second important point is the rise of biology as a major theoretical field in 
drug discovery. This quote clearly shows that biology and chemistry linked themselves into 
                                                 
13
 In 2000 Smithkline Beecham and GlaxoWellcome merged, the new enterprise became GlaxoSmithkline. 
14
 Dr. William I. H. Shedden was the vice-president of clinical avaliation at Eli Lilly. 
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the industry’s innovative process. Such fact turned biology on an important academic field in 
drug discovery, particularly, in the areas concerning the causes of diseases. 
The discovery by design represents a breakthrough in the pharmaceutical industry that 
enables the incorporation of theoretical advances in the enterprises’ search activities. The 
pharmaceutical industry proves to be a highly dynamic sector, capable of incorporating into 
its R&D numerous technologies from different industries. This process makes R&D more 
efficient, but those activities became increasingly sophisticated. 
For example, the use of computers with greater processing capacity and more 
advanced software enable the creation of 3-D molecules models. The ability to see the cell 
structure and their receptors makes easier to drawn compounds, which must fit in the desired 
receptors (Gambardella 1995). Another significant advance, brought by the advances in 
computing, was the construction of algorithms that simulate the target (enzymes, proteins, 
cellular receptors, pathogens) response to components (prototype drug). These simulated 
experiments (in silico) allow a better selection of molecules, a reduction in cost and an 
increase in the volume of experiments (Nightingale, 2000). The computer models enabled the 
discovery by design creation and made it more efficient. Nevertheless, the use of 3-D 
modeling and simulations raise the costs of R&D and made computing capabilities prominent 
in drug discovery activities, making R&D even more complicated.  
Drug discovery activities, as was shown so far, is a multidisciplinary activity, whose 
evolution is carried out by the incorporation of new technologies and scientific advances. This 
process confirms the complexity of drug discovery activity as can be seen in the diagram 
below:  
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Figure 1: Technologies used for drug discovery activities 
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The picture above shows that the drug discovery activity is at all times supplemented 
with new technologies. The new technologies incorporated into this process have brought a 
greater reliance on science in guiding drug discovery activities. This fact becomes more 
visible considering the incorporation of biotechnology in the innovation process. 
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by the development of specific 
technologies in specific periods, whose effects can be observed in the industry organization as 
BOX 2: High-Throughput-Screening (HTS) 
As a prominent example of technology, that was derived from biology and applied 
for the search of new molecules, is the High-Throughput-Screening (HTS) (Hopkins et al 
2007). The HTS is the automation of random screening that allows companies to test more 
components in a very short time (Nightingale, 2000). According to Houston and Banks 
(1997) before HTS an enterprise could possibly check 75000 components of the same class 
for 20 targets. The HTS allowed testing a million components, within a class, for 100 
targets. The HTS was a breakthrough among techniques to test components. It is a standard 
technology that increased the scale in the drug discovery process, as it enhances the 
number of candidates for new medicines. Yet, this technology was unable to improve the 
quality of components (Nightingale 2000 Nightingale and Madhi 2006; Gassman et al., 
2004). 
The HTS
1
 development revealed another problem in the pharmaceutical industry 
process that was related to the ability to construct higher quality components (Nightingale, 
2000). Despite HTS’s outcome in increasing the number of possible drug candidates, many 
of these elements proved unworkable in toxicity testing, efficacy, among others. 
The answer found to overcome the compounds quality problem arose from the 
development of another biotechnology technique called combinatorial chemistry, which 
allows, for the same molecular structure devise numerous components, thus scaling ups the 
production of molecules (Nightingale, 2000; Gassaman et al., 2004). The HTS and 
combinatorial chemistry are diverse source technologies used to develop new drugs. The 
HTS significantly increases the ability of companies to test molecules and components for 
diseases and combinatorial chemistry improves the quality of the components tested by 
HTS.  
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a whole. Thus, it is possible to deduce that each new set of innovations involves the use of 
different scientific fields and different technologies, both distinct from previous 
innovations. This fact largely changes the way the industry behaves (Achilladelis and 
Antonakis, 2001). 
 
1.3 The advent of biotechnology as a technology for drug discovery 
 
So far, this study has discussed how drug discovery activities have reduced its 
empirical character and became more complex by encompassing different research 
methodologies, which were originated in diverse theoretical fields and sectors. Finally, 
biotechnology has brought a new impetus to R&D through various ways of searching for new 
drugs and further expanding the research scope of pharmaceutical companies. 
Before understanding how biotechnology became a conventional drug discovery 
technology it is necessary to define biotechnology as a technology that could be used for drug 
discovery activities. Such definition must take into account the development of biotechnology 
as new in time. Said that, biotechnology could be conceptualized as "the application of 
biological organisms, systems and processes to manufacturing or services sectors" (Acard, 
1980). This definition can be part of biotechnology definition, but this statement, solely, 
makes biotechnology, as one of the oldest techniques in the world, for any fermentation 
process (such as the production of beer or wine) could be named biotechnology. Such broad 
view of biotechnology brings difficulties for this study, especially, when one tries to analyze 
the impact of these technologies on modern innovative and productive processes. However, 
an excessive restriction on the concept makes biotechnology so specific that its actual effect 
on the innovative and processes are put aside. So, this study looked at a concept that is not 
overly broad as well as overly restrictive. Thus, biotechnology was defined as the possible 
technologies from the application of biological organisms, systems and processes to 
manufacturing or services sectors obtained through the discovery of the DNA double helix. 
With this concept in mind, biotechnology respects the principles established by molecular 
biology in the same way that machines work under the principles established by physics and 
chemistry. 
The cornerstone in the development of biotechnology was the establishment of 
molecular biology as a scientific field (Kenney, 1987). This process began in the 1930s when 
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attempts to turn biology into a typical Western Science by incorporating the same rigor as 
shown in chemistry and physics (McKelvey, 1987). As a result, molecular biology has 
established itself as a scientific field capable of generating knowledge in a systematic way 
respecting the standards established of Western Science. Molecular biology became a 
scientific paradigm, following Kuhn’s (1963) scientific paradigm theory, as this theoretical 
field was able to explain scientific problems inherent in biology, in which the new 
assumptions construction allowed to build a significant academic scientific advancement. 
The molecular biology’s scientific paradigm establishment was enabled when a 
theoretical model of DNA was proposed. The discovery of the double helix by Watson and 
Crick in 1953 was "the triumph of molecular biology and the signal that it had arrived as a 
discipline."(Kenney, 1987, pg. 19). The creation of a theoretical model for molecular biology 
was seen as vital for sustaining a continuous technical advancement, according to the theory 
of Useful Knowledge proposed by Mokyr (2002). 
Techniques based on molecular biology enable the genetic alteration, introduction of 
genes into organisms and ability to divide and to construct DNA sequences in vitro (Martin, 
1999). The molecular biology as well as physics and chemistry, brought the tools that might 
be used in the discovery, understanding and treatment of diseases (Kenney, 1987), these 
features were pointed out by Schwartzman (1976) as essential for advancing the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
"(…)[W]hile much progress toward understanding normal and diseased cell 
functions has been made, vast unknown areas remain, including the molecular basis 
for most of our serious diseases. Because the necessary theories have been 
missing, pharmaceutical research has had to rely on setting up working hypothesis 
based on laboratory and clinical observations (…) applying chemical and biological 
principles to develop useful drugs requires bridging large gaps in the theoretical 
framework”(Schwartzman, 1976, pg.45, emphasis added) 
This conclusion brought by Schwartzman (1976) becomes even more appealing when it is 
analyzed in the light of the theory proposed by Mokyr (2002). 
Mokyr (2002) states that technological development depends on a solid abstract 
knowledge base. The relationship between technical and conceptual knowledge that allows 
sustaining long periods of technological advancement (Mokyr, 2002). Advances in the early 
period of the pharmaceutical industry came from chemistry and to a lesser extent of physics. 
In the 1930s, these two theoretical fields were well established and developed in Western 
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science. The consolidation of them enabled creating long waves of technological advance 
characterizing the second industrial revolution (Mokyr, 2002 and Landes 1969). 
However, a molecular basis for understanding diseases depends on the foundation of 
molecular biology, as a scientific field. This fact occurred in 1950, fostered by the discovery 
of the DNA double helix structure. The double helix established a theoretical model for 
molecular biology. Thus, biotechnology, which was derived from molecular biology, could 
only start its advance in the pharmaceutical industry from the 1950s onwards. 
The first step in the establishment of a biotechnology-based industry was given in 
1973 by the possibility of transferring organism’s genetic material through plasmids15, rather 
than using special types of virus. This technique, that paved the way for gene therapy and new 
ways to fight pathogens, was considered “(…) the simple pivotal event in the transformation 
of the ‘basic’ science of molecular biology into an industry” (Kenney, 1987, pg. 23). Thus, 
the constitution of genetic engineering could only be glimpsed with the advent of the double 
helix and the development of gene transfer techniques (Martin, 1999; Kenney, 1987). 
1.3.1 Biotechnology and biology related technologies for the drug discovery activities 
As a technological alternative, biotechnology offers two technological trajectories
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for enterprises (Henderson et al. 1999 and Gisling and Noteboon, 2006). One is the use of 
biotechnology to develop and produce drugs, requiring a drastic change in technologies for 
production and forcing the industry to develop and build new production capacities. This path 
would mean a radical change in the current technological trajectory, setting a –or a choice 
towards a- competence destroying alternative (Henderson et al. 1999 and Gisling and 
Noteboon, 2006). Although some drugs based on this trajectory have been successful, such as, 
Humulin the insulin developed in partnership between the Eli-Lilly and Genetech, there are 
not many drugs that have been produced and discovered based solely on biotechnology 
(Gassman et al., 2004; Hopkins et al., 2007). 
The second trend is the use of biotechnology as a tool – or methodology – for new 
molecules design with a, possible, high rate chance of creating active components 
(Gambardella, 1995; Gisling and Noteboon, 2006; Henderson et al. 1999; Nightingale, 2000; 
Powell et al.; Santos, 2003; among others). This trajectory is not competence destroying and 
                                                 
15
 Plasmids are DNA molecules capable of reproducing chromosomal DNA independently.  
16
 According to Dosi (1988, pg 9) technological trajectories are “the activity of technological process along the 
economic and technological trade-offs defined by a paradigm” 
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enables the use of new research technologies in addition to those already existing in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Thus, biotechnology as a new methodology can increase the 
pharmaceutical industry ability to generate possible candidates for new components (Gisling 
and Noteboon, 2006; Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale and Madhi, 2006; Powell et al., 1996; 
Santos, 2003). 
The creation of a new paradigm entirely based on biotechnology techniques has not 
fulfilled yet. Most studies on biotechnology conducted in the 1970s and 1980s gave for 
granted the overcoming of the old Big-Pharma by the new pharmaceutical companies and 
small biotech companies, thus, characterizing a typical creative destruction process
17
. 
However, this did not happen and biotechnology was merged into pharmaceutical industry as 
has happened before with different technologies.  
The pharmaceutical industry evolution showed that this sector is highly efficient and 
fast to incorporate new technologies into their search activities and therefore to build a typical 
technological trajectory for these newly combined techniques. As it happened with 
biotechnology, that has established itself as a technology dedicated to drug discovery (Drews, 
2000). 
Biotechnology as a research method enables economies of scale and scope in the 
pharmaceutical industry R&D (Nightingale, 2000), however, until now, little was achieved 
compared to the expectations generated by the incorporation of biotechnology to the sector 
(Hopkins et al. 2007; Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale and Madhi, 2006 and Nightingale and 
Martin, 2004). Several studies have addressed the issue, driven by the prospect of success in 
scientific and technological terms contained in the evolution of biotechnology. Some studies 
pointed that the end of small technology-based companies, through a Schumpeterian 
competition process, would lead to the establishment of a well-defined technological 
trajectory (Sharp, 1985 and Orsenigo, 1989). However, the competition still occurs in the 
Schumpeterian patterns, but small businesses have not been eliminated. In addition, 
biotechnology has been unable, so far, to generate a typical technological trajectory and to 
increase the generation of new molecules in the pharmaceutical industry (Hopkins et al. 2007 
and Nightingale and Madhi, 2006). 
                                                 
17
 The concept of Creative destruction was conceived by Schumpeter (1942) in his book Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy. Creative destruction is an outcome of radical innovations that create new ways of conceiving 
and producing new or existent goods. In that process the “old way” is destroy and replaced by the “new way” 
being destructive and creative at the same time. 
35 
 
The success of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry is evident when one 
observes its use for drug discovery (Drews, 2000, Hopkins et al. 2007). Biotechnology has 
established itself as an "industry" dedicated to drug discovery. Its adaptation to this type of 
activity was successful especially regarding the technology and knowledge appropriation 
conducted by large pharmaceutical companies. 
The incorporation of biotechnology means that the molecular synthesis is facing an 
evolution process that encompasses its increasing reliance on science.  
"[The] discovery process begins on the scale of the gene often demanding 
molecular biology to connect [the gene] human disease and determine the function 
of these same genes ... So the drug discovery underwent a change towards molecular 
biology computing and genomic science in recent years." (Schimid et al., 2001, pg 
42) 
This statement makes clear the dependence that pharmaceutical companies have the 
knowledge and skills derived from biotechnology for its drug discovery activities. Nowadays, 
Big-Pharma that do not hold expertise in biotechnology are unable to develop new medicines. 
The study by Nigtingale (2000) and Nigtingale and Madhi (2006) show the attempt to 
"automate" the process of drug discovery by enhancing productivity technologies, for 
example, HTS. Also, according to Nightingale and Mahi (2006), the process of R&D 
industrialization encompass the use of biotechnology, therefore,  
"The shift towards an R&D model based on finding products for specific 
markets relies on exploiting scientific understanding of the biology of disease to 
select specific targets that small molecules drugs can be targeted 
against”(Nightingale and Madhi, 2006, pg. 86) 
The constant advances in drug discovery activities thus show a continuous use of science to 
improve these activities. 
1.3.2 The Human Genome Project 
The most promising advance in biotechnology was brought by the Human Genome 
Project (HGP), which was a significant research effort, undertaken from 1991 to 2003. The 
HGP aimed to decode the human genetic sequence. This research effort was a milestone in 
how biotechnology could be useful by the pharmaceutical industry (McKelvy and Orsenigo, 
2001 and Quéré, 2004). 
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HGP carried with it the theoretical advances about diseases that now are understood as 
interactions between genes, proteins, and enzymes. Advances in this path were achieved by 
further progress in the biological theories of diseases and how interactions between genes, 
enzymes and proteins could occur and propagate (Nightingle and Martin, 2006). As an 
outcome, the HGP enable the opportunity of economically exploiting compounds that directly 
affect these interactions and, therefore, change the way diseases were diagnosed and treated 
(McKelvy and Orsenigo, 2001 and Quéré, 2004). In sum,  
“The HGP results in various economics opportunities defined as the PGE 
[post genome era].A major characteristic of the PGE is that knowledge accumulation 
is no longer driven by large international corporations or small academic start-ups, 
but by complex interactive and changing sets mixing public research institutions, 
large international companies, academic start-ups and even consumer association” 
(Quéré, 2004, pg 83) 
The HGP is an evolution in biotechnology whose development took place outside the 
pharmaceutical companies. Nowadays, pharmaceutical enterprises come to depend more and 
more on biotech companies, which have been increasing their competencies for drug 
discovery. Therefore, the development and application of this new set of tools were done 
through partnerships between businesses (Martin et al., 2011). 
The vast range of technologies for drug discovery and the vast diversity of actors that 
hold competencies for those technologies enables the large pharmaceutical companies to 
access a large technology market, in which those companies behave as co-developers or 
buyers. As a research effort that allows for the creation of a new set of technologies, the HGP 
has established the infrastructure in which molecular biology dedicated to genetic was linked 
into solving important aspects of pharmaceutical industry problems (Martin et al., 2011). This 
process enhanced the interaction between large pharmaceutical companies and small 
biotechnology companies (Quéré, 2004 and Martin et al., 2011). 
According to Martin et al. 2011, the fast evolution of genomics and its appropriation 
by the pharmaceutical industry allowed the commercial exploitation of several applications 
which are: (i) DNA sequencing to encode proteins with therapeutic application; (ii) 
sequencing of DNA for encoding protein targets of monoclonal antibodies; (iii) DNA 
sequencing to encode proteins that may be targets for small molecule drug; (iv) DNA 
sequencing for diagnosis of diseases; (v) nucleotides that inhibit the expression of a gene; (vi) 
genetic sequences that can be inserted or replaced in the human body to correct diseases (gene 
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therapy). All these technological paths (Nightingale, 1998 and Nightingale, 2000) were 
encompassed by the opportunities offered by the HGP. Thus, all these technologies are based 
on molecular biology and the understanding of the relation between genotype and phenotype, 
i.e., are focused on how genes may express disease in humans. 
There is a new way to deal with diseases that start on their understanding as a genetic 
code expression; this means a transparent approach to science and a departure from 
empiricism in the pharmaceutical research. The interaction between science and search 
activities is patent in the pharmaceutical industry. Currently, the inputs needed for conducting 
search activities are linked to the understanding of the genetic mechanisms that generate 
disease (Gambardella, 1995; Gassman et al., 2004; Quéré, 2004; Nigtingale, 2000; 
Nightingale and Madhi, 2006; Martin et al., 2011 ). 
This process of greater adherence to abstract knowledge and technique enables the 
expansion of science to open paths that can be commercially exploited. In this context, the 
new specialized companies occupy opportunities as specialized providers of technologies 
dedicated to a particular sector, as happened to biotechnology and drug discovery activities. 
Therefore, biotechnology used by the pharmaceutical industry is highly specialized 
and dedicated to drug discovery activities. Part of the small biotech companies form a highly 
specialized sector, which drew the attention of the large pharmaceutical companies in their 
search to increase productivity and the efficiency of their search activities. 
The investment in these new technologies occurs differently from the way they were 
conducted research in past decades. As pointed by Schwartzman (1976), the pharmaceutical 
industry innovative process between the 1930s and the 1970s was carried out by the 
companies in a "lonely" way; the company was able to build competencies for technologies 
efficiently, especially when drug discovery was mainly based on chemistry. Currently, the 
process of R&D industrialization (Nigtingale and Madhi, 2006) allows a greater interaction 
between science and technology and the establishment of biotechnology as a drug discovery 
industry. These facts led big business to add new actors to its innovative process. 
The genomic advance reinforces the path of increasing complexity that encompasses 
the drug discovery activities (see Figure 1). In this cycle technological progress is 
technologically appropriated by the pharmaceutical companies, therefore, it may increase 
the search activities productivity, as a result broadening the treatment mechanisms and, 
at the same time, increasing the drug search activities complexity. In this context, there is a 
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need for specialized companies to participate in the innovative process of the big company, 
due to the impossibility of any enterprise to handle such complex and diverse activity 
(Gassamn et al., 2004; Martin et al., 2011; Quéré 2004). In the end, the HGP gave a new 
boost for the creation of new enterprises by creating new technological paths capable of 
bearing several small specialized biotech enterprises. 
The incorporation of small biotechnology firms by major pharmaceutical company 
through realization of external R&D is a movement already observed by Martin et al. (2011), 
for these authors, 
"[a]s a result of growth in externally supported R&D, a new networked 
industrial structure has evolved, dominated by large firms this facilitates the rapid 
growth in the number of small biotech and genomics forms seeking to discover new 
drugs since the 1980s”(Martin et al., 2011, pg 153)  
So far, biotechnology has brought new impetus to the pharmaceutical industry, but only this 
“push” is not enough to explain the incorporation of small businesses to the innovative 
process of large companies. The pharmaceutical industry organization evolution must be 
analyzed in light of the continuous changes that the sector has experienced over the years. 
Thus, the drug discovery process always renews itself, when it incorporates new 
technologies, that increase productivity, and through scientific advances, that makes easier the 
design more active molecules. In contrast, the incorporation of new technologies, makes the 
activity more complex and the discovery process more costly (Gambardella, 1995 
Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale and Madhi 2006; Nightingale et al. 2007 and 2011; 
Schwartzman, 1976).  
The various technologies used in drug discovery are associated with increased 
productivity periods in the pharmaceutical industry, measured by the registered NCE. As a 
way to summarize the technologies discussed in this chapter is presented in the next chart: 
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Graphic 1.1: Number of NCE’s per year and the leading technologies used in 
each period 
 
Source: Elaboration based on USPTO NCE data 
The graphic above shows that the NCE behave cyclically and that new technologies 
can increase the number of registered entities. This same graphic shows that biotechnology by 
itself is not enough to bring back the number of NCE to old patterns. As stressed by 
Nightingale and Martin (2007) the outcomes of biotechnology were not as successful as 
predicted in the 1980s. A technological analysis can be confusing. As indicated in the graphic 
above, the biotechnologies have increased the number of NCE in the recent years. However, 
biotechnology efficiency cannot be analyzed alone. To have some conclusions about its 
effectiveness, the NCE approval must be analyzed in comparison with other variables like (i) 
costs; (ii) number of patents; (iii) NCE novelty; and other elements.  
Until this point, we can attest that biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry 
interact in their R&D activities, where biotechnology is used as a new technology for 
drug discovery. However, there is only an expectation that the utilization of these new 
technologies could enhance the industry’s productivity by bringing new technological 
results such as new compounds, technologies, and patents. 
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The pharmaceutical industry in an attempt to overcome its productivity problems 
search for solutions in technology by incorporating biotechnology competencies to their drug 
discovery activities but, at the same time, this industry is changing the way it is organized. In 
that sense, the dependence of the large pharmaceutical companies involves a context that goes 
beyond the technological evolution. To achieve a deeper understanding of the dependence of 
the large pharmaceutical companies on the small biotech companies, it is necessary to analyze 
the evolution of how the pharmaceutical industry is organized. 
 
1.4 The pharmaceutical industry organization after the development of biotechnology 
 
The incorporation of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry is not a purely 
technological phenomenon. This process is linked to changes in the way the global industry is 
organized. The Big-Pharma in a movement of decentralizing its research activities resort to 
external sources of innovation, mainly, biotech start-up in an attempt to enhance its drug 
discovery activities. However, technological and organizational changes in the pharmaceutical 
industry occurred at the same time, so, it is impossible to attest that one lead to another. 
Therefore, in this study these two changes occupy separate sections.     
The previous sections of this chapter were focused on the technological history of the 
pharmaceutical industry, encompassing the evolution of drug discovery activities. The next 
sections will comprise the organizational changes that happened in the pharmaceutical 
industry after the creation of a biotechnology sector specialized in drug discovery 
technologies.  
The continuous change in the pharmaceutical industry can be better stated by showing 
the industry structure. This whole study is focused on the initial stages of R&D, therefore the 
sector structure that will be shown encompass the new chemical entities (NCEs) that is the 
first step into producing a new medicine, those entities are the ones that have a higher 
probability to become an innovation and therefore are the more promising outputs in the 
initial stage of R&D. 
In the series of studies conducted by Grabowski and Vernon (1977, 1982, 1994 and 
2000) the authors show that the innovation is highly concentrated in the pharmaceutical 
industry, as shown in the next table. 
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Table 1.1: Trends in the innovative outputs 
  
Periods 
1957-61 1962-66 1967-71 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 
Total number of new 
chemical entities (NCE's) 
233 93 76 45 55 67 73 
Number of firms having an 
NCE 
51 34 23 26 29 32 36 
Concentration 
ratios of 
innovational 
outputs*: 
4-firms 46.2% 54.6% 61.3% 57.8% 65.7% 48% 49.1% 
8-firms 71.2% 78.9% 81.5% 75.6% 81.1% 64.8% 69.5% 
20-
firms 
93.2% 97.7% 98.55 98.7% 98.2 92.2% 93.9% 
* Innovation output is measured as new chemical entity sales during the first three years of product introduction.  
Source: adapted from Grabowski and Vernon (1994) 
The table above clearly shows how the outputs of R&D are concentrated, over the 
years the number of enterprises responsible for producing innovations were reducing and 
therefore concentrating the innovative output around fewer enterprises. Not only that, but, the 
20 leading enterprises in NCEs approvals are the ones that appropriate almost all sales from 
the innovation, showing great first-to-move advantages.  
The next table show the leaders in terms of innovative outputs, the 17 most innovative 
firms in the industry are responsible for producing 76,5% of the total innovative output.  
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Table 1.2: NCEs distribution from 1963 to 1999  
Firms new chemical entities 
(NCEs) Approved in the US 
from 1963 to 1999  
Number 
of NCEs 
Percentage 
of all NCE 
American home Products 45  6.5%  
Bristol-Myers Squibb 43  6.2% 
Roche 41  5.9%  
Aventis 38  5.5%  
Pharmacia & Upjohn 38  5.5 % 
Merck 36  5.2%  
Novartis 36  5.2% 
Glaxo Wellcome 35  5.1% 
SmithKline Beecham 34  4.9% 
Johnson & Johnson 32  4.6% 
Lilly 31  4.5% 
Pfizer 27  3.9% 
Schreing-Plough 21  3.0% 
Warner-Lambert 21  3.0% 
Abbott 18  2.6% 
Astrazeneca 18  2.6% 
Bayer 14  2.0% 
Total 528 76,2% 
Source: DiMasi, 2000, pg 1174. 
A deeper analyses in the industry will also show that besides the innovative output 
being concentrated it also concentrated among therapeutic areas as shown by the next table.  
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Table 1.3: Leading Firms in the number of US NECs approvals from 1963-1999 by therapeutic category 
Analgesic/Anesthetic 
  
Anti-infective 
  
Antineoplastic 
  
Cardiovascular 
 
Central Nervous System 
Enterprise NCEs Enterprise NCEs Enterprise NCEs Enterprise NCEs Enterprise NCEs 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
8 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
15 
Bristol-
Myers 
Squibb 
13 Merck 14 
American 
Home Products 
12 
Glaxo 
Wellcome 
7 
Glaxo 
Wellcome 
14 
Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
9 
American 
Home 
Products 
12 Aventis 8 
American 
Home Products 
6 Lilly 13 AstraZeneca 4 Aventis 8 Novartis 8 
AstraZeneca 5 Roche 12 Roche 4 Novartis 8 Roche 7 
Merck 5 
SmithKline-
Beechman 
12 Aventis 3 
Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
8 Abbott 5 
Roche 5 Pfizer 11 
Glaxo 
Wellcome 
3 Pfizer 6 Lilly 5 
Akzo Nobel 4 
American 
Home 
Products 
10 Novartis 3 
SmithKline-
Beechman 
6 Pfizer 5 
BOC Group 4 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
8 
  
BASF 5 
Warner-
Lambert 
5 
    Aventis 7 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
5 
Glaxo-
Wellcome 
4 
  
Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
7 Lilly 5 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
4 
  
Warner-
Lambert 
7 Roche 5 
SmithKline-
Beechman 
4 
  
Merck 6 Abbott 4 
  
  
Schering-
Plough 
6 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
4 
Source: DiMasi, 2000, pg. 477.
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Another significant fact about the structural changes in the pharmaceutical industry are 
the M&A. Since 1999 (last year shown at the table) several M&A have happen, those mergers 
have changed and further concentrated the sector’s innovative output. Therefore, by updating 
the table above one can see how the sector became even more concentrated. The main M&A 
that happen encompassing the enterprises presented in the table above were: (i) the acquisition 
of Warner-Lambert, Pharmacia and American Home products by Pfizer, respectively, in 2000, 
2003 and 2009; (ii) Glaxo Wellcome has merged with SmithKline Beechman in 2000; (ii) 
Sanofi has merged with Aventis in 2004 and (iii) Merck has acquired Shering-Plough in 2009.  
Those M&A have changed the industry structures. Through M&A the industry became 
more concentrated. By merging the large pharmaceutical industry were able to enter in new 
therapeutic areas that they were not consolidated before. The most interesting case is Pfizer 
that after its aggressive policy of M&As became relevant in more therapeutic areas, as shown 
in the next table. 
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Table 1.4: Leading Firms in the number of US NECs approvals from 1963-1999 by therapeutic category, updated according to 
the M&A after 1999 
 
 
 
 
Analgesic/Anesthetic 
 
Anti-infective 
 
Antineoplastic 
 
Cardiovascular 
 
Central Nervous System 
Enterprise NCEs 
 
Enterprise NCEs 
 
Enterprise NCEs 
 
Enterprise NCEs 
 
Enterprise NCEs 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
8 
 
Pfizer 28 
 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
13 
 
Merck 14 
 
Pfizer 22 
GSK 7 
 
GSK 26 
 
Pfizer 9 
 
Pfizer 26 
 
GSK 9 
Pfizer 6 
 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
15 
 
AstraZeneca 4 
 
Sanofi-
Aventis 
8 
 
Sanofi-Aventis 8 
AstraZeneca 5 
 
Lilly 13 
 
Roche 4 
 
Novartis 8 
 
Novartis 8 
Merck 5 
 
Merck 12 
 
Sanofi 3 
 
GSK 6 
 
Roche 7 
Roche 5 
 
Roche 12 
 
GSK 3 
 
BASF 5 
 
Abbott 5 
Akzo Nobel 4 
 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
8 
 
Novartis 3 
 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
5 
 
Lilly 5 
BOC Group 4 
 
Sanofi-Aventis 7 
 
    
 
Lilly 5 
 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
4 
                  Roche 5       
                  Abbott 4       
    
              
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
4 
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As seen so far, the pharmaceutical industry output is concentrated over few 
enterprises. Although this process is enhanced by M&A and through new technologies and 
methods incorporated in the R&D (see picture 1, pg. 10), the pharmaceutical industry R&D 
has been facing a reduction in its efficiency (Booth and Zemmel, 2004; Drews, 2003; Higgins 
and Rodriguez, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007; Hopkins et al., 2012;. Nightingale and Martin, 
2004; Paul et al., 2012; Pammolli et al., 2011; Munos, 2009). The decline in the R&D 
productivity is evident when new chemical entities’ approval (NCE), by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), is compared with the patent granted and the costs per NCE (Drews, 
2003; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007; Hopkins et al. 2012; Nightingale 
and Martin, 2004). 
Graphic 1.2: NCE per dollars spent in R&D (normalized to five-year rolling 
average of 1970–1974) 
 
Source: Booth and Zemmel (2004), pg451 
The graphic above shows a 30-year productive decrease in the pharmaceutical industry 
R&D. Authors such as Nightingale and Madhi (2006), express that bottlenecks in the R&D 
process, from the mapping of the possible candidate molecules blockbuster to clinical trials, 
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have immobilized the ability of pharmaceutical companies to build NCEs successfully and 
therefore new drugs. 
Not only large enterprises are facing a productive decrease, they are also reducing 
their participation on the total of NCEs approved. In other words, the large pharmaceutical 
companies are having more difficulties on producing NCE than other enterprises because their 
participation among the NCEs is reducing, as the graphic above shows.  
Graphic 1.3: Concentration of output in the pharmaceutical industry. Share of 
total United States new chemical entity (NCE) approvals by the leading four and eight 
firms in number of approvals for the period.  
 
Source: DiMasi, 2000, pg. 1183 
In recent years a more detailed analysis of the NCE shows a change in their nature and 
origin. The new NCE are still focused on therapeutic areas already supplied by a wide range 
of products. Whereas, science and research have expanded and diversify the technology 
frontier into new or unexplored therapeutic areas (Paul et al., 2010; Pammolli, 2011; Munos, 
2009). According to Paul et al. (2010), in 2009, only 29% of the NCE could be actually 
considered as an improvement when compared to drugs already in use. Also, the NCE 
recorded by major pharmaceutical companies has fallen steadily (Munos, 2009, Paul et a., 
2010). According to Munos (2009), in 2004 large and small companies had each registered 
50% of NCE; in 2008, the share of NCE of small businesses grew by nearly 70%. The 
evolution of NCE indicates, at the same time, a change in the innovative dynamics of the 
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pharmaceutical industry as well as an inability of large companies to diversify their 
innovations. 
The Big-Pharma advocates that the rising cost of developing new molecules limits and 
restricts the success of their innovative activities. Many studies have tried to calculate the cost 
of a new molecule, more recently DiMasi and Grawbowski (2007) and Scherer (2010), 
however, these studies are marked by difficulties and discrepancies in estimating the actual 
molecules of costs (Morgan et al., 2011). Despite this problem, the study conducted by 
DiMasi and Grawbowski (2007) is notable for one interesting conclusion. According to the 
authors, the costs for developing new molecules have steadily increased over the years, but 
they are relatively equal for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. According to these 
authors, in 2005 dollars, biotech companies would spent US $ 1,241 billion for each new 
molecule, and pharmaceutical companies costs, for a new molecule, is about of US$ 1,318. 
The study aforementioned show that biotechnology is as expensive as pharmaceutical industry 
in producing new drugs. Therefore, the increasing NCE registered by small companies 
(Munos, 2009) is not an outcome of cost reduction. If cost does not explain the changes 
among the enterprises that have registered NCE; probably, the R&D efficiency problems lie 
in how biotechnology has been used in the innovation process. Therefore, the answer for the 
productivity crisis in the pharmaceutical industry cannot be found in a cost perspective 
analyses.  
It is important to observe the large companies behavior to attest what kind of response 
and solution the industry has presented to the R&D productivity problem. The answer to this 
problem is based on two fronts, being one the incorporation of biotechnology as a technology 
dedicated to the drug discovery activities (as already dealt in the prior sections) and the other 
being the reorganization of the pharmaceutical industry in a more decentralized way.  
The literature shows that the industry evolves towards a marked division of innovative 
labor and specialization of research activities (Gambardela, 1995 and Hopkins et al., 2012). 
As a result, there is a risk reduction and a greater ability to acquire new technological skills, 
that, in some cases, can completely replace parts of the innovative process (Cassiman and 
Veuglers, 2006; Hagedoorn et al., 2012 and Hess and Roathermel, 2011). These positions 
carry with them a consensus: the large pharmaceutical companies have tried to incorporate 
biotechnology skills into their routines. 
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On the organization side, authors such as Comanor and Scherer (2013); Gleadle et al. 
(2013); Light and Lexchin (2012); Hopkins et al. (2012); Higgins and Rodriguez (2006); 
Munos (2009); Paul et al. (2009), among others, attest that large pharmaceutical enterprises 
have chosen the M&A as an option for the acquisition of new technologies. These two 
different size enterprises, also, build a clear division in their R&D activities, whereas the 
small enterprise deals with new technologies and the discovery of new drugs; the large 
pharmaceutical enterprises are responsible for conducting the clinical trials. Therefore, the 
activities closer to research is where the small enterprise knowledge is employed. 
The incorporations of new technologies, through acquisition of small enterprises, 
became a well established behavior. The interviews showed that up to 50% of the large 
pharmaceutical enterprises’ new technologies were projects that started at small biotech 
enterprises. In addition, as shown in table 2.2 (pg. 66), the majority of enterprises, at the time 
they were acquired, had their main products at the early stages of R&D. Although, this fact 
indicates that enterprises are giving up the early stages of research, the Big-Pharma still can 
profit from small enterprises innovation. 
As explained by Teece (1986) the success of enterprises’ innovation is linked to the 
company control over complementary competences. Sometimes, it is not enough to dominate 
the core competences, because due to the sectors characteristics an imitator could better 
appropriate the spill-over effects and dislocate the enterprise that had first introduced the 
innovation. In that context, the complementary competences can work as a mean to protect 
the innovation and reduce the spill-over effects (Teece, 1986).  
In the pharmaceutical industry the small biotech companies do not control the whole 
R&D process, they have strong capacities on the first stages of R&D, but, these enterprises do 
not have expertise and financial strength to conduct the clinical trials or late stages of 
innovation. Whereas, the Big-pharma have a complete knowledge over the whole R&D, not 
only that, they also have financial capabilities, and control over complementary competences, 
especially marketing, sales channels and access to physicians. Therefore, by controlling these 
complementary competences and the core competences, the Big-pharma can incorporate and 
appropriate the technology developed by small enterprises.  
Looking at the way the pharmaceutical sector is organized today, the discussion about 
the replacement of large pharmaceutical companies for new agents of biotechnology is 
overcome. Indeed, large pharmaceutical and small biotechnology companies are organized, 
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networked, through collaborations, in order to innovate. This behavior indicates that 
biotechnology "follows a well-established, historical pattern of slow and incremental of 
technological diffusion"(Nightingale and Martin, 2004, pg. 564) in which new technology is 
being incorporated gradually to large pharmaceutical companies (Zucker and Darby, 1997). 
Thus, the coexistence of these two types of enterprises and an increasing number of M&A and 
collaborations between them shows that this is how small companies research effort are 
further incorporated into large pharmaceutical companies pool of competencies.  
 
1.5 The creation of a biotechnology sector and the role played by the collaborations, 
M&A, and inventors in the innovative performance of enterprises.  
   
The creation of a biotechnology industry, composed by small biotech enterprises, 
focused on solving pharmaceutical problems can be seen as a typical American movement. 
Although many nations tried to emulate a similar system for biotech industry, based on 
regional clustering, venture capital, and incentive policies, the cases of success outside the 
US
18
 are rare, being Cambridge the one that stands out (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2015). As this 
study data will show, the biotechnology industry, mainly, based on small enterprises 
originated in the academic environment are typical form the US context. Not only that, but the 
majority of M&A seeking small biotech enterprises take place in the US.  
At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry were organized as follow. Biotechnology was scattered through 
universities within several research projects conducted by professors and in small enterprises 
that span off from the academic environment (Audretesch, 2003 and Kenney, 1986, Zucker 
and Darby, 2002). Through several government incentives biotechnology was fostered and it 
left the academic realm of research to become a sector based on academic start-ups 
(Audretesch, 2003; Kenney, 1986; Malerba and Orsenigo, 2015; Powell et al.l., 1996). 
Although biotechnology and pharmaceutical technology were highly complementary 
especially in the drug discovery activities, the pharmaceutical enterprises had little 
competencies in this field. In the end 
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 For a comprehensive selection of essays about government attempts to build a biotechnology clusters outside 
the US, see: Fuchs (2003) Biotechnology in Comparative Perspective, Routledge, London, 2003. 
Audretesch, D. (2003) The Role of small firms in US biotechnology clusters 
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 “[i]n the emerging field of biotechnology, the lack of corporate expertise 
led to an all unique new arrangements between industry and corporations at 
institutional levels that are affecting a number of universities traditional values and 
norms” (Kenney, 1986, pg 28) 
According to Sharp (1999), the large pharmaceutical enterprises in a first moment did 
not engage in creating biotechnology competencies, but they kept some research inside to 
develop some absorptive capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and to keep up with the 
technical advance. In a second moment, in the mid of the 1980s, the Big-Pharma started to 
interact with small biotech enterprises, in particular, through collaborations and acquisitions. 
Those interactions were attempts to internalize some critical biotechnology competencies 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cassiman and Veuglers, 2006; Cullen and Dibner, 1993; Malerba 
and Orsenigo, 2015; Powell et al.l. 1996; Makri et al., 2010; Gambardela, 1995; Hagedoorn et 
al.,2002; Cloodt and Hagedoorn, 2006; Sharp, 1999). Almost all Big-Pharma have some 
scouting team that looks for promising new technologies developed by small biotech 
companies. Those scouting teams are institutionalized actions towards increasing the 
interaction with small biotech corporations. Sharp (1999) also mention a third phase where 
the Big-Pharma converts some biotech products into large-scale ones, such as Humulin, but, 
there are still too few success examples of this phase. 
1.5.1 The role of collaborations  
The biotechnology industry is still, mainly, composed by small companies
19
 that have 
a reduced financial capacity but are potentially innovative. On the other hand, the Big-Pharma 
are financially robust, however, they are facing a crisis in their innovation productivity. It is 
easy to comprehend that one of the ways for overcoming the weak points on both sides is 
through interaction. According to Malerba and Orsenigo 2015, pg 15:  
 “…[L]arge corporations realized that they could not rely solely on their 
internal knowledge to discover and developed new drugs. The prospect of the 
expiration of most key patents in the coming decade coupled with strengthening 
competition from a generic segment, put pressure on attempts to discover and 
develop new blockbusters. Big companies reacted to this challenge first through a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions. Second as already mentioned they increasingly 
started to rely on small biotech companies and academics for new molecules and 
research technics, though licenses and collaboration agreements”. 
                                                 
19
 Some of them being already large enterprises, like Amgen.  
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Alliances dedicated to research would reduce the innovation activity risk and would give the 
financial help needed for the small enterprises to develop its products and enhance the Big-
Pharma’s capabilities regarding biotechnology (Audretsch, 2003). Not only that, but, Higgins 
and Rodriguez (2006) postulate that alliances are a way for large companies obtaining 
information about the portfolios and pipelines of small businesses, therefore, reducing 
uncertainty and facilitate the acquisition. In this matter, alliances can have a pre-acquisition 
role allowing large pharmaceutical enterprises to gather better information enabling 
acquisitions to have a better chances of success. Although Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) 
advance, they are focused on financial aspects of M&A and treat collaborations as an activity 
that only generates information that further facilitates M&A. When the collaborations 
happen before the acquisitions, it becomes an important step in the successful negotiation 
20
.  
According to another group of studies, doing research in collaboration involve a 
dichotomy between doing R&D internally or externally (make or buy decisions) (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006; Veuglers, 1997; Veuglers and Cassiman, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2012; 
Hess and Roathermel, 2011).Through the decisions between these two options, these studies 
seek to identify if the external R&D complements or substitutes the internal research efforts. 
These decisions cannot be dealt as a yes or no option, as was recognized by Cassiman and 
Veuglers (2006). Those kinds of decisions are sensitive to sectors activities, to each enterprise 
behavior and to what kind of research is done.   
Studies dedicated to the pharmaceutical industry, such as Hess and Roatehrmel (2011) 
and Danzon et al. (2003), points out that the complementarity and substitutive character of 
external and internal R&D activities change according to their position in the value chain 
(Hess and Roathermel, 2011). Upstream activities or research activities are substitutes. 
Therefore, they are marked by the greater use of alliances as external sources for innovation 
(Laursen and Salter 2006 and 2014; Hess and Roathermel, 2011). However, as the activities 
are moving downstream - or as activities move away from a dynamic purely guided by 
research - more companies resort to internal R&D. 
Nicholson et al. (2003) attest that alliances between Big-Pharma and small biotech 
corporations are more focused on the early stages of drug development, where the level of 
experience of enterprises, measured by the firms’ number of compounds and research lines, is 
less determinant than in late stages of development. This fact indicates that there is a 
                                                 
20
 This fact was stressed in the interviews conducted for this study 
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substitution character for research activities and complementary to activities closer to 
production (Roathermel and Thursby, 2011). As pointed out before, biotechnology is a 
technology largely used in research activities. Therefore, it has been used by pharmaceutical 
enterprises to substitute some of their R&D efforts. 
Rafols et al.l. (2014) analyze this same aspect from another perspective. The authors 
observe the use of external sources of innovations through the scientific articles published by 
people linked to large pharmaceutical enterprises. Rafols et al. (2014) sees an interesting 
evolution in which large pharmaceutical enterprises have been decreasing all their 
publications, but, articles related to molecular biology are facing a much faster decrease than 
works related to chemistry. This article suggests certain trends in the pharmaceutical industry 
R&D, showing that pharmaceutical enterprises are relying even more on external sources of 
information for basic research. The Big-Pharma are retreating from science and using of 
external sources of innovation (Rafols et al., 2014).  
This process of using external sources for innovations, as closer to science is an 
activity, was also confirmed by the interviews conducted during this study. All persons 
interviewed have stressed that small biotech companies are used as sources of new promising 
technologies, the first stages of R&D are done in collaboration, but the clinical trials are 
conducted by the Big-Pharma alone. However, activities, especially R&D cannot be 
indefinitely held externally or subcontracted, there is a limit for this process as shown by 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) in their historical analysis. Thus, the formation of networks by 
incorporating various actors in the innovation process has a limit. 
According to Nicholson et al. (2003, pg 29) 
 “[T]he market for pharmaceutical R&D is functioning reasonably well, 
with extensive entry by small firms and effective use of alliances, as a source of both 
funding and expertise for small firms, and a source of product for large firms”.  
This citation is important to summarize an important proposition for this study, that is: for the 
interaction between Big-Pharma and small biotech companies, the collaboration plays 
an important role in the innovative dynamics by contributing to the Big-Pharma’s 
competence acquisitions and enhancement.  
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1.5.2 The role of M&A: the incorporation of new technologies and its relation with the 
enterprise scientific basis. 
Along with collaborations, M&A are seen as an important strategy for firms, allowing 
them to obtain and enhance its technological competencies. There are several types of 
acquisitions driven by several factors, which may change according to sectors and enterprises 
size (Chakrabarti, 1995). Nevertheless, this study deals with acquisitions driven by 
technological aspects. Therefore, when enterprises engage in this kind of acquisition, they are 
intending to increase their technological outputs that can be measured by patents (Anderssen 
and Xiao, 2015; Ahuja e Katila, 2001; Desyllas and Hughes, 2008; Gerpott, 1995; Hagedoorn 
et al., 2002; Cloodt and Hagedoorn, 2006; Makri et al., 2010).  
Regarding the acquisitions of small biotech enterprises by Big-Pharma, Schweizer 
(2005), shows that the incorporation of small biotech companies into large pharmaceutical 
firms follow a model, in which research teams are maintained, and the small biotech firm 
productive capacity is dismantled (Schweizer, 2005). According to Schweizer (2005), each 
purchased company acts as a new R&D team, specialized in biotechnology, which was added 
to the set of innovation activities held by the large corporations. This integration model 
highlights the goal of pharmaceutical companies as the incorporation of biotechnology 
capabilities into their R&D through this type of acquisitions. Although this M&A model is 
not unanimous among large pharmaceutical companies, it indicates changes in the innovation 
process and the nature of M&A. 
As pointed out by Schweizer (2005) the small enterprises ability to innovate is 
maintained through its incorporation as an R&D unit. By combining acquisitions driven by 
technological elements and the model of integration showed by Schweizer (2005), it is 
possible to attest that acquisitions of small biotech enterprises are driven by the potentiality 
that small biotech enterprises can bring to the Big-Pharma’s R&D. Several studies have 
pointed a positive relation between acquisitions of small enterprises and an increase in the 
acquiring technological output (Anderssen and Xiao, 2015; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Hussinger, 2010; Szücs, 2014). 
The knowledge and skills incorporated through acquisitions enable the company to 
create new products for the market and in some cases create new technological trajectories 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2002). The acquisition is a way of uniting different pieces of knowledge in 
one enterprise, by gathering those pieces of knowledge the number of knowledge 
combinations is increased, thus, all these novel combinations can, possibly, leads to more 
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innovations (Ahuja e Katila, 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Desyllas and Hughes, 
2008; Makri at all. 2010). But, the successful incorporation of R&D of one company to 
another involves time and does not have direct and short-term effects on the company's 
financial data, which, in many cases, can disguise the actual effect of acquisition (Gerpott, 
1995). Indeed, M&A driven by technological factors can only be analyzed through 
technological variables. 
Among the M&A that aims to access to technology, the model of Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002) presents an interesting approach. The authors divide technological 
acquisitions in: (i) horizontal, which correspond to acquisitions of enterprises in the same 
value chain activity; (ii) vertical, regarding acquisitions of companies located downstream or 
upstream in the value chain, i.e. the acquisition of suppliers or customers; and (iii) unrelated, 
consisting in acquisitions of firms in different sectors that have no apparent relationship. 
Acquisitions of small biotech enterprises that produce technologies for drug discoveries are a 
case of horizontal acquisitions, in those cases, the Big-Pharma is trying to diversify its 
technologies for drug discovery and sometimes combine the new techniques with old ones to 
increase productivity.  
1.5.3 Knowledge base relatedness  
Although there is a correlation between acquisitions and technological outputs 
increase, this fact is not directed; it depends on the enterprises’ knowledge bases relatedness 
(Ahuja e Katila, 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Desyllas and Hughes, 2008; Makri at 
all. 2010). According to Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002), technological relatedness or any 
other variable that tries to measure how much of an enterprise’s knowledge base is shared 
with its target is of extreme importance. The definition of technological relatedness given by 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) is good because it involves broader categories such as patent 
classes. For the authors: 
“Technological relatedness of companies, then, refers to the degree to which 
companies are active in particular fields of technology that they share with 
(potential) partners in M&As. These fields of technology have to be understood in 
terms of the activities of companies related to relatively broad categories of 
technological disciplines and engineering capabilities, such as electronics, electrical 
engineering, chemistry, bioengineering and their sub-categories that coincide with 
fields of technology as for instance identified by patent-classes.” (Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002 pg 6 e 7) 
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Therefore, the elements that each enterprise’s knowledge base share can be treated as 
similarities. 
Enterprises must have some similarities regarding what they know, enterprises cannot 
deal with things that they completely do not know. In order to have some capability creation 
and enhancement, the acquiring enterprise must understand the general principals on the other 
enterprises knowledge base (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Desyllas and Hughes, 2008; Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002; Makri et al.l., 2010). Therefore, enterprises engaging horizontal and 
vertical acquisitions could enjoy some technological relatedness with its target (Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002). 
Several studies attempt to create concepts and measures for enterprises knowledge 
base relatedness and how these relations affect the enterprises’ technological outputs. 
Nevertheless, all those ideas are based on the concept of absorptive capacity, proposed by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989 and 1990). Absorptive capabilities are the firm’s ability to 
incorporate new knowledge into its routines. One important observation is that absorptive 
capabilities are a function of R&D, so as the enterprise conducts more R&D, it will enhance 
its absorptive capacities. As an outcome, those capabilities will allow enterprises to 
incorporate, understand and better interpret the related knowledge by sharing the same 
scientific principle (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and 1990). As enterprises’ experience became 
more different, the assimilation of each other’s knowledge will be harder (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989). The difference and relatedness between each knowledge base will lead to 
different degrees of assimilation.  
According to Makri et al. (2010); Cloodt and Hagedoorn (2006); Hagedoorn and 
Duyster (2002) the difference in the technological and scientific knowledge between 
companies is an important factor in the process of technical change. The acquisition of 
companies that are too technologically similar would only generate duplication. Therefore, a 
difference between the enterprises knowledge is necessary to provide opportunities for 
learning and building and developing absorptive capacities (Makri et al, 2010). On the other 
hand, when companies are extremely different from each other, regarding technical 
knowledge, the process of M&A becomes highly complex and the incorporation of a 
company into another cannot generate any effect on the process of technological change and 
innovation rate.  
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As demonstrated by Cloodt and Hagedoorn (2006), the expansion of the firm's 
knowledge base through M&A impacts, directly, the innovative performance of the company 
in the post-acquisition period, but it is necessary that the knowledge base of firms to have 
some similarity (Cloodt and Hagedoorn, 2006). In other words, the acquisitions targets must 
have a difference between their knowledge base that able learning opportunities to be 
translated into new products and may even generate new technological trajectories (Makri et 
al., 2010). As a conclusion, in M&A process, the relatedness of enterprises knowledge base 
and the innovative output are related in a form of an inverted U-shaped curve (Ahuja e Katila, 
2001).  
Ahuja and Katila (2001) also put the technological relatedness between acquiring and 
acquired companies as an important variable for explaining post-acquisition innovative 
output. These authors used as measure and definitions of enterprises knowledge base the 
enterprise’s patent portfolio, and they build a relation between the knowledge base and patent 
citation to obtain the relatedness of knowledge bases. Although, patents capture part of the 
enterprise knowledge and patent citations allows building ways of measuring knowledge base 
relatedness; the use of patents is still too restrictive when one is trying to measure the firms’ 
knowledge base. First, patents represent a narrow and a particular piece of knowledge and, 
most important, patents include only a technical and replicable set of instructions i.e. patents 
are techniques. Knowledge is much broader and knowledge base must include other forms of 
knowledge besides technology as stated by Mokyr (2002).  
As an important conclusion, Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) demonstrate that 
technological relatedness and differences in the firms’ size affect the technological 
performance of companies positively. The model proposed by Hagedoorn and Duysters 
(2002), which is related to the pharmaceutical industry, is conclusive on the point that 
correlates the technological relatedness of the firms involved in processes of M&A and its 
technological performance. In other words, for those authors, firms that share some common 
elements in their knowledge bases, after going through an acquisition process, enjoy higher 
productivity on the similar technological areas. Nevertheless, the model cannot support the 
hypothesis that the acquisition of similar size firms can increase the performance of the same 
technology, in that sense for Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) size is not determinant for the 
technological productivity of businesses. It is clear that sharing technological characteristics 
between firms is an important factor in increasing the rate of innovation among acquiring 
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firms. The size of the companies involved in M&A process apparently is not something that 
will restrict or boost the innovative rate of the new company.  
All those studies attest that a certain amount of technological relatedness can generate 
opportunities for learning in areas where science plays a significant role in sustaining the 
innovation process. The acquisitions of firms will lead to an expansion of their knowledge 
base (Cloodt and Hagedorn, 2006), and by expanding their knowledge base, companies create 
new routes for research to be explored (Makri et al 2010). In addition, multinational 
corporations increase their technological outputs by acquiring small enterprises with 
complementary capabilities (Anderseen and Xiao, 2015).  
The whole section allows to propose that despite the difference between the 
companies; the relations and some degrees of similarity between their knowledge bases 
are essential for increasing the rate of innovations and technological progress. In that 
sense, studies must have some kind of measure of knowledge base similarity if it tries to relate 
acquisition and a potential innovative performance. 
1.5.4 The role of inventors in the enterprises’ technology output 
This study, so far, has dealt with technological and organizational movement in the 
pharmaceutical industry in an attempt to increase its R&D productivity. Studies focused on 
collaborations, but most especially, studies that deal with M&A are prone to consider only 
technical aspects of knowledge. However, when an enterprise acquires another, usually the 
key people move from the purchased company to the acquiring one. 
Activities may be more or less depending upon the worker skills, according to the type 
of activity conducted by the same worker. As pointed by Bravermann (1974) the division of 
labor and the spread of Taylor principles have brought with them the extreme specialization 
of workers and the concentration of knowledge in some certain activities within the value 
chain. R&D is a typical activity that demands much from knowledge. Random screening 
technologies and computational models cannot build molecules by they own; they need a 
trained scientist able to recognize a possible molecule. Drug discovery is still highly 
dependent on the scientist skills, although, the industry has been facing a process of R&D 
industrialization (Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale and Madhi, 2006). Therefore, is not difficult 
to accept that inventors have a great effect on the enterprises technological outputs (Almeida 
et al., 2001; Grigoriu and Roathermel, 2014; Hohberg, 2016; Zucker and Darby, 2007; Zucker 
et al., 2001; Zucker et al., 2006).  
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One important element regarding biotechnology is that these technologies, especially 
the ones dedicated to drug discovery and genetic sequencing, were born in universities. 
Therefore, scientists have a great role in the diffusion of these technologies outside the 
academic world and inside the economic environment (Colombo and Piva, 2012; Zucker and 
Darby, 2007; Zucker et al., 2001; Zucker et al., 2006). For Zucker et al. (2002), the star 
scientists
21
  that have some kind of relations with firms enhance the innovation rate of the 
same. In addition, scientists do not work alone. Therefore, their capacity to increase the 
enterprises innovative activity is also related to how they related with another scientist within 
the same enterprise (Oettl, 2012; Grigoriu and Roathermel, 2014). 
Therefore, the whole team in which the inventor works is important. The study 
conducted by Hohberger (2016), about the biotech industry advances in other, but still very 
important, direction in the biotechnology sector. This author tries to verify the importance that 
star inventors have as sources of research lines. An extremely important result achieved by 
Hochberg (2016) is about a certain path dependence held by scientists over their research 
achievements. Star scientists do not follow other star scientist research, they tend to keep 
researching their “own stuff” (Hohberger, 2016). When scientists move from one to another 
enterprise probably they will keep researching about the same thing they were already 
researching in the acquired enterprise. 
The importance of scientists in the R&D activities is more probable in high-tech 
sectors that depend on science for its technological advance, such as biotechnology. 
Biotechnology also offers an interesting perspective in the relations between scientist and 
enterprises technological output. This sector, as stressed several times before, was born in the 
academic environment where the scientist played an important role in creating molecular 
biology techniques, such as the RNA splicing, and was fundamental for the diffusion of such 
technologies.  
When star scientists work directly in these same small enterprises, the enterprises have 
an easier access to venture capital and therefore a higher rate of survival (Fuller and 
Roathermel, 2012). Based on those two conclusions, it is possible to make some 
extrapolations. The easier access to venture capital enjoyed by star scientists is, to a great 
extent, due to their reputation. The same principle is seen in acquisitions process: enterprises 
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 Zucker et al. (2001) definition of star scientists is based on productivity measures for articles related to 
genetic sequencing discoveries. For them, only 0.7% of the authors of articles, reporting genetic sequence 
discoveries through 1989, are star scientists.   
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linked to scientists who have a better reputation, regarding technologies development, are a 
less risky target to be purchased.  
This section demonstrates that scientists considered as the patent inventors are the 
skill part of the knowledge, being extremely important for the firms’ technological 
outputs  
 
1.6 Summary 
 
Until this point, the study has shown its theoretical basis. Through this chapter, several 
significant points were highlighted. It is necessary, now, to summarize these important points 
in the light of the study’s objective. First, the study objective is: establish a general view of 
how the small acquired biotech companies can contribute to the large pharmaceutical 
enterprise that acquired them. Having the objective in mind below is presented a summary 
chart of chapter 1 with the import points derived from the study theoretical basis. 
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Chart 1.1 : Chapter 1 summary chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactions origins Propositions gathered through bibliography Elements to be considered when 
analyzing the overall contribution 
Enterprise behavior 
Each new set of innovations involves the use of 
different scientific fields and different 
technologies, both distinct from previous 
innovations. This fact largely change the way the 
industry behaves (see, pg. 29).  
The use of external sources of 
innovation  
Technology 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical industry 
interact in their R&D activities, where 
biotechnology is used as a new technology for 
drug discovery. However, there is only an 
expectation that the use of these new technologies 
could enhance the industry’s productivity by 
bringing new technological results such as new 
compounds, technologies, and patents (see, pg. 
39). 
Complementarity between 
Biotechnologies and Pharmaceutical 
industry in the drug discovery activity 
Collaborations 
Collaboration plays an important role in the 
innovative dynamics by contributing to the Big-
Pharmas’ competencies acquisitions and 
enhancement (see, pg.47). 
The collaborations created and their 
outcomes 
M&A 
Despite the difference between the companies, the 
relations and some degrees of similarity between 
their knowledge bases are essential for the 
increasing rate of innovations and technological 
progress (see, pg. 52).   
The relations between purchased and 
acquiring enterprises knowledge bases 
Scientists 
Scientists considered as the patent inventors are 
the skill part of the knowledge, being extremely 
important for the firms’ technological outputs (see, 
pg 54). 
Inventors that move from one 
enterprise to another (from the 
acquired to the acquiring ) 
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Source: Own elaboration 
 The overall contribution process that is going to be presented in the methodology will 
encompass the elements presents in the table above. The overall contribution process deals 
with large pharmaceutical enterprise using small biotech companies as external sources of 
innovation. The contribution process is focused on the use of biotechnology as set of drug 
discovery technologies. Therefore, in a general way the overall contribution process is 
considering the first two lines of the above table.    
 The other interactions are considered as components of the overall contribution 
process. In that sense, collaborations are considered to be a first step in the contribution 
process (table’s third line). When a small enterprises is acquired it contributes due to its 
knowledge that is incorporated by the large pharmaceutical enterprise (table’s fourth line). 
And finally, inventors are of extreme importance because they are the knowledge holders 
(table’s last line).  
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Chapter 2 Methodological Remarks 
 
 
The methodology should show the means to answer the research question, demonstrate 
the validity of the proposed argument and thus achieve the desired goal. Understanding the 
methodology is crucial so that the data presentation and analysis could be understood. 
Therefore this study’ methodology is composed by three main elements that are connected. 
The first step was to build the study theoretical background. The bibliography is of extreme 
importance to show how the industry has evolve, the relevance of biotechnology to the 
pharmaceutical industry and the main sources of contribution were outlined in the part were 
the industry organization were discussed. The main theoretical aspects were summarized 
throughout chapter one as statements derived from the literature, the mains statements and 
their connection to the methodology were presented in chart 1.1 at p. 61. 
Second as the argument and the objective outlined in the introduction, this part of the 
methodology seeks to establish how one can analyze and identify the overall contribution of 
any small business to the large acquiring pharmaceutical enterprises’ R & D. Therefore, this 
part composes the majority of the methodology.  In order to build the tool of analyses for the 
overall contribution this study needs to: (i) definition of a sample composed by companies, 
which is significant among the world pharmaceutical industry; (ii) the definition and 
explanation of the overall contribution. Each component of the overall contribution has its 
sources on chapter 1 where the study defined the collaborations, M&A and skills as the main 
sources of contribution. 
Finnaly the study is supported by interviews, those interviews were conducted during 
the time the doutorado sanduíche (PhD abroad program) were conducted in the USA at the 
George Washington University. The interviews were exploratory (the questioner is presented 
in the annex 1, pg. 187) based on broad questions they gave further information about the 
small acquired enterprise and the large enterprises behavior.  
The whole study and the construction of an overall contribution depends on M&A, 
therefore, by showing the relevancy of M&A the study’s pertinence will be endorsed. For 
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instance, one can focus on the 11 largest companies
22
. Those enterprises account for 46% of 
the total R&D spent by the world pharmaceutical industry. From 2005 to 2012, these 11 
companies, spent 52% of the whole amount in M&A regarding the pharmaceutical industry 
(see table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Data about R&D and M&A among the world largest pharmaceutical 
companies (in US$ billions) 
Companies 
Total 
Income 
(2012) 
R&D 
(2012) 
Total Expenses in 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
(M&A) between 
2005-2013 
Annual 
average of 
M&A(2005-
2013) 
R&D/Revenues 
(2012) 
Annual average 
of 
M&A/Revenues  
Annual 
average 
M&A/R&D 
Pfizer 51 6,6 76,5 9,5 13% 18,60% 1,4 
Novartis 32,1 6,7 70,9 8,8 21% 27,40% 1,3 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
25,35 5,3 4,5 0,5 21% 2,00% 0,09 
Merck&Co 47,2 8,1 2,9 0,5 17% 1,10% 0,06 
Roche 40,96 14,16 48,3 6 35% 14,60% 0,4 
Bristol-
Myers 
Squibb 
17,6 3,9 12,1 1,5 22% 8,50% 7,5 
AstraZeneca 27,9 4,4 18,3 2,2 16% 7,90% 0,5 
Sanofi 43 5 26 3,25 12% 8% 0,65 
Eli Lilly 22,6 5,2 9,5 1,1 23% 4,90% 0,2 
GSK 16 2 8,3 1 13% 6,30% 0,5 
Abbott 
Laboratories 
39,8 4,3 4,1 0,5 11% 1,30% 0,11 
Total of the 
11 
enterprises  
 
62,16 306,8 
   
 Total of the 
sector in the 
world 
 
135 585,485 
   
 Total of the 
11 
enterprises 
/Total sector 
 
46% 52% 
   
 Source: own elaboration based on Forbes, Annual Reports, HBM Pharma/Biotech M&A report 
  
 
The table above gives a glimpse of how relevant M&A are for Big-Pharma. In some 
cases the annual average spent on M&A is almost the same as the total expenditures on R&D. 
The table show a higher proportion of M&A over Revenues than the R&D/revenue relation. 
                                                 
22
according to 2013 Forbes list of the 2000 largest enterprises.  
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Therefore, it is clear that companies have devoted a significant portion of their resources to 
carry on M&A. This fact alone makes such a movement an interesting feature. 
Those 11 large companies acquired 90 biotech companies. An aggregate outlook over 
the companies acquired (see table 2.2) can show an interesting geographical and technological 
features about the small enterprises acquired. 
Table 2.2: Small acquired companies’ overview 
Companies Development stage of main product 
Country 
Percentage of 
the total 
acquired 
Stage 
Percentage of the 
total acquired 
Austria 1% No product 8% 
Canada 1% Stage 0 17% 
Switzerland 3% Stage 1 13% 
France 2% Stage 2 21% 
Germany 2% Stage 3 13% 
Holland 1% Stage 4 2% 
UK 11% 
Product at the 
market 
26% 
USA 78%     
 Source: own elaboration, based on HBM Pharma/Biotech M&A report 
The analyzed phenomenon has its epicenter in the US. This country accounts for 78% 
of the small businesses acquired. Historically, the US pioneered and still is the locus, in 
which, many small companies dedicated to biotechnology are born. Any study interested in 
M&A involving biotechnology cannot ignore the US. 
The table 2.2 also presents the development stage of the companies’ main products. 
Most acquisitions occurred when the company main product were still in development and 
testing phase. Among the 90 acquired small companies, 51% were acquired in the early stages 
of their product development. It should be noted that 8% of the sample consists of companies 
that still have no product and only 26% of the small businesses have a product in the market. 
There is a clear trend of large pharmaceutical enterprises to acquired small companies with its 
products at early stage of development.  
Acquisitions that happen at an early stage of product development indicates that the 
contribution of small businesses seems to be focused at the beginning of the innovative 
process as showed by the studies of Hess and Roathermel (2011) and Laursen and Salter 
(2006 and 2014). In addition the interviews have shown that enterprises have created scouting 
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teams for searching, mainly, small companies with products up to stage 2 of clinical trials. 
There is a clear preference of large pharmaceutical enterprises to collaborate and acquire 
enterprises in early stages of development. 
Some remarks can be drawn upon the panorama made above. First, acquisitions 
became an extreme important strategy for large pharmaceutical companies. Second, this 
phenomenon occurs mainly in the US. Third, the acquisition of small biotech companies are 
done in the early stages of their product develop. Therefore, M&A with small biotech 
companies are focused on the search for new technological knowledge that can boost the large 
companies search activities. 
 
2.1 Sample definition 
  
The existence of an immense amount of data on the pharmaceutical industry and 
patents makes the feasibility of this study dependent on the definition of a relevant sample of 
enterprises. The sample will be drawn from the large research intensive pharmaceutical 
companies that engage on M&A activities with small biotech enterprises (see table 2.1, pg. 
59).  
The first source of data is the report "HBM PHARMA / BIOTECH M&A REPORT 
2013", which compiles M&A between pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology 
companies between 2005 and 2012, there can be found: (i) acquired companies, (ii) acquiring 
companies and (iii) the amount spent. From this report is extracted which companies bought 
more actively and which spent more resources on M&A. Another important data source was 
Forbes' list of the 2000 largest companies in the world
23
 used as a means of establishing 
which the global players are in the world pharmaceutical industry. 
Finally, the interviews conducted (for interview details see section 2.7, pg.66) offered 
the last parameter in order to select the sample. The interviews will be detailed throughout the 
study, but as a meaning of defining the sample, some interviews findings should be raised. 
Although, enterprises behave differently from each other the objectives of an acquisition and 
collaboration are similar. Acquisitions are driven by promising technologies developed by the 
small biotech enterprises. Promising technologies, here, are not the best possible technology, 
                                                 
23
 This study used the 2013 edition 
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but the technology that will deliver the expected results- profits- in a the less amount of time. 
The interviews showed that collaborations encompass activities with a higher risk, sometimes 
the technology is not ready yet and the only element that a small enterprise has to offer is a 
“good idea” and some good experiments. In addition, collaborations are almost divided in the 
same way
24
: the large pharmaceutical enterprise offers financial support and it conducts the 
late stages of clinical trials while the smaller company dedicates itself to further develop the 
product until the early phases of clinical trials, from that point the large pharmaceutical 
enterprise will take over.  
Those general aspects above mentioned do not change much over one enterprise to 
another. Nevertheless, there are important differences in how enterprises manage the acquired 
enterprises and the people that developed the technology, whereas, the drivers of an 
acquisition and the task division in collaborations, with a small firms, are very much the 
same. Therefore, this study chose 5 enterprises to compose its sample. Four (4) of these 
enterprises are Americans, and interviews were conducted with three of them. The two 
enterprises which no interviews were conducted were chosen as cases in which the 
methodology would be tested. Although, interviews are important, conducting two cases 
without it is a way of proving the methodology’s capacity of explanation.  
The sample will be composed by: (i) Pfizer, (ii) Johnson & Johnson, (iii) Merck& co, 
(iv) Roche and (v) Abbott-Laboratories. Interviews were conducted with: (i) Pfizer; (ii) 
Johnson & Johnson and (iii) Merck&co. Those 5 enterprises are among the 11 largest 
pharmaceutical companies, together they spent, in 2012, U$ 38,48 billion in R&D. That 
amount represents 28% of the world’s R&D expenditures in the pharmaceutical sector. The 
five enterprises expenditures in M&A are 44% of what was spent by the 11 enterprises 
presented in table 2.1 (see pg.59). In addition, the sample have more than 15%
25
 of the 
American market share. The date presented has shown how relevant those enterprises are 
among the world pharmaceutical industry. 
  
                                                 
24
 The information about how collaborations are usually divided were obtained through interviews 
25
 This data refers to 2013 
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2.2 Overall Contribution 
 
This study works with the assumption that when large pharmaceutical enterprise 
acquires small biotech firms, the acquiring enterprise could create new competences and 
strengthen the ones that already exists. Therefore overall contribution is to use the technical 
and skills knowledge held by the acquired small enterprise in order to build or 
strengthen capabilities in the acquiring enterprise. 
To analyze this process, overall contribution will be considered a one way movement 
from the small acquired company to the Big-Pharmaceutical. It is possible to state, based on 
the literature and on the interviews conducted, that enterprises engaging in acquisition with 
small biotech firms are looking for new promising technologies and therefore new 
competences. Although, achieving those goals is not assured, in fact, the strengthening and 
the acquisition of new competencies is a potential fact that could happen and it varies 
according to enterprise.  
 Overall contribution as a meaning of enhancing the acquiring enterprise’s 
competences can be better analyzed if this concept is divided into components or variables. 
Each component has a particular feature that combined can capture the whole idea of overall 
contribution. Those components are: (i) prior contribution measured by the existence of some 
research collaboration agreement between firms; (ii) technical contribution that is divided into 
direct and indirect contribution and it is given by the patent data analyses; (iii) skills 
contributions verified through the movement of inventors between enterprises.  
All of those components will be explained in the following sections. In order to 
understand each component one needs to: (i) explain how each component is linked to the 
concept of overall contribution (ii) determine how the data collected will be used (iii) show, if 
necessary, how data, about large and small businesses, can be combined in order to obtain a 
relationship between agents, (vi) set parameters for data analysis derived from the relations 
established in (iii). 
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2.3 Prior contribution  
 
The process of strengthening competences may start before a large company acquires 
a small biotech company. As has the literature and the interviews pointed out, the research 
agreements are a way for the Big-Pharma gather better information about the smaller ones 
(Higgins and Rodrigues, 2006). Those information makes easier the acquisition, since 
enterprises “get to know” each other during collaboration. While enterprises are collaborating 
information are traded between each other. Mainly based on Hess and Roatehrmel (2011); 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006); Nicholson et al. (2003), the process of doing research together 
aims to develop new competences, mutual help enable enterprises to correct deficient 
competences and enhance pre-existent ones. Therefore, collaborations are a way build 
competences together. 
Research agreements happen quite often, much of the research agreements are done 
without being reports to journal and regulatory institutions. The available data only captures 
the agreements that went through such kind of scrutiny. In that sense, the data about research 
collaborations were compiled from the several databases available at the library of congress in 
Washington D.C. Those databases are subject to following directories: Gale Directory 
Library, Leadership Library, Reference USA, OneSOurce and ThomasNet.  
Another important point is that acquisitions preceded by research collaboration are 
judged by the enterprises as an ideal case. Nevertheless, this fact does not happen so often
26
. 
Sometimes, the process of acquiring a small biotech companies resemble a bidding process in 
which the Big-Pharmaceutical enterprises have no time or chance to establish research 
collaboration while several competitor are looking for the same target
27
. Also, acquisitions 
may happen because large enterprise are trying to avoid losing, what was constructed during 
the collaboration, to other company
28
.  
 
  
                                                 
26
 Interview information 
27
 Interview information 
28
 Interview information 
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2.4 Technical contribution 
 
Technical contribution analyses the enterprise’s technical development and behavior 
through patent data
29
. The patents data were collected at the USPTO in the patent database 
called PatFT (Patent Full-Text and image database). This database was chosen because 
enables searching patents by company name. However, a search based on the issuer's (patent 
owner) name can only be done since 1976. 
The acquisition of an enterprise is a way of obtaining technical knowledge from other 
sources rather than internal efforts. As the interviews have shown, acquisitions between Big-
Pharmaceutical enterprises and small biotech firms aim to gain access to new competences. In 
other words, at the moment the Big-Pharma acquire a small biotech firm, the former can 
access the technical knowledge possessed by the small firm in the form of patents. 
Incorporating these kind of knowledge, turning it on competences and routines demands 
learning efforts from the acquiring firm. Arguably, a small biotech company can offer to a 
Big-Pharmaceutical enterprise only a potential technical contribution. In that sense, patents 
can show a potential contribution.  
Although patents are proxy from search results (Hall et al., 2001), comparing patent 
activity from Large and small pharmaceutical enterprises is comparing two highly different 
agents in their size and behavior. While large pharmaceutical companies have several research 
programs in different therapeutic areas; small biotech enterprises generally have only one 
research program and sometimes only one possible molecule. The heterogeneity between 
these two agents bring an obvious question: How the technical contribution of such small 
agent can be traced in a large pharmaceutical company?  
By considering the work of Trajtenberg (1997) this study can infer that patents offer a 
direct way of tracing a small enterprise’s technical contribution as they are used as reference 
in other patents. Many times, the large pharmaceutical enterprise will reference the small 
enterprises patents as a source for its own patents. According to Trajtenberg (1997) the 
patents that are more cited could be considered the most important one, because in the process 
of developing technologies enterprises tend always to cite the initial idea that started the 
technological development. Based on Trajtenberg (1997) a patent that is the used as reference 
                                                 
29
 Hall et al. (2001) have made a good study about the methodological uses that USPTO’s patents may have as a 
source of data. 
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several tie is important for the enterprise that cited, therefore, the use of patents to generate 
others is clearly a technical contribution of one enterprise to another.  
Based on Ahuja and Katila (2001); Desyllas and Hughes (2008); Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002); Makri et al. (2010) it is possible to infer that patents also conveys an indirect 
indication of technical contribution, as long as it express part of the knowledge stock 
accumulated by enterprises. All the patents of an enterprise are the output of how it combines 
its technical knowledge and the combination possibilities are bounded by what the enterprise 
knows. For instance, there are enterprises that know more about kidney disease and 
enterprises that know more about heart diseases.  
Each patent is a specific piece of knowledge that contains processes description 
(instructions) which, in theory, can be replicated from a set of basic knowledge pertaining 
each patent. For example, U.S. Patent 8,426,363, issued by Rinat Neuroscience, referred to a 
“[m]ethod for reducing a level of LDL-cholesterol by an antibody that specifically 
binds to PCSK9 (…) The present invention provides antagonizing antibodies, 
antigen-binding portions thereof, and aptamers that bind to proprotein convertase 
subtilisin kexin type 9 (PCSK9). Also provided are antibodies directed to peptides, 
in which the antibodies bind to PCSK9. The invention further provides a method of 
obtaining such antibodies and antibody-encoding nucleic acid. The invention further 
relates to therapeutic methods for use of these antibodies and antigen-binding 
portions thereof to reduce LDL-cholesterol levels and/or for the treatment and/or 
prevention of cardiovascular disease, including treatment of hypercholesterolemia.” 
(Quoted from patent number 8,426,363, issued at USPTO in 2011) 
This invention is related to a method based on molecular biology to reduce cholesterol. 
The full text of this patent describes the cell receptors, the DNA sequences of its antibodies 
and how these two elements bind. Based on this patent, companies, technologically similar to 
Rinat Neuroscience, could replicate the same process. 
On one hand, enterprises can share some similarities among its technical knowledge 
but patents alone are too specific to allow comparisons between companies. On the other hand 
it is impossible for enterprises to know everything, therefore, their technical knowledge have 
boundaries. One way of defining the boundaries of an enterprise technical knowledge is to see 
how its patents are classified in broader categories that can indicate the competences needed 
for patenting. As a matter of fact, patents are classified into classes, which determines what it 
refers and its purpose, and subclasses, which indicate a narrower specificity. For instance, the 
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US patent classification called USPC (United States Patent Classification) defines the class 
and subclass 424/130.1 (424 is the class and subclass is 130.1) as follows: 
“Class 424 refers to: DRUG, BIO-AFFECTING AND BODY TREATING 
COMPOSITIONS. This class includes the following subject matter, not provided for 
elsewhere, when a utility set forth below is either (a) claimed or (b) solely disclosed. 
A. DRUG AND BIO-AFFECTING COMPOSITIONS which are generally capable of: 
1. Preventing, alleviating, treating, or curing abnormal and pathological conditions of the 
living body by such means as: (a) destroying a parasitic organism; (b) limiting the affect of 
the disease or abnormality by chemically altering the physiology of the host or parasite. 
2. Maintaining, increasing, decreasing, limiting, or destroying a physiologic body function; 
e.g., vitamin compositions, sex sterilants, fertility inhibitors, growth promotors, etc. 
3. Diagnosing a physiological condition or state by an in vivo test; e.g., X-ray contrast, etc. 
4. Controlling or protecting an environment or living body by attracting, disabling, inhibiting, 
killing, modifying, repelling or retarding an animal or micro-organism. For example: (a) 
Nonfood baits, attractants, and lures; (b) Biocides including antibiotics of undetermined 
structure; (c) Warfare gases such as lachrymators, sternutators, etc.; (d) Chemical pest 
repellents and adhesive trapping agents. 
B. BODY TREATING COMPOSITIONS generally intended for deodorizing, protecting, 
adorning, or grooming a body; e.g., cosmetics, dentifrices, embalming fluids, etc. 
C. FERMENTATES (e.g., antibiotics, etc.), PLANT AND ANIMAL EXTRACTS, OR 
BODY FLUIDS OR MATERIAL CONTAINING PLANT OR ANIMAL CELLULAR 
STRUCTURE, PER SE, intended to be used for the purposes set forth in A and B above, and 
whose chemical structure is not sufficiently known to be classified elsewhere. 
D. COMPOSITIONS OF THIS CLASS DEFINED IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC 
STRUCTURE; E.G., LAYERED TABLET, CAPSULE, ETC. 
The lines generally prevailing between the composition classes and the article classes are 
applicable to Class 424, unless otherwise indicated, with the exception that Class 424 
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provides for a composition, per se, defined in terms of specific structure having a utility for 
Class 424 (see subclasses 400+). 
E. PROCESSES OF USING the subject matter of the Class Definition, A through C above, 
and in Lines With Other Classes or Within This Class, Compositions Of This Class Defined 
In Terms Of Specific Structure; e.g., Layered Tablet, Capsule, Etc., A, above, or compounds, 
per se, for the purposes set forth in A and B of the Class Definition (See References to Other 
Classes, below, for those classes that that concern "processes." Note particularly the Search 
Notes for Use Processes involving Class 424 subject matter classified elsewhere.) 
F. PROCESSES OF PREPARING subject matter of the Class Definition, A through C, and of 
Lines With Other Classes and Within This Class, Compositions Of This Class Defined In 
Terms Of Specific Structure; e.g., Layered Tablet, Capsule, Etc., part A. 
G. Patents to adjuvant or carrier compositions, per se, which are claimed or solely disclosed 
for perfecting a composition for this class are classified as original in the first appearing 
appropriate subclass providing for any one of the ingredients in Class 514, appropriate 
subclasses, except where the claimed composition possesses a functional property or other 
feature which has been provided for in the Special subclasses 1.1-84, 125 and 126; e.g., Free 
carbon containing, Corrosion inhibitor containing, etc. 
H. A patent claiming a Class 424 active ingredient broadly in terms of its function in 
combination with a specific adjuvant or carrier; e.g., "A tranquilizer and as a carrier therefore 
sugar and gelatin" has been classified as original in the first appearing subclass providing for 
any one of the disclosed specific active ingredients and cross-referenced to all other 
subclasses providing for the remaining disclosed active ingredients.”30 
The subclass 130.1 refers to IMMUNOGLOBULIN, ANTISERUM, ANTIBODY, OR 
ANTIBODY FRAGMENT, EXCEPT CONJUGATE OR COMPLEX OF THE SAME WITH 
NONIMMUNOGLOBULIN MATERIAL: This subclass is indented under the class 
definition. Subject matter involving an immunoglobulin, an antiserum, an antibody, or an 
antibody fragment, except a conjugate or a complex of the same with a nonimmunoglobulin 
material
31
. 
                                                 
30
 Quoted from USPT, link: http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc424/defs424.htm 
31
 Quoted from USPT, link: http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc424/defs424.htm  
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The aforementioned example illustrates that the patent classes and subclasses define 
parameters and purposes, therefore, for enterprises being able to patent in a specific class they 
have to attend to the parameters and purposes established, i.e. enterprises must have certain 
competences that could be translated into patents that fit into the patent class description. 
Thus, one can possibly define the small enterprise’s technical knowledge as: the classes and 
subclasses that compose the small enterprise’s patent universe. As an example, below is 
Rinat Neuroscience technical knowledge set. 
Table 2.3: Rinat Neuroscience Technical Knowledge Set 
424/130.1 424/152.1 424/131.1 435/69.7 
424/133.1 530/388.1 435/329 424/165.1 
530/387.1 435/69.1 530/388.23 424/172.1 
530/387.3 435/326 424/134.1 435/70.21  
424/141.1 424/139.1 424/143.1   
424/145.1 435/252.3 435/254.11   
530/388.24 435/325 530/388.22   
536/23.53 435/320.1 530/389.1   
424/152.1 424/158.1 435/254.11   
      Source: Own elaboration based on USPTO patent data 
The table above encompasses the technical knowledge set held by Rinat Neuroscience. 
But to trace the technical contribution is necessary to compare the acquired and the acquiring 
enterprise. As a feature, technical contribution can only capture technological aspects of R&D 
activities. As will be explained in the following sections, enterprises, even in the same sector, 
have different patent portfolios, by comparing these portfolios is possible to see the difference 
in technological knowledge held by the firms. In a more dynamic view, the evolution of a 
patent portfolio shows the enterprises’ quest for new technical solutions. Therefore enterprises 
that have a similar patent portfolio evolution are looking for similar things. 
 2.4.1 The relationship between technical knowledge set of small biotech enterprises 
and the patenting activity of large pharmaceutical companies  
In the universe of patents, there is a high heterogeneity among them, each patent 
demand divergent R&D efforts and capabilities in order to be developed. The various 
capabilities are expressed among patent’s classes and subclasses. A class that includes some 
form of intravenous serum, for example, requires less scientific and technological effort than a 
patent on genetic markers or DNA sequencing methods. Thus, one can state that there are 
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"easy" and "difficult" classes to issue patents. There is a possibility of companies owning 
several patents in classes and subclasses that require little R&D effort and fewer patents on a 
classes and subclasses that require much R&D efforts. Therefore, not considering any classes 
and subclasses in the innovative process of an enterprise can eliminate significant portion of 
technical knowledge used by a company. 
Another important observation relates differences, importance and relevance of 
patents. Certain patents involve significant scientific and technological efforts from the 
company, resulting in the accumulation of knowledge in specific areas. Often, only one patent 
or a set of few patents may attract the interest of a major pharmaceutical company to acquire a 
small business, in fact, this occurs in most cases. In this context, there may be cases in which 
the acquired small company has only one patent in a class, but its importance cannot be 
minimized. 
The characteristic of small business brings up another important element of its patents. 
Small firms dedicated to biotechnology were originated from opportunities that appear during 
research programs (Audretesch, 2001; Colombo and Piva, 2012). Given the small size of the 
company, its effort to patent is considerable. The trajectory of the small business is often 
marked by only one research line, which summarizes, almost, every R&D effort. Thus, in 
small technology-based companies, any patent is of utmost importance and the patent classes 
also summarize all the company's efforts to innovate. Therefore, (i) the different R&D efforts 
required for patenting in different classes and subclasses, (ii) the importance that a single 
patent may have and (iii) the characteristic of the small firm, turn all classes and subclasses 
into relevant elements for building the technical knowledge set of small biotech enterprises. 
The technical knowledge set of a small business is a parameter used to verify how the 
patenting activity of large pharmaceutical enterprise has changed. For this, is necessary to 
observe the year that the large company applied its first patent in each class and 
subclass that encompass the small enterprise knowledge set. This process creates a link 
between the technical knowledge set of the small business and the patenting activity of the 
large company. By doing this is possible to observe when the acquiring company began to 
incorporate new classes and subclasses to its technical knowledge set. As an example, 
consider the following table concerning Rinat Neuroscience (RN) technical knowledge and 
Pfizer’s patent activities. 
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Table 2.4: Interactions between Rinat Neuroscience’s technical knowledge set 
and Pfizer’s patenting activity. 
Technical knowledge Set of 
Rinat Neuroscience 
Year when Pfizer 
applied its first 
patent on the 
patent class at left  
424/131.1 
2011 
435/329 
530/388.23 2009 
536/23.53 2005 
435/326 2004 
424/145.1 
2003 
530/388.24 
424/139.1 2001 
424/134.1   
424/130.1 
1999 
424/133.1 
530/387.1 
530/387.3 
424/141.1 
424/152.1 
530/388.1 
424/143.1 
530/388.22 
424/172.1 
530/389.1 1998 
435/252.3 
1995 
435/254.11 
435/254.11 
435/69.1 
435/69.7 
435/320.1 1994 
435/325 1992 
435/70.21  1986 
424/158.1  Not developed 
424/165.1  Not developed 
   Source: Source: own elaboration based on USPTO patent data 
In the table above one can observe the relationship between the acquired company, 
Rinat Neuroscience, and the acquiring company, Pfizer. In the left column are the classes and 
subclasses that compose the Rinat Neuroscience’s technical knowledge set, the right column 
indicates the year in which Pfizer filed its first patent in the class and subclass at left. For 
instance, in 2011 Pfizer has applied its first patent in the classes 424/131.1 and 435/329, 
therefore in 2011 Pfizer has incorporate these technologies in its set of capabilities  
The table above is an example of how the data was collected. To present the data, 
there is a summary table where each small firm acquired is displayed. The summary table 
compiles the dates when the classes and subclasses that compose the small business 
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knowledge set started to be developed. The summary table is divided into four decades, 1970, 
1980, 1990 and 2000 onwards and a final category which contains the not developed classes. 
Table 2.5: Summary of the contribution of Rinat to Pfizer 
Classes developed in 
the years of 
(%) 
2000 onwards 30% 
1990 60% 
1980 3% 
1970 0% 
Classes not developed 7% 
  Source: Own elaboration 
The table above indicates that during the 1970s Pfizer did not start to develop any 
class or subclass belonging to Rinat’s technical knowledge. During the 1980s, Pfizer 
developed only 3% of the classes and subclasses in RN’s technical knowledge set. Through 
the 1990s Pfizer began patenting in 60% of classes and subclasses owned by Rinat. In the 
2000 onwards, Pfizer began patenting in 30% of classes and subclasses. Only 7% of classes 
and subclasses were not developed by Pfizer 
In order to get the percentages presented above, for each decade, the average number 
of classes developed by the Big-Pharma was calculated. Therefore, the small company A has 
N classes and subclasses in its technical knowledge set; of these, only k classes and subclasses 
were carried on by Big company B during the 1970s, x classes and subclasses in the 1980s, y 
classes and subclasses in the 1990s, w classes from 2000 onwards, and z classes were not 
developed. Note that k + x + y + w +z =N, and k, x, y, w, z≤ N. The average calculation is 
given by the relationship: k / N for the 1970; x / N for the 1980s; y / N for the 1990s, w / N 
for the years 2000 onwards and z / N for classes and subclasses not developed. Thus, it is 
possible to build, for each company, a summary table that will be presented in a graphical 
form. 
Therefore the technical contribution of a small biotech company to a large enterprise is 
observed according to how recent the large pharmaceutical company started to developed the 
small biotech company technical knowledge set. As recent the development is the greater is 
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the potential technical contribution that a small company can offer to a Big-Pharmaceutical 
enterprise. 
2.4.2 Expected results and their analysis 
Before presenting the data collected, it is necessary to discuss what the expected 
results are and how they will be interpreted. The correspondence between technical 
knowledge set of small enterprises and the large companies’ patenting activity places a strong 
temporal character in data analysis. "Time" will be an important factor to trace indirect 
technical contribution.  
A way of identifying when a large company has incorporated a certain body of 
technical knowledge into its own patenting activity, therefore into its research activities, is 
tracing in time the moment the large pharmaceutical enterprise applied its first patent in each 
class and subclass that compose the small enterprises’ technical knowledge. Technical 
contribution will be verified according to the period that the large pharmaceutical enterprise 
has applied its first patent in the same patent class and subclass in which the small biotech has 
patents. The correlation between the first large enterprise’s patent in specific class and 
subclass within the small enterprise’s technical knowledge can generate three types of results. 
Thus, the patent activity of the large pharmaceutical enterprise could have begun: (i) prior to 
the acquisition of small business; (ii) close in time to the acquisition of small business or it 
could be (iii) non-further developed by the large company. 
When the development of classes and subclasses by large enterprises occurred long 
before the small business’ acquisition, the technical contribution of this firm will be classified 
as intermediate. A large company that have patented in the classes, that compose the small 
enterprises’ technical knowledge set, in a long period before the acquisition is an indication 
that the technical knowledge of small business are not new to the large company. Thus, the 
Big-Pharma’s technical knowledge set is very similar to the technical knowledge set of the 
acquired company, therefore the potential addition of new competences in the Big-Pharma’s 
technical knowledge set is intermediate. This kind of result indicates an intermediate 
contribution of small business to the large enterprise.  
When the development of classes by the large pharmaceutical enterprise is close in 
time with the acquisition of a small biotech company, the technical contribution of the small 
enterprise will be classified as substantial. A Big-Pharma that has recently develop patents in 
the same classes and subclasses of its acquired small enterprises is an indication that the large 
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enterprise’s knowledge set is not extremely similar nor extremely different from the technical 
knowledge set of the small acquired enterprise, therefore, both technical knowledge sets are 
potentially complementary. In that sense, the small enterprise’s technical knowledge set can 
substantially add new competences to the large pharmaceutical company. In the end, this may 
indicate that the small firm technical knowledge set is useful for large company.  
Finally, a large company may not develop any patents in classes or subclasses that are 
comprised in the small business knowledge set. This case shows that the enterprises technical 
knowledge set are totally different from each other. A high degree of heterogeneity means 
greater difficulty in combing technical knowledge sets for creating learning opportunities, 
therefore, in this specific case, the potential new competences that the small enterprise’s 
technical knowledge set could add to the technical knowledge set of the Big-Pharma is weak. 
These kind of results will be classified as a weak technical contribution from the small 
business to the large enterprise. In this study, it is not supposed that the no continuity of a 
particular class and subclass of patents are due to the large company inability to develop it
32
. 
Given the size and the ability to search it is almost impossible for the large company be 
unable to develop any patent class regarding pharmaceutical industry.   
The analyses of the technical contribution are part of the overall contribution. The 
acquisition of a firm’s technology through patent portfolio does not mean that the large 
pharmaceutical company will master the competences that were held by the smaller company. 
The ability of companies to develop new competences and innovate is not only a matter of 
replication and application of technological knowledge, that is somehow encoded in patents, 
manuals, books, etc. That is why it is necessary to analyses the transference of skills from one 
enterprise to another  
 
2.5 Skills contribution 
 
Skills are a component of knowledge there is embodied in the persons that developed 
the technology. This type of knowledge, within the economic agents, cannot be transferred 
through instructions, but are acquired through learning and experience. The pharmaceutical 
industry, despite its relationship with the patent system, depends highly on skills in drug 
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discovery, as pointed by, Nightingale (2002); Gambardella (1995), Schwartzman (1976) and 
Schwartzman and Cognato (1996). 
Given the importance played by skills, as pointed out by Almeida et al. (2001); 
Grigoriu and Roathermel (2014); Hohberg (2016); Oettl (2012); Zucker and Darby (2007); 
Zucker et al. (2001); Zucker et al. (2006), it would be important to check if it is transferred 
from the small to the large company and what effects it has on the big enterprise R&D and 
patent activities. But, it is possible, within the innovative process of large and small firms 
identify some kind of skill knowledge or establish any proxy for it? The answer is yes. Skills 
are embodied in agents and thus move with them. Regarding patents information is possible to 
retrieve the inventors’ information which is the agent who executed and deposited patents. 
Therefore, the inventors will be compiled from the patents information. All inventor 
information will be retrieved from the PatFT (Patent Full-Text and image database) database. 
Big enterprise’s ability in retaining the core people responsible for the development of 
technologies is imperative and desired
33
. The people responsible for creating the patents can 
be a great contribution to the large pharmaceutical enterprises’ R&D and patent activity. 
Thus, the large enterprise that is capable of acquiring the small enterprise technical and skill 
set enjoys a better contribution from the small company. 
2.5.1 Relationship between skill set of small business and its use by big business 
The inventors do not represent the whole skill set of a company. However, the 
inventors responsible for patents are important elements and can offer a great contribution to 
the large acquiring enterprise.  
The technological knowledge, described in a patent, is very specific and has a 
particular purpose, as can be seen in the example of patent No. 8,426,363 (see pg. 42). Skills, 
however, have a characteristic of being more "elastic" and "amorphous", they can be 
considered less rigid because they can be applied in similar technological elements. The 
greater "flexibility" held by skills allows scientist to employ them in similar researches that 
will lead to different kind of drugs. Nevertheless, the drug purposes should not be so 
distinguished. The same scientist can work in a series of researches that encompass the same 
mechanism such as inhibition of a cell receptor. Therefore, inhibiting a cellular receptor has 
the same principle, no matter if this receptor is responsible for kidney or liver enzymes. Yet 
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technical knowledge, as patent 8,426,363, cannot be applied to anything other than what it 
describes. 
In this context, the use of inventors by large companies can be wider. Due to the skills 
embodied in agents, inventors can be allocated in similar research and development processes. 
The skill set is defined in this study as all the inventors compiled through the company’s 
patents. In order to track the skill contribution of a small company to a large company, this 
study, seeks which inventors has changed from the small acquired company to the large 
acquiring enterprise. An example is shown in the table below related to Roche. 
Table 2.6: The use of Inventors by Roche 
Companies acquired by Roche 
(year of purchase) 
Total of 
inventors in 
the acquired 
enterprises 
(A) 
Inventors that 
started 
patenting by 
Roche (B) 
Numbers of 
patents of 
Roches’s 
inventors (C) 
Use of 
inventors by 
Roche (B/A) 
Piramed (2008) 24 24 102 100% 
Mirus-Bio (2008) 25 19 78 76% 
Arius (2008) 14 5 11 36% 
Therapeutic Human Polyclonals 
(2007) 
4 0 0 0% 
Memory Pharmaceuticals (2008) 26 0 0 0% 
Macardia (2010) 2 0 0 0% 
Source: Own elaboration 
The concept of inventor’s use should be highlighted in the table above. For the 
purpose of this study, use of inventors is defined as the ratio of the inventors who started to 
patent for the large company (B) in relation to the total of inventors in the acquired 
small enterprises (A).  
2.5.2 Expected results and their analysis 
The group of results that indicate the relationship between skills and patenting activity 
can be divided in two, namely: the use and nonuse of inventors. Not using inventors means 
that the small company does not have a skill contribution to the large enterprise’s innovative 
activity. In contrast, the use of inventors indicates that there is a skill contribution. 
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2.6 Interviews 
  
Interviews were conducted during the period that the PhD was conducted abroad. Four 
interviews were made, two with Pfizer, one with Johnson & Johnson and one with 
Merck&Co. All persons interviewed were key people in the scouting teams of each enterprise. 
Although not all enterprises call their departments as scouting teams, their mission is to scout 
for small biotech enterprises with promising technologies and capabilities. The scouting teams 
are looking to establish research agreements and selecting possible acquisition targets, so they 
can be considered as an institutionalized action towards searching for external sources of 
innovation. The existence of such scouting teams are a fact that alone indicates the importance 
of small pharmaceutical enterprises as potential sources of innovation.  
The interviews were exploratory and the questions made were  divided in three main 
areas (see Annex, pg. 187). The first part of the interview aimed to identify what was the 
interviewee role among the enterprise structure then showing the relevance of the persons 
interviewed for the study objective. The answers have showed that all persons interviewed are 
involved in the processes of choosing small enterprises for collaboration and acquisition. 
Also, the main parameters for choosing a target are technological related; that is different 
from Mergers between large enterprises.  
The second part of the interview was focused on the collaborations (one of the overall 
contribution elements). The questions in this part aimed to first stablish how important 
collaborations are. Then the interview aimed to identify how often the Big-pharma uses 
external sources of innovation in their R&D. Finally the interview tried to identify if there 
was a clear work division in the process of collaboration. 
The third part of the interviews deals with acquisitions their technological and skills 
outcomes (the other element of overall contribution). First this part of interview tried to 
differentiate the acquisition and the collaborations regarding their purposes. Then the 
interview explored what drives a Big-Pharma to acquire a small company. One important step 
during the interviews was to question what small enterprises could be considered as a 
successful case. All enterprises interviewed defined the success cases in very similar ways, for 
those enterprises success are considered when the acquisition of a small enterprise enables 
the development of new competences related to the small enterprises knowledge or when 
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the acquisition enhances some existence competence in the acquiring enterprise. 
Therefore, the not successful cases are acquisitions that had no effect on the enterprises set of 
competencies. Thus, each interview allow to define which acquisition of small enterprise 
could be considered successful and unsuccessful.  
There is no chapter dedicated to the interview alone, the results of the interviews are 
presented throughput the study. This decision was made because the information obtained 
would be better employed as sources of complementing and supporting the ideas developed in 
the study.. Most of the interviews results are presented throughout the study cases. Finally, is 
important to state that the interviews supported the study findings 
 
2.7 Methodology Summary table 
 
This study is looking for the overall contribution that an acquired small biotech firm 
can offer to a large pharmaceutical enterprise’s R&D. The overall contribution can be divided 
into components: (i) prior contribution; (ii) technical contribution, divided into direct and 
indirect and (iii) Skills contribution. 
In order to summarize the important concepts developed in the methodology and how 
it are linked, bellow is shown a summary table. 
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Table 2.8: Methodology Summary 
Elements to be 
considered 
when 
analyzing 
contribution 
Overall 
contribution 
component 
Key elements 
Data 
source 
Collaboration 
Prior 
contribution 
 
R&D 
collaboration 
agreements 
Databases 
in the 
library of 
congress 
M&A 
 
Direct 
technological 
contribution 
Patents used as 
reference  
Patents 
Indirect 
technological 
contribution 
Technical 
knowledge set 
analyses 
Patents 
Scientists 
Skills 
Contribution 
Skill set 
analyses 
Patents 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Chapter 3 Overall Contribution Process: Case Study Analyses 
 
 
This following chapter is composed by five case studies. The enterprises analyzed are 
Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co, Roche and Abbott-Laboratories. The interviews 
were conducted with three of the five enterprises being them: Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and 
Merck&Co the other two enterprises (Roche an Abbott-Laboratories) were used to test the 
methodology. 
 
3.1 The Pfizer Case 
 
3.1.1 Pfizer’s M&A overview  
 
Pfizer is a major US pharmaceutical company that, among all the companies in the 
sample, has showed the most active behavior concerning acquisitions of small biotech 
companies. This behavior is showed in the table below. 
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Table 3.1: Pfizer’s acquisition of small biotech enterprises between 2005 and 2012(U$ million) 
Enterprises 
Acquisition 
year 
M&A 
deal 
amount  
Number of 
patents 
Employees 
(2012) 
Enterprise 
origin 
Foundation 
Revenue 
(2012) 
Collaboration 
Development 
stage of lead 
product 
Vicuron 2005 1900 24 216 US 1995 7 Yes (2003) - 
Idun 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 280 39 50 US 1993 4.1 No 2 
Bioren 2005 80 1 - US - - No Pre-clinical 
Rinat 
Neuroscience 
2006 400 25 16 US 2000 1.7 No 2 
Coley 2007 200 55 130 US 1997 22.6 No - 
Biorexis 2007 130 4 - US 2002 - No Pre-clinical 
CovX 2008 300 7 45 US 2002 4.6 No 1 
Serenex 2008 200 10 23 US - - No 1 
Encysive 2008 195 9 282 US 1989 59 No - 
FoldRx 2010 200 3 32 US 2004 32 No 3 
Icagen 2011 56 91 38 US 1992 
10.5* 
(2010) 
Yes (2007, 
renewed in 
2011) 
- 
Excaliard 2011 - 5 
 
US 2006 - No 2 
Source: Own elaboration  
*Revenue in 2010 
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The amount spent by Pfizer, between 2005 and 2012, in M&A with small biotech 
enterprises totalizes US$ 3.9 billion. This sum is almost half as the enterprise has spent in 
R&D in 2012 (US$ 7.870 billion). Pfizer seems to behave as a major global player that 
systematically resorts to M&A as a strategy to acquire new technologies. For instance, Pfizer 
has, in eight years, "inherited" 268 patents by acquiring the twelve (12) small biotech 
companies listed above. Through M&A only, Pfizer has obtained an average of 33 patents per 
year. Whereas, from 1976 to 2012, Pfizer issued 4029 patents at USPTO
34
, an average of 
ninety (90) patents a year  
An important M&A feature unfolds, as R&D and M&A expenditures are linked to 
patent production and “inherited” patent portfolio. A simple input-output model can be draw. 
In this simple model the inputs are: (i) R&D and (ii) M&A expenditures. Those inputs 
generates, respectively: (i) the Patents issued for Pfizer and (ii) “inherited” patent portfolio, 
i.e. the patents that Pfizer has obtained after it acquired the small enterprises. Based on this 
model, Pfizer has spent, from 2005 to 2012, 65 billion dollars in R&D and it produced 484 
patents. In the same period, Pfizer has spent U$3.9 billion
35
 in M&A and it obtained 268 
patents. 
The M&A expenditures are only 6% of the R&D expenditures and the inherited 
portfolio is more than half of the patents produced with its own research efforts. In a simple 
way of thinking: Pfizer has through acquisitions generated 55% of the patents it would 
generate just using its internal research efforts. At least for Pfizer, acquisitions have a more 
than proportional technological outcome, when compared to R&D. 
Although, this input-output model is extremely simple and possess limitations, 
especially regarding the effects of learning in R&D activities, one can state that M&A are a 
more efficient
36
 ways of producing technology. At least for Pfizer, acquisitions seem to be the 
easiest and cheapest way to get new technologies.   
The development stage of lead product also shows the tendency of Pfizer on acquiring, 
preferably, enterprises with products at an early stage of development. Of all small companies 
acquires, 33% of them does not have any product in clinical trials and 27% were in stage 2 of 
the clinical trials. Pfizer tries to cooperate and acquire enterprises that have products at least 
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 In this study, all patent data were collected from the PatFT base at USPTO. 
35
 The M&A amount refers, only, to the acquired small biotech enterprises that had at least one patent at USPTO. 
36
 Where efficiency means the relations between inputs and cost 
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on stage two of clinical trials
37
, at an earlier stage of development corrections in research are 
easier to be made. What makes Pfizer and other large pharmaceutical companies different 
from small biotech companies are their capacity to run and conduct clinical trials. In a 
research agreement, Pfizer is responsible for the funding and the conduction of the clinical 
trials
38. Pfizer’s preference on acquiring companies whose products are at an early stage of 
development is due the company capacity of generating and conducting research activities 
originated among external sources. In addition, the use of external sources of innovation in 
early stages shows that small companies are being incorporate into the large enterprises R&D 
activities at the beginning of the innovative process.  
3.1.2 Overall contribution analyses: The Pfizer Case  
As stressed before, overall contribution is composed by three categories: (i) prior 
contribution, (ii) direct and indirect technical contribution and (iii) skills contribution  
3.1.2.1 Prior contribution 
An important step towards building new competences is stablishing research 
collaborations. Through research collaborations, enterprises share the risks inherent to R&D 
activities and they increase the economies of scale and scope in the research activities 
(Vonortas, 2009). According to Higgins and Rodrigues (2006), collaboration help enterprises 
to know better its research counterparts. Research collaborations prior to the small enterprise 
acquisition, compose an important part of this study. Although not all research partnerships 
appear in the databases because several of them are tacit agreements, the ones that can be 
traced through the databases are important agreements that had some kind of contractual 
binding. 
The results found pointed that only Icagen and Vicuron had some kind of research 
agreement with Pfizer. Vicuron had a research agreement to further develop a new class of 
antibiotics and Icagen had a major research agreement related to Pfizer’s sodium channel 
program. 
The research agreement between Vicuron and Pfizer were set in May 15
th
 of 2003, the 
agreement was a continuity of a prior agreement between Pharmacia and Vicuron. After 
Pfizer acquired Pharmacia, the two companies started to operate as a single one in 2003, and 
the collaboration between Pfizer and Vicuron was carried on. This research agreement aimed 
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to further develop Oxazolidinones a new class of antibiotics. According to the source of 
information  
“ [Oxazolidinones] have several significant characteristics, including a 
unique mechanism of action that prevents cross-resistance with existing 
antimicrobials. Next-generation compounds from this class likely will have 
improved potency and a broader spectrum of activity, providing the potential to 
target the multi-billion dollar community-based anti-infective market”39(PR 
Newswire 15 May 2003).   
The other small enterprise that had a research agreement with Pfizer was Icagen. The 
agreement between these two enterprises was established for developing Pfizer’s sodium 
channel program for pain and related disorders, it generated a compound that targets the ion 
channel, called Nav 1.7. This partnership agreement started in 2007 totalizing US$ 1 billion 
dollars. The agreement was divided as follows: for two years, Pfizer would fund U$ 38 
million of Icagen’s research activities and US$ 15 million was an upfront deal for Pfizer 
acquiring Icagen’s stocks, the rest was divided in licensing agreement fees and in advanced 
payment for each new product developed.  
The collaboration was extended in 2010 when Pfizer decided to pay US$ 3 million as 
a milestone payment to Icagen. Pfizer had continuously fund all aspects of the collaboration, 
including all preclinical development efforts and clinical studies. As an outcome, Pfizer 
receive exclusive worldwide rights over the products commercialization originated from this 
agreement (Drug store news, 2010; Business Insights, 2015) 
The next two statements can summarize how usually the research agreements are 
divided between large and small pharmaceutical companies. The first one is of Claudio Quart, 
Ph.D., Vicuron's chief operating officer, he said: "Pfizer brings world-class research and 
powerful sales and marketing capabilities to this collaboration"
40
. The second was made by P. 
Kay Wagoner, CEO of Icagen, where he stated that "in collaboration with Pfizer, we continue 
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 Vicuron to Continue Collaboration with Pfizer to Develop Oral Antibiotics For Community Market." PR 
Newswire 15 May 2003. Acessed via:  Business Insights: Global Web, on 1 Oct. 2015.  
40
 Icagen -- Pfizer Pain Collaboration Reaches First-in-Man Milestones." Benzinga.com 29 July 2010. Business 
Insights: Global. Web. 1 Oct. 2015 
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the clinical development of our potent and subtype-selective Nav 1.7 blocker”41. Those 
statements and the interviews conducted clearly show that this kind of collaboration is done in 
the early stages of the product development, up to stage II of clinical trials.  
Pfizer uses its financial and research capacity for further developing the new product 
and for conducting the late stages clinical trials. This large enterprise, also, uses its channel of 
distribution and marketing capacity to deliver the product to its consumers. Therefore, in most 
cases, the “idea” and the early development is in charge of the small company; whereas the 
financial support, late stage clinical trials and distribution is in charge of Pfizer. This whole 
passage reinforces the idea that small biotech enterprises form some kind of market for 
technology and they are chosen for cooperation and acquisition based on the capabilities that 
the large companies wants to be developed. 
3.1.2.2 Technical Contribution 
In order to identify how the acquired small enterprises could contribute to the large 
pharmaceutical company’s innovative activity is imperative to conduct two steps. First, 
identify if any small enterprises’ patent were used as reference in some patent of Pfizer. 
Finally, it is necessary to established when Pfizer started to patent in the same classes and 
subclasses that compose the acquired small biotech company’s technical knowledge set. At 
the same time this is a way of comparing how different the enterprises knowledge bases and 
to evidence how new the small enterprises technical knowledge is new for the Big-Pharma. 
By doing this, the study aims to cover the technical contribution analyses. 
As already explained in the methodology, a direct way of identifying technical 
contribution is through patents used as references. The table below shows: (i) all small 
enterprises acquired by Pfizer; (ii) the number of patents each enterprise has issued at 
USPTO; (iii) the number of patents used by Pfizer as reference; (iv)the number of patents 
generated by Pfizer having the small enterprises’ patents as references and (v) a patent 
productivity measure that gives the idea of how many patents each referenced patent has 
generated, therefore, high patent productivity value means patents that were used more times 
than lower patent productivity values.  
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Table 3.2: Acquired small enterprises direct technical contribution to Pfizer 
Acquired 
enterprises 
Number of 
patents 
(A) 
Patents used, 
by Pfizer, as 
reference 
(B) 
Patents applied, by 
Pfizer, using the small 
enterprises' patents as 
reference 
(C) 
Patent 
productivity 
(C/B) 
Bioren 1 0 0 0 
Vicuron 24 0 0 0 
Idun 
Pharmaceuticals 
39 1 1 1 
Bioren 1 0 0 0 
Rinat Neuroscience 27 2 3 1.5 
Coley 56 34 7 0.2 
Biorexis 4 0 0 0 
Covx 8 1 3 3 
Serenex 10 0 0 0 
Encysive 9 0 0 0 
FoldRx 3 0 0 0 
Incagen 91 2 1 0.5 
Excaliard 5 0 0 0 
Source: Own elaboration 
Not so many enterprises had their patents used as references, only Idun 
Pharmaceuticals, Rinat Neuroscience, Coley, Covx and Icagen. At a first glance, Coley could 
be highlighted, thus several of its patent portfolio was used as reference (61%). Although, 
Coley had a greater amount of patents used as reference, its patents generated a small number 
of patents than the ones referenced, the 34 patents were only referenced in 7 (seven) of 
Pfizer’s patents. For instance, Pfizer referenced two patents of Rinat, but those patent were 
referenced in 3 different patents. At least one patent of Rinat were used as reference in more 
than one patent of Pfizer. Covx is another interesting case where only one patent were 
reference in other three patents. Therefore Rinat’s and Covx’s patents were more broadly 
used.  
Idun Pharmaceuticals, Rinat Neuroscience, Coley, Covx and Icagen can be highlighted 
as enterprises that contributed directly to Pfizer. Not only that, but, Rinat and Icagen were 
pointed as a successful case of acquisition
42
. For Pfizer, up until this moment, it is possible to 
state that direct technical contribution is an important component of overall contribution.  
The indirect way of tracing technical contribution is by comparing patent data between 
these two companies. Such comparison was based on data encompassing the small business 
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technical knowledge set, as previously presented. Thus, the small business technical 
knowledge set is the starting point, through it was established when large companies began to 
apply its patents in the same classes and subclasses that compose the small biotech 
enterprises’ technical knowledge set.  
The indirect technical contribution begins by showing the summary table below. This 
table shows the evolution of Pfizer’s patent activity in the same classes and subclasses that 
compose the small enterprises’ technical knowledge set. So, at this point, this study is trying 
to observe when and how Pfizer has constructed the same technical knowledge set held by its 
acquired companies.  
According to the patent activity of Pfizer, the potential technical contribution that each 
small company can offer varies. On one hand, Companies that had their technical knowledge 
set developed, by Pfizer, long before its acquisition would have little to contribute 
technologically, because, Pfizer has constructed a long time ago a very similar knowledge 
base.  
On the other hand, companies, that had their technical knowledge set developed in a 
recent period of time, have much to contribute. Under these circumstances, the large and the 
small companies were building related capabilities and forming their knowledge base almost 
at the same time. In that sense, when two enterprises are researching related things, not so 
distant in time, the degree of novelty in the small enterprise research is higher than in a 
research that Pfizer has undertaken several years ago.  
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Table 3.3: Pfizer’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to the acquired biotech firms.  
 
 
Enterprises acquired by Pfizer from 2005 to 2012 (year of acquisition) 
Decade 
Bioren 
(2005) 
Idun 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2005) 
Vicuron 
(2005) 
Rinat 
Neuroscience 
(2006) 
Icagen 
(2011) 
Coley 
(2007) 
Biorexis 
(2007) 
Encysive 
(2008) 
Serenex 
(2008) 
CoVx 
(2008) 
FoldRx 
(2010) 
Excaliard 
(2011) 
2000 
onwards 
0% 10% 12% 30% 7% 10% 7% 0% 3% 14% 0% 0% 
1990s 0% 21% 29% 60% 20% 37% 43% 17% 16% 21% 14% 25% 
1980s 0% 30% 24% 3% 30% 17% 0% 24% 24% 7% 29% 25% 
1970s 0% 27% 24% 0% 36% 55% 0% 57% 18% 0% 57% 0% 
Classes 
not 
developed 
100% 12% 12% 7% 7% 29% 50% 2% 39% 57% 0% 50% 
Source: Own elaboration based on patent data 
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The table above should be understood as follows. For example, Pfizer developed 27% 
of a similar technical knowledge set to Idun during the 1970s, 30% in the 1980s, 21% in the 
1990s, 10% from 2000 to 2012 and 12% of all its technical knowledge set has not been 
developed yet by Pfizer. 
The way that Pfizer has developed the small enterprises technical knowledge enables 
to divide companies according to the indirect technical contribution made to the large 
enterprise innovative activity. As shown before, there are three possible cases. First, weak 
contribution happens if Pfizer has not developed the majority
43
 of classes – that compose the 
small enterprises technical knowledge set. Second, intermediate contribution, in case Pfizer 
has developed the majority of classes in a period time long before small business’ acquisition. 
Third substantial contribution, in case Pfizer has developed the majority of classes in a recent 
period or after the purchase of small business. The division of firms acquired by Pfizer, 
according to the categories described above is shown in the table below. 
Chart 3.1: Small enterprises division according to their indirect technical 
contribution.  
 
Technological Contribution 
 
Weak Intermediate Substantial 
Enterprises 
Biorexis, 
Serenex, 
CoVx, 
Excaliard 
Bioren 
Idun Pharmaceuticals, 
Icagen, 
Coley, 
Vicuron, 
Encysive, 
FoldRx 
Vicuron, 
Rinat Neuroscience, 
Biorexis 
   Source: Own elaboration  
Pfizer’s patent activity, regarding the small enterprises technical knowledge set, 
highlights some import features. In the recent period, Pfizer has, clearly, developed a similar 
technical knowledge to Rinat Neuroscience, where 90% of RN’s technical knowledge set was 
developed, by Pfizer, during the 1990s and from 2000 onwards. Pfizer has developed 50% of 
a similar technical knowledge set to Biorexis, during the 1990s and from 2000s onwards. 
Nevertheless, Biorexis have a high rate (50%) of classes that Pfizer has not issued any patent. 
Biorexis can at the same time be a weak contribution enterprise or a substantial contribution. 
Finally, Vicuron case poses some difficulties, because the enterprise’s technical knowledge 
set was not majorly developed in any period of time, from the 1990s to 2000 onwards only 
                                                 
43
 In this study, majority is always equal or higher to 50% 
95 
 
41% were developed and 48% were developed from the 1970s to the 1980. Until this point, 
Rinat, is the only case where it is possible to assure a substantial indirect technical 
contribution.  
Substantial contributions are best analyzed individually; indeed, these are cases that 
really show how the small business contributes to the large enterprise R & D activity. The 
individual analyses of each enterprise cited above can shed some light in their technical 
contribution to Pfizer. 
3.1.2.3 Vicuron 
Vicuron has 24 patents filed at USPTO, the company was founded in 1995 and 
acquired in 2005. In order to see how Pfizer’s patent activity has evolved in the same classes 
and subclasses that compose Vicuron’s knowledge set, a graphic is presented below. The 
chart is composed as follows. The Y axis represents how many classes and subclasses Pfizer 
has developed. The years are represent in the X axis. The green line marks the year Vicuron 
was founded and the red line the year the company was acquired. 
Graphic 3.1: Pfizer’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to 
Vicuron.  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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In the early 1970s, Pfizer had already started to develop 6 patent classes and 
subclasses that compose Vicuron’s technical knowledge set. The period from 1995 to 2005 
can be considered important for two reasons. First, is the moment that encompasses the 
enterprise foundation and acquisition. So, it is during this time that Vicuron has constructed 
all of its competences. Second, this is the exactly period when Pfizer has developed a large 
number of classes and subclasses (23 new classes and subclasses) also. Therefore, from 1995 
to 2005 these two enterprises were constructing, at the same time, their technical knowledge 
set and then building related competences 
Pfizer has developed 2 classes in the year that Vicuron was founded, 17 from 1996 to 
2004, 3 in the year the small enterprise was acquire and one class (530/326) was developed 
after the Vicuron was acquired. This particular patent class may have a strong influence of 
Vicuron on Pfizer’s technology development. The reason for that is that the class 530/326 
only became part of Pfizer’s technical knowledge set after Vicuron’s acquisition. A closer 
look at this class and subclass 530/326 could raise some interesting conclusions about why 
this class was developed after Vicuron’s purchased. 
Class 530 refers to proteins and peptides and subclass 326 encompass amino acids 
linked by peptide. This class encompass the capacity of synthetize proteins that could bind to 
cellular receptors for then achieve the desired therapeutic effect. This class as showed in 
chapter one deals with new ways of treating diseases enabled by the advances in 
biotechnology. The fact that this class was only developed by Pfizer after the acquisition of 
Vicuron shows an attempt of acquiring new technological competence in this specific area, 
following the industry tendency to incorporated new technologies in drug discovery activities. 
3.1.2.4 Biorexis 
The company was founded in 2002 and acquired by Pfizer in 2007. Biorexis has few 
patents, only four, however, the company conducted some important research about diabetes 
type II. 
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Graphic 3.2: Pfizer’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to 
Biorexis.  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Despite Biorexis few patents, the development of its technical knowledge set by Pfizer 
started recently. However, through the graphic above it is possible to see that Pfizer had 
already stopped developing the same classes and subclasses held by Biorexis one year before 
the enterprise foundation. This lack of continuity in building a technical knowledge set equal 
to Biorexis indicated that this enterprise has not contribute so much to Pfizers competences. 
Even after the acquisition Pfizer has not pursue the same technical path as Biorexis. This fact 
explains why 50% of Biorexis’ technical knowledge set was not developed by Pfizer. Possibly 
Pfizer has not dedicated efforts to developed areas related to the ones Biorexis had already 
developed. 
The last class developed by Pfizer, within Biorexis’s technical knowledge set, was the 
class 514 / 7.2, which is related to drug production. The subclass 7.2 is under subclass 6.9, 
which is related to medications and treatments for diabetes. Thus, it is possible to observe a 
relationship between the last class developed by Pfizer, within the range of Biorexis technical 
knowledge set and the research conduct by Biorexis aiming to develop a treatment for type 2 
diabetes. Thus, the fact of having so many classes not developed by Pfizer and the long period 
which Pfizer has not developed any patent class does not allow to conclude that Biorexis has, 
indeed, contribute to Pfizers technical development.  
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3.1.2.5 Rinat Neuroscience 
The last company that presented a substantial technical contribution was Rinat 
Neurosicence (RN), founded in 2002 with 25 patents filed at USPTO prior to its acquisition in 
2006. RN still is a research unit of Pfizer, Therefore, it still issued patent under its name, but 
now as a Pfizer’s research facility. In addition, RN was pointed out as a successful 
acquisition. 
Graphic 3.3: Pfizer’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to Rinat 
Neuroscience.  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
RN being a stand-alone research facility is a fact that by itself is enough to indicate a 
substantial contribution from RN to Pfizer’s R&D. In addition, Pfizer has only recently started 
to develop the same classes that compose RN’s technical knowledge set. In 1992 Pfizer 
started to develop, continuously, the patent classes held by RN. In 1995, the Big-Pharma 
started to develop 5 new patent classes and subclasses, this number was only surpassed in 
1999, when the company began to develop 10 new classes. The RN’s technical knowledge set 
is new for Pfizer and also important, this small enterprise was acquired just 4 years after it 
was founded. Not only that, but, 3 classes were developed by Pfizer after RN acquisition.  
Classes and subclasses developed after the small enterprise acquisition can indicate a 
great contribution and that can be analyzed when those specific classes and subclasses are 
looked individually. The three classes developed by Pfizer after RN acquisition were: 424 / 
131.1; 435/329 and 530 / 388.23. 
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The class 424 relates to vaccine production and use of antibodies in diseases’ 
treatments. Subclass 131.1 involves an antibody or an antigen-binding fragment thereof that 
binds another antibody at one of its idiotopes. Class 435 is related to molecular biology being 
a typical biotechnology class. The subclass 329 designates antibodies and immunoglobulins 
that bind to saccharide chains. Finally, Class 530 is linked to production of natural resins that 
may be proteins and peptides and the subclass 388.23 refers to proteins or peptides, which 
bind to certain molecules or could control cells’ growth. The classes, developed by Pfizer 
after RN acquisition, were focused on protein production and RN has strong competences on 
developing proteins for treating neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’ disease.  
The way Pfizer has, recently, developed its technical knowledge shows a tendency in 
developing classes linked to protein production that are able to bind into specific targets. This 
fact is an evidence of the technological shift
44
 towards proteins production for treating 
diseases. 
3.1.2.6 The Skill contribution of small acquired enterprises to Pfizer 
As mentioned before the use of inventors is an important way to verify if the acquired 
small biotech enterprises have contribute to Pfizer’s R&D. Below is a summary table that 
encompass the inventors’ mobility and production in Pfizer and in their prior enterprise. 
  
                                                 
44
 This tendency were explored in the first chapter 
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Table 3.3: Small enterprises’ skill contribution to Pfizer.  
Small acquired 
enterprises (year of 
acquisition) 
Number of 
patents (A) 
Inventors in 
the acquired 
companies 
(B) 
Inventors 
that started 
to patent by 
Pfizer ( C) 
Patents 
issued by 
the 
"new" 
Pfizer’s 
inventors 
(D) 
Use of 
Inventors 
(E=C/B) 
Small 
enterprises’ 
inventor 
productivity 
(F=A/B) 
Pfizer's new 
inventor 
productivity 
(G=C/D) 
Bioren (2005) 1 6 2 2 33% 0.16 1 
Vicuron (2005) 24 47 6 12 13% 0.5 2 
Idun 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2005) 
39 25 0 0 0% 1.6 0 
Rinat Neurosicence 
(2006) 
25 35 18 56 51% 0.7 3.1 
Biorexis (2007) 4 5 0 0 0% 0.8 0 
Coley (2007) 55 61 9 21 15% 0.9 2.3 
CovX (2008) 7 27 0 0 0% 0.3 0 
Encysive (2008) 9 25 8 9 32% 0.4 1.1 
Serenex (2008) 10 25 0 0 0% 0.4 0.0 
FoldRx (2010) 3 3 0 0 0% 1 0.0 
Icagen (2011) 88 68 8 51 12% 1.3 6.4 
Excaliard (2011) 3 8 0 0 0 0.375 0 
Source: Own elaboration 
This table should be read as follows. In column (A) is displayed de number of patents 
that each small enterprise had before it was acquired. Column (B) is the small enterprise’s 
skill set, therefore it is shown, according to the patent data, the numbers of inventors that each 
small biotech enterprise had. Column (C) shows the number small enterprise’s inventors that 
started to issue patents for the Big-Pharmaceutical enterprise, in the present case Pfizer. 
Column (D) presents de number of patents that the former small enterprise’s invertors issued 
under Pfizer name. Column (E) was obtained through the relation between column C and B, 
this result indicates the usage of inventors made by Pfizer, i.e. the percentage of the small 
enterprise’s inventors that started to issue patents for Pfizer. Column (F) is a relation between 
column A and B, this relation is the small enterprises inventors’ productivity, i.e. the number 
of patents per inventor, while the inventor was patenting for the small biotech enterprise. 
Finally, column (G) was obtained through the relation between column C and D it indicates 
the inventor’s productivity after the inventors started patenting for Pfizer.  
The inventors, employed by Pfizer, issued for this enterprise 149 patents; this number 
is more than half of the 268 patents obtained through acquisition. After the inventors move to 
Pfizer they produced several patents, in general, the inventors productive in Pfizer are much 
higher than the productivity they had in the small enterprises. In all the cases, which Pfizer 
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has employed some small enterprises inventors their productivity has, at least, doubled. As the 
table above shows, Pfizer has not employed the whole skills set of any enterprise. 
Nevertheless, just the employed part has a higher productivity than the whole small enterprise 
skills set. This increase shows Pfizer’s ability to exploit, in a successful way, the skills set 
from its acquired enterprises. Pfizer is able to use its inventors in a very efficient way.  
The graphic bellow contains the percentage of the small enterprises’ skill set used by 
Pfizer. Among the enterprises that have at least one patent at USPTO, Pfizer employ the skill 
set of half of the enterprises.  The skill set usage goes from 12% to 51% 
Graphic 3.4: The Inventors usage by Pfizer  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In the Pfizer case, there is a possible correlation that can be draw from the usage of 
inventors (graphic above) made by the Big-Pharmaceutical enterprises and the technical 
contribution of small firms. As a fact, all small companies that were classified as having an 
intermediate or substantial technical contribution are also the ones that had part of its skill set 
employed by Pfizer. As stated before the technical contribution is potential, in order to fulfil 
its full potential it is necessary to employ the people responsible for researching and 
developing the new technologies. Technical contribution cannot be taken alone, the skills 
contribution is its most important counterpart.  
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The application of a technology or the continuation of a research path needs the right 
kind of people. It is possible to employ or further develop a technology starting just from 
instructions, such as patents, but the combinations of technical knowledge and skills, indeed, 
makes the pace of development much faster and robust. The development of new 
competences is more dependent on the combined use of technology and skills.  
For Instance, CoVx that is an unsuccessful acquisition
45
, had a weak technical 
contribution; not only, that, but, none of CoVx’s inventor issued a patent for Pfizer. 
According to this study, CoVx had a reduced contribution to Pfizer R&D and this result is 
supported by the interview. Rinat Neurosience is the opposite example, the enterprise had a 
substantial technical contribution and also a great part of its skills (51%) were employed by 
Pfizer. Therefore, RN is a case of substantial contribution also supported by the interview. 
The study methodology is able to capture extreme cases of weak contribution and substantial 
contribution especially because the technical knowledge set and the skills set analyses are not 
conflicting. 
Icagen poses an interesting analysis. The enterprise acquisition was a success, 
according to the interview. Icagen helped Pfizer to acquire new competences and new 
technologies. This small biotech was disinvested because Pfizer could not get any more 
advantage from it
46
. Like a resource, Pfizer, explored and exploited all the competences from 
Icagen and then sold the asset.  
Finnaly, the case of Bioren should be highlighted. Among Bioren inventors is Dr. 
Robert Crea the enterprise founder and the inventor responsible for the optimization antibody 
technology development. Dr. Robert Crea is one of the two inventors that have issued patents 
for Pfizer. In that case, Pfizer was able to employ the enterprise founder that poses Bioren as 
an enterprise that had contribute with important key people to Pfizer.  
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 Interview information 
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 Interview information 
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3.2 The Johnson & Johnson case 
 
3.2.1 Johnson & Johnson’s M&A overview  
 
Johnson &Johnson (J&J) is an extremely diversified enterprise in the health care 
industry producing a great array of products, ranging from cosmetics to advanced medical 
devices. This fact brought new features to the J&J case, because the study had to focus on the 
specific area of drug discovery activities. In order to meet this requirement, the patent search 
had to take into account patents assigned by J&J, and by Janssen
47
. Another important 
observation came up during the interview, in which it was stressed that Alios was a successful 
case of acquisition. Even though, Alios was acquired in 2014
48
, this enterprise needed to be 
analyzed.  
From 2005 to 2012, J&J has acquired 7 small biotech companies and Alios in 2014, 6 
of each had at least one patent at USPTO. The total expenditures on acquisitions were of US$ 
4.5 billion
49
.  
 
                                                 
47 Janssen is a pharmaceutical company of J&J and is also one of the main biotechnology subsidiaries of J&J.  
48 With the exception of Alios, all the acquisitions took place between 2005 to 2012 
49
 The M&A amount refers, only, to the acquired small biotech enteprises that had at least one patent at USPTO. 
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Table 3.4: J&J’s acquisition of small biotech enterprises between 2005 and 2012 (US$ million) 
Enterprise 
Acquisition 
year 
M&A 
deal 
Amount 
Number 
of 
Patents 
Employees 
(2012) 
Enterprise 
origin 
Year of 
foundation 
Revenues 
(2012) 
Collaboration 
(Year) 
Development 
stage of lead 
product 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 230 28 2 US 
 
0.14 No 
2 
Omrix 2008 438 21 212 US 
  
Yes*  (2006) 
- 
Respivert 2010 120 7 10 UK 
 
14.8*** Yes** (2010) 
Pre-clinical 
Crucell 2011 2300 127 
 
NL 2000 
 
Yes (2009) - 
Corimmun 2012 200 1 23 G 2007 
 
No Pre-clinical 
Alios 2014 1750 9 
    
No 2 
*Colaboration wiht Ethicon 
**Colaboration with Centhocor for clinical trials 
*** Revenue originally in UK£ (Pounds) (£8.8 milion). On september 2012, £1 was equivalent to US$1.6.  
Source: Own Elaboration 
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According to the table the M&A amount
50
, with small biotech enterprises, were of 
US$ 5 billion; while the total expenditures on R&D, from 2005 to 2012, were of U$57.8 
billion. In terms of percentage, the M&A expenditures are equivalent to 8% of the R&D 
investment.  
Through the acquisitions, J&J obtained 193 patents; whereas, the internal efforts 
(R&D) yielded 1749 patents for Janssen and 5488 for J&J a total of 7237 patents. In terms of 
percentage, the patents obtained through acquisitions represent only 2% of the patents 
generated by internal efforts. For J&J acquisitions do not have a proportional technological 
outcome, when compared to R&D.  
In terms of productivity, J&J through its internal efforts produced an average of 904 
per year and through M&A the annual average is about of 24 patents a year. In J&J’s case, 
M&A have not even shown advantages in terms of costs, the average cost of patent through 
internal efforts
51
 is of US$7.8 milion, while the average cost of a patent through M&A
52
 is of 
US$31 million dollars.  
The development stage of lead products among the acquired companies shows that 
J&J has acquired enterprises on the initial stages of clinical trial and also in pre-clinical 
stages. From 2005 to 2012, J&J has not acquired any enterprise in advanced stages of clinical 
trial, this fact also reinforces the idea that small biotech companies are a source of ideas for 
the large pharmaceutical enterprise.  
3.2.2 Overall contribution analyses: The Johnson & Johnson Case  
As a starting point for J&J analyses, the acquisition of Alios was determined as 
successful case; this new acquired enterprise gave a real contribution to J&J research activity 
by incorporating new antiviral technologies into the already developed J&J’s antiviral 
capabilities set. Alios case is going to be used as a pattern of comparison for establishing 
which enterprises had really given a contribution to J&J.  
3.2.2.1 Prior contribution 
Nowadays the pharmaceutical industry is facing a change where all major companies 
are using external sources for innovation. J&J is no exception, 60% of the enterprises research 
programs are derived externally, among which, almost 50% started as a small company 
                                                 
50 From 2005 to 2012 plus Alios acquisition 
51
 Calculated through the relation between R&D expenditures/number of patents issue by the enterprise 
52
 Calculated through the relation between M&A expenditures/inherited patents 
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project
 53
, not only that, but the use of external sources is restricted to early development 
phases
54
.  
This change in the way of organizing research has made collaborations an important 
step and sometimes the starting point for a future acquisition (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). 
Collaborations followed by acquisitions are an indication that large pharmaceutical enterprise 
internalized, through acquisitions, the research results obtained during the collaboration 
period. J&J has established collaboration with three of the acquired small enterprises: Omrix, 
Respivert and Crucell. Each of these small enterprises had collaborated with one enterprise 
within J&J group, Omrix has collaborated with Ethicon, Respivert with Centocor and Crucell 
with Janssen Pharmaceuticals. 
Omrix and Ethicon developed together a bio-surgical product (EVITHROM) designed 
to contain bleedings through biotechnological procedures. “Upon contact with a bleeding 
surface, the matrix hydrates and the fibrinogen-thrombin reaction initiates the key step in the 
coagulation cascade. The fibrin clot, as well as the matrix, is subsequently absorbed during 
wound healing”55 (Business Wire, 2006). On 2006 the product entered Phase 1 of clinical 
trials and in 2007 the FDA approved the product for production. The EVITHROM will be 
commercialized by Ethicon. 
Respivert collaboration with Centocor is slightly different form the collaborations seen 
in this study so far. Although Respivert was acquired before the collaboration, the enterprise 
conducted, in collaboration with Centocor Scientists, the clinical trials for the components 
RV-568 and RV-1088 for treating asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) 
and cystic fibrosis (CF). Respiviert was not shut down and the enterprise was kept as a 
standalone company, where all of its employees were kept and the enterprise research facility 
was maintained in London.  
Finally, Crucell collaboration with Janssen Pharmaceuticals aimed to developed a  
“universal influenza monoclonal antibody and a universal flu 
vaccine for the treatment and prevention of influenza, as well as a long-term 
innovation collaboration for the development of monoclonal antibodies 
                                                 
53 Interview information 
54 Interview information 
55 Business Wire 2006 “OMRIX Biopharmaceuticals Receives Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Approval for Thrombin 
Stand Alone, EVITHROM* Thrombin, Topical (Human), with General Hemostasis in Surgery Indication” 
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and/or vaccines directed against up to three other infectious and non-
infectious disease targets”( PR Newswire Association LLC Sep 28, 2009).  
This collaboration happened in 2009 and it was divided in two parts, a short run and a 
long run steps. 
On the short run, Crucell was responsible for the research and development, until 
Phase II a, of its already developed influenza antibodies and also the others influenza 
antibodies that came up through this collaboration. In the same collaboration agreement, 
Janssen Pharmaceuticals would develop the products from Phase II b onwards. The long term 
collaboration was based on the joint development of a universal flu vaccine for the prevention 
of influenza and also the research and development of antibodies for pre-determined disease 
targets. Janssen Pharmaceuticals kept the commercialization rights for products resulting from 
both collaborations in all countries, with the exception of the European Union and certain 
additional European countries where Crucell would retain commercialization rights.  
 The collaborations here show, again, an interesting pattern. On one hand, small 
enterprises act at the beginning of the innovative processes, especially by providing platform 
technologies for drug discovery activities. On the other hand, large pharmaceutical enterprises 
deal with clinical trials and financial support. The collaborations present an interesting 
division of innovative labor in which large pharmaceutical companies use small biotech 
enterprises as sources of innovation. There is a clear path to specialization in the 
pharmaceutical industry where large pharmaceutical companies are now specialized in the 
conduction of clinical trials and financial support and the small biotech enterprises are the 
sources of new capabilities and technologies  
3.2.2.2 Technical contribution  
 The technical contribution of small biotech enterprises to J&J will began with the 
direct effect of technical contribution. Therefore, bellow is presented a table that shows what 
patents were used as reference to generate other patents for J&J. 
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Table 3.5: Acquired small enterprises direct technical contribution to J&J 
Patents used as references for J&J. 
Acquired 
enterprises 
Number of 
Patents 
(A) 
Patents 
used, by 
J&J, as 
reference 
(B) 
Patents generated by J&J 
using the small enterprises' 
patents as reference 
(C) 
Patent 
Productivity 
(C/B) 
Transform-Pharma 28 1 10 10 
Omrix 26 6 12 2 
Respivert 13 0 0 0 
Crucell 141 0 0 0 
Corimmun 1 0 0 0 
Alios 10 1 1 1 
                Source: Own elaboration through Patent data  
J&J has only used a low rate of Transform-Pharma, Omrix and Alios patent portfolios 
as references, although, the use of these patents was recurrent. For example, only one patent 
of Transform-Pharma was referenced, but, in ten new J&J’s patents, this same pattern can be 
seen in Omrix also. Even Alios is an interesting case, the enterprise was acquired very 
recently and already one of its patents was used as reference. One interesting fact about the 
direct technical contribution is the productivity of the small enterprises’ patents, especially, 
transform-Pharma whose only patent were referenced in other 10 patents of J&J. Therefore, 
J&J uses intensively the technology of some acquired enterprises. 
The indirect technical contribution (already explained) is based on patent activity 
analyses. In the J&J case, were searched patents under the assignment of Johnson & Johnson 
and Janssen. The summary table for the technical knowledge set development made by J&J is 
presented below: 
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Table 3.6: J&J’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to the 
acquired small enterprises. 
Decade 
Enterprises acquired by Johnson & Johnson from 2005 to 2012 (year of 
acquisition) 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2005) 
Omrix 
(2008) 
Respivert 
(2010) 
Crucell 
Holland 
B.V 
(2011) 
Corimmun 
GmbH 
(2012) 
Alios 
Biopharma 
(2014) 
2000 
onwards 
14% 14% 21% 27% 80% 23% 
1990 20% 19% 21% 20% 0% 5% 
1980 15% 8% 29% 7% 20% 15% 
1970 11% 0% 29% 0% 0% 0% 
Classes 
not 
developed 
41% 59% 0% 46% 0% 56% 
                  Source: own elaboration 
By looking at the table above some facts can be highlighted. First, there is a high rate 
of classes not developed. All the other enterprises, except Respivert, and Corimmun had a 
weak technical contribution. The case of J&J shows an interesting fact, Crucell can at the 
same time be classified as having substantial and weak technical contribution (see chart 3.2). 
This fact may seem inaccurate, but this is a plausible situation.  
Differences in technical knowledges sets are represented by the not developed classes, 
one Big-Pharma that has a high rate of not developed classes can be considered to have a 
different technical knowledge set, when compared to the acquired small enterprise. The Big-
Pharma can overcome those differences by patenting in the classes that it had no patents 
before. As large pharmaceutical enterprises keep patenting in new classes, the differences in 
technical knowledge are diminished and became newly developed patent classes. Thus, the 
differences among enterprises’ technical knowledges are possible new classes to be 
developed. This fact show an evolutionary path in which not developed classes become newly 
developed classes. Therefore, companies that are classified as having a weak contribution can 
offer a substantial technical contribution as the large pharmaceutical enterprise develop new 
patents in new classes. In the end, as mentioned in the methodology technical contribution is a 
potential state. 
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Chart 3.2: Acquired small enterprises division according to their indirect 
technical contribution 
 
Technological Contribution 
 
Weak Intermediate Substantial 
Enterprises 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Omrix, 
Crucell Holland B.V 
Alios Biopharma 
Respivert 
Crucell Holland 
B.V, Corimmun 
GmbH 
Source: Own elaboration 
In the interview was stressed that J&J’s acquisitions of small enterprises are mainly 
driven by new promising technologies. In addition the data has shown a high rate of not 
developed classes, which can be understood as possible new competences. Therefore, the 
singularity of J&J is on the high rate of not developed classes. As a consequence the acquired 
small enterprises are mainly classified as having weak technical contribution (see chart 3.2, 
above). This fact leads to interesting interpretations. 
First, table 3.6 shows that J&J’s technical knowledge set development has two defined 
characteristics. Part of it was developed in a recent period of time, from 1990 onwards and, 
second, J&J has a high rate of not developed classes. Those two characteristics are linked: a 
patent class recently developed is an indication that J&J has very recently started to develop 
the competences linked to those patents activities and the not developed classes are 
competences that could be developed or are in the process of being developed. 
The part of the knowledge that is not developed yet works, for J&J, as a stock of 
knowledge, as this large enterprises incorporate and employ the capabilities of the acquired 
firm; the not developed classes will became recently developed classes. Therefore, the small 
acquired enterprises could work as stocks of knowledge that can be accessed in order to 
develop new competences. In that sense, the high rate of not develop classes in J&J technical 
knowledge set shows that the enterprise has acquired a large stock of knowledge that could be 
accessed through time.  
3.2.2.3 Crucell Holland B.V 
Crucell Holland B.V. or just Crucell is a small Dutch biotech enterprise with 127 
patents at USPTO. The enterprise history can be traced back to 1993, as a small start-up born 
from the union of Leiden university scientists. In 2000 Crucell was created from the union of 
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two small Dutch biotech enterprises and in 2011 it became part of Janssen. This enterprise has 
strong capabilities on platforms for monoclonal antibodies, those competences allowed 
Crucell to stablish a research collaboration agreement with J&J in 2009, also, its platform 
technologies lead to its acquisition on 2011.  
The large number of patents, held by this enterprise, results in a vast Knowledge set. A 
closer look on how J&J developed a similar technical knowledge set to Crucell can indicate 
when some Crucell’s capabilities started to be of J&J interest. 
Graphic 3.5: J&J’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to Crucell 
 
Source: own elaboration 
In a broad view, the process, led by J&J, of developing the same patent classes as 
Crucell’s technical Knowledge set is new in time and it became more concentrated after 1995. 
J&J increase the development of the same patent classes of Crucell’s technical knowledge set 
in the period this small enterprise was founded. Therefore, there is joint movement of 
technological development in related competences, undergone by J&J and Crucell. From 1975 
to 2000, J&J has developed 45 patent classes and subclasses that compose Crucell’s technical 
Knowledge set, whereas, from 2000 to 2010, J&J has developed 44 patent classes and 
subclasses from Crucell’s knowledge set. As said before, is obvious that since 2000 J&J 
interests on Crucell’s technical knowledge set has increased and culminated in the acquisition 
of this enterprise.  
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Another indicator of contribution, from Crucell to J&J, is the classes developed after 
Crucell’s acquisition. According to the graphic above, four (4) classes were developed by J&J 
after 2011, those classes are: (i) 435/400, (ii) 435/70.21, (iii) 435/328 and (iv) 530/388.8. The 
435 class encompasses biotech related patents. The subclasses 400, 70.21 and 328 encompass 
respectively, animal cell culture and separation, monoclonal antibody production and 
antibodies with multiple functions or antibodies that had their functions changed. The ability 
of patenting in those classes give to the companies a set of capabilities for the production of 
antibodies dedicated to diseases treatment. Finally class 530 is related to natural resins and 
protein production. The subclass 388.8 encompasses monoclonal antibodies that bind to 
cancer cell.  
As a platform producer, Crucell used its molecular biology capacities to create a 
technology that produces several antibodies capable of attacking different targets. What can 
be noted is that these very same capabilities were also the ones developed by J&J after 
Crucell acquisition. The J&J’s pattern of development and the classes developed after 
Crucell’s acquisition show J&J interest in Crucell’s Knowledge on antibodies treatment for 
cancer and other diseases. 
3.2.2.4 Corimmun GmbH 
Corimmun is a small German biotech firm that was acquired by Janssen in 2012. This 
enterprise has only one patent issued at USPTO. Nevertheless, the interviews have shown that 
an enterprise contribution is not due its number of patents, but due to how promising and 
useful its developed technology could be for the acquiring company. Corimmun had not 
established any official research agreement with J&J group. Although, the company had a 
promising peptide
56
 compound for treating heart failure. 
  
                                                 
56
 Peptide is a large molecule formed by two or more amino acids bonded together   
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Graphic 3.6: J&J’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to Corimun.  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Although Corimmun had just one patent and then a relative small technical knowledge 
set, the graphic above indicates J&J started to incorporate its technical knowledge in recent 
period. J&J tried to incorporate some classes to its own technical knowledge in 1987, but the 
processes of developing a Corimmun’s related knowledge set only took off in 2005. 
The most recent classes developed by J&J among Corimun’s Technical Knowledge set 
are the classes: (i) 424/141.1 and (ii) 435/326. Class 424 is related to drug compounds; the 
subclass 141.1 encompass “monoclonal antibody or fragment thereof (i.e., produced by any 
cloning technology)”57. Class 435 is a biotech related class; the subclass 326 refers to cells 
capable of expressing antibodies. The development of these two classes shows J&J attempt to 
construct very strong antibodies related capabilities especially in the platform areas 
3.2.2.5 The Skill contribution of small acquired enterprises to J&J 
All J&J’s acquisitions of small enterprises are driven by the possibility of further 
developing and incorporating new promising technologies
58
. The process of acquisition in 
J&J consists on getting the needed technology and shutting down the acquired company, in 
this process some key people could be maintained
59
. The number of people maintained 
                                                 
57
 USPC class denomination  available at: 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc424/sched424.htm 
58
 Interview information 
59
 Interview information 
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depends on how many people are necessary to incorporate, operate and further developed the 
technology. In the end, J&J could keep the whole crew or just one person.  
In order to construct the Table 3.5, which shows the skill usage made by J&J, the 
study had to search for inventors patents not only at J&J but in other enterprises that compose 
J&J group. To trace the skill contribution of a small enterprise, the study looked for inventors 
that have started to issue patents for J&J and Janssen. In the case of Omrix it was also 
checked if any inventors have started to issue patents for Ethicon and for Respivert it was 
checked if any inventor had started to issue patents for Centhocor
60
. 
Table 3.7: Small enterprises skill contribution to J&J’s  
Small acquired 
enterprises 
Number 
of 
patents 
(A) 
Total of 
inventors 
in the 
acquired 
companies 
(B) 
Inventors 
that 
started to 
patent by 
J&J ( C) 
Number 
of 
patents 
of the 
"new" 
J&J 
inventors 
(D) 
Use of 
Inventors 
(E=C/B) 
Small 
enterprises 
inventor 
productivity 
(F=A/B) 
J&J's new 
inventor 
productivity 
(G=D/C) 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2005) 
28 33 8 10 24% 0.84 0.8 
Omrix (2008) 21 22 0 0 0% 0.95 0 
Respivert (2010) 7 15 0 0 0% 0.46 0 
Crucell (2011) 127 81 1 1 1% 1.5 1 
Corimmun (2012) 1 5 0 0 0% 0.2 0 
Alios (2014) 9 23 1 6 26% 0.39 6 
Source: own elaboration 
As the table above shows, J&J has not employed many inventors of its acquired 
companies. In turn, those inventors also did not produce a high number of patents. Indeed the 
inventors’ productivity employed by J&J had not increase, with the exception of former Alios 
inventors. Alios should be highlighted, especially because the increase in the inventor’s 
productivity, as they moved to J&J. 
Another common practice at J&J is to employ the acquired enterprises inventors for a 
short period of time being it one or two years, this is the necessary amount of time for the 
enterprise internalizing and builds the capabilities that once driven the acquisition. The 
graphic bellow shows the inventors usage in a more detailed perspective. 
  
                                                 
60
 As mentioned before Omrix had a research agreement with Ethicon and Respivert had a research agreement 
with Centhocor. 
115 
 
Graphic 3.7: The inventors usage by J&J 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
The employment of inventors is an important factor, no matter how many were 
employed. In graphic above Alios, the successful example of acquisition, is the one enterprise 
that had most of its inventors employed, Crucell and Transform were also the two enterprises 
that had some inventors employed by J&J. 
On one hand, Crucell was the only enterprise acquired by J&J that had a prior 
technical contribution; a substantial technical contribution and skills contribution. On the 
other hand, Alios and Transform are all enterprises that had a weak technical contribution to 
J&J. But, these three enterprises share two common characteristic. First, J&J has a high rate 
of not developed classes and subclasses and those were the only enterprises that J&J has 
employed its skills set.  
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3.3 The Merck case 
 
3.3.1 Merck’s M&A overview 
 
Merck is one of the major American Pharmaceutical enterprises; as shown in the table 
below, from 2005 to 2012, Merck has acquired 8 small biotech enterprises, seven of which 
had at least one patent at USPTO.  
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Table 3.8: Merck’s acquisitions of small biotech enterprises from 2005 to 2012 (US$ million) 
Enterprise 
Acquisition 
Year 
M&A Deal 
Amount 
Number 
of Patents 
Employees 
(2012) 
Year of 
foundation 
Enterpris
e 
Origins 
Revenues 
(2012) 
Collaboratio
n (Year) 
Product stage of 
development 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme) 
2006 1100 183 68 1992 US 10.7* No Pre-clinical 
GlycoFi 2006 400 40 
 
2006 US 
 
Yes (2005) Pre-clinical 
Abmaxis 2006 80 6 16 2000 US 
 
Yes (2004) Pre-clinical 
NovaCardia 2007 350 1 10 2003 US 1.1* No 3 
Insmed 
(Biologics) 
2009 130 13 42 1992 US 11.5 No  
SmartCells 2010 500 13 14 2003 US 
 
No Pre-clinical 
Inspire 2011 430 96 240 1993 US 44.5* No  
Source: Own Elaboration 
*Those values refers to sales 
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From 2005 to 2012, Merck has expended on M&A an amount of US$ 2.9 billion
61
 and 
it has obtained 356 patents from all the small acquired enterprises, an average of 44 patents 
per year, the average cost of each patent is of US$ 8.1 million. Regarding its internal efforts 
Merck has expended, from 2005 to 2012, US$51,9 billion in R&D. In the same period, it has 
issued 1170 patents, an average of 146 patents per year, the average cost of each patent is of 
US$ 44 million. Although, Merck’s internal efforts have produced as greater amount of 
patents; the M&A allow Merck to obtain patents at a lower cost. 
In terms of investment, the expenditures on M&A represent only 5% of the R&D 
investments. The patents obtained through acquisitions are 41% of the patents generated by 
internal efforts. This enterprise with only 5% of its R&D investment was able to generate 
41% of its whole technological output (measured as patents). Therefore, for Merck, M&A 
with small enterprises generate proportionally more patents than its internal efforts.  
 
3.3.2 Overall contribution analyses: The Merck Case  
 
Merck Analysis must begin by identifying the successful and unsuccessful 
acquisitions. Sirna was pointed out as an unsuccessful example of acquisition, whereas 
Abmaxis was considered a successful acquisition. Sirna is not a typical case of an 
unsuccessful acquisition, this enterprise became not interesting for Merck due to changes in 
these enterprise strategies resulting in a knowledge divergence between Sirna and Merck. In 
the end, Sirna’s knowledge was not useful anymore for Merck62. Meanwhile, Abmaxis was 
successful because the enterprise delivered what Merck was expecting during their 
collaboration agreement and the acquisition generated new capabilities related to platform 
technologies at Merck.    
3.3.2.1 Prior Contribution 
From all the enterprises acquired, just two had prior research agreement with Merck, 
those enterprises were Glycofi and Abmaxis. The research agreement with these enterprises 
started, respectively, at 2005 and 2004. Glycofi establish a strategic research alliance in order 
to developed novel biologic and vaccine candidates and Abmaxis had a research agreement 
for the development of a platform technology. 
                                                 
61
 The M&A amount refers, only, to the acquired small biotech enterprises that had at least one patent at USPTO. 
62
 Interview information. 
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The collaboration with Glycofi was constructed based on its capabilities and 
technology for making proteins in yeast, this capability “has advantages of speed, cost and 
quality over current methods of producing monoclonal antibodies and other protein 
therapeutic agents” (Business Wire May 9, 2006). This collaboration created the basis for 
increasing biologic research and development capabilities that led Merck to acquire Glycofi. 
Therefore, the whole research agreement was based on the use of Glycofi’s platform to 
developed new drugs.  
Abmaxis collaborations with Merck relied on Abmaxi’s optimization of an 
undisclosed Merck’s antibody producing technology. Abmaxis held a better in-silico 
Immunization (AISIM™) technology platform over conventional antibody engineering 
technologies. Although, there is not much information on how the research alliance was 
organized, according to the interview, all research alliance are divided in the same way. 
Merck provides the financial support and run the late clinical trials, from phase IIb onwards, 
whereas, the small company conducts the early stages of clinical trials, especially the steps 
related to toxicity and efficacy tests. It must be highlighted that those two collaborations were, 
both, based on the development of platform technologies for antibodies treatment. It seems to 
be a trend that all major pharmaceutical companies analyzed until now are concerned with 
platform technologies.  
3.3.2.2 Technical contribution 
The table below shows the patents used as references by Merck. 
  
120 
 
Table 3.9: Small enterprises direct technical contribution to Merck.  
Acquired 
enterprises 
(A) 
Number 
of 
Patents 
(B) 
Patents 
used as 
reference 
(C) 
Patents 
generated by 
Merck using the 
small 
enterprises’ 
patents 
(D) 
Patent 
Productivity 
(D/C) 
 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme) 
192 35 32 0.914 
Glycofi 40 26 9 0.346 
Abmaxis 6 5 1 0 
NovaCardia 1 0 0 0 
Insmed 17 0 0 0 
SmartCells 13 0 0 0 
Inspire 96 1 1 1 
Source: Own elaboration 
As can be noted in the table above Merck has only used as references patents from 
Sirna, Glycofi, Abmaxis and Inspire. By comparing the small enterprises number of patents 
and the amount of patents used by Merck as reference, one can conclude that Merck has only 
used a small amount of the enterprises patent set being, Glycofi the only exception. In a direct 
way, the small enterprises patent set did not yield several patents for Merck, this fact is 
proved by productivity that was not higher than one.  
The indirect effect of technical contribution is presented in the table below 
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Table 3.10: Merck’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to the 
acquired biotech firms.  
Decades 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme) 
Glycofi Abmaxis NovaCardia 
Insmed 
(Biologics) 
Inspire Smartcells 
2000s 8% 5% 9% 0% 5% 6% 0% 
1990s 28% 24% 45% 0% 12% 22% 25% 
1980s 20% 44% 27% 100% 46% 30% 19% 
1970s 14% 16% 14% 0% 25% 26% 37% 
classes 
not 
developed 
29% 11% 5% 0% 12% 16% 19% 
Source:own elaboration 
Merck developed a very similar technical knowledge as its acquired companies, there 
is a relative small proportion of not developed classes and subclasses. The enterprise that had 
comparatively the highest rate of not developed classes and subclasses was Sirna. The 
majority of the technical knowledge developed by Merck took place in the 1980s and the 
1970s.  
As was stressed in the interview, Merck engage in acquisitions with small enterprises 
that were aligned with the enterprises research programs, so Merck does not acquire an 
enterprise to start a new research program as happen to J&J and Pfizer. Therefore, Merck first 
develop its research program and it uses the small enterprises only to complement what was 
already developed. This fact is shown in two particular characteristics of the table above: (i) 
there is a few rate of classes not developed by Merck, therefore Merck and its acquired small 
companies have a very similar technical knowledge set; (ii) Merck has mainly developed a 
similar technical knowledge set to its acquired companies in the 1970s and the 1980s. In that 
sense, when the small biotech companies were acquired it did not had an overly new technical 
knowledge set in comparison to Merck. Therefore, Merck has acquired a more homogenous 
group of enterprises in its technical contribution classification. The table below organizes the 
enterprises according to its technical contributions  
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Chart 3.3: Acquired Small enterprises division according to their technical 
contribution 
 
Technological Contribution 
 
Weak Intermediate Substantial 
Enterprises 
 
Sirna, 
Glycofi, 
NovaCardia 
Insmed, 
Inspire 
Smartcells 
Abmaxis, 
 
         Source: Own elaboration 
Sirna is one enterprise that can be highlighted. Although, the interviews pointed out 
Sirna as an unsuccessful case, the enterprise could be classified in all technical 
contributions
63
, because, Merck has developed 34% of a similar technical knowledge to this 
enterprise between the 1980s and the 1970s and 36% from the 1990s up today. In addition, 
29% of classes and subclasses that compose Sirna’s technical knowledge set were not 
developed.  
When it was acquired, Sirna was a good source of new competences and technologies, 
but over the years, changes in Merck made the enterprise reduce its investment on noncore 
areas
64. In addition Sirna’s growing difference with Merck, especially related to science, made 
the large enterprise sell this small company to Alnylam in 2014. Sirna is an example of 
enterprise that could have contribute to Merck, but due to technological differences this was 
not put in practice.  
The aspect showed above can shed some light in the technical evolution of Merck and 
Sirna. Part of the technical development of Sirna was interesting for Merck, but a relevant part 
was not (29%). The not developed part of Sirnas’s technical knowledge was not incorporated 
by Merck and it was seen as piece of technical knowledge that was not interesting to be 
further developed. A parallel can be done between Sirna and Icagen (acquired by Pfizer in 
2011). Although, Icagen was also disinvested and sold for another company; this enterprise 
was a successful acquisition made by Pfizer. The difference between these two enterprises 
resides on the classes that were not developed by its acquiring firms. While Merck has not 
developed 29% of Sirna’s technical knowledge set; Pfizer has not developed only 7% of 
Icagen’s Knowledge set. This fact shows that Pfizer was able to exploit all the competences 
that Icagen had to contribute; when the enterprise became very similar technologically to 
                                                 
63
 There is no clear majority over Sirna’s indirect technical contribution 
64
 Interview information 
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Pfizer it was disinvested. Pfizer was able, not only, to master all the competences held by 
Icagen but also to transform the not developed technical knowledge in technical capabilities. 
In the case of Sirna, Merck was not interested in developing and mastering all the 
competences that these enterprises held so that’s why it has a high rate of not developed 
technical knowledge.  
Among all enterprises acquired by Merck only Abmaxis had a substantial technical 
contribution. Abmaxis is also a case of success and it will be individually analyzed in the next 
subsection 
3.3.2.3 Abmaxis 
Abmaxis was a small biotech enterprise founded in 2000 acquired in 2006, it had 6 
patents at USPTO. The main technological development of Abmaxis was a platform 
technology for producing antibodies. This enterprise technical Knowledge set could heavily 
contribute to Merck, especially related to platform technologies that was the main driver of 
the collaboration between these two firms. The graphic below show Merck’s evolution on 
creating a similar technical knowledge to Abmaxis 
Graphic 3.8: Merck’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to 
Abmaxis 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Merck has started early the process of developing a knowledge set similar to Abmaxis. 
The process was intensified from the 1988 onward, where Merck started developing new 
patent classes in year basis. By 2004, Merck had already developed a similar knowledge set to 
Abmaxis and only 5% of Abmaxis’ technical knowledge was not developed.  
Two classes and subclasses can be highlighted in order to see in which technological 
path Merck was going. These classes are 702/22 developed in 2000 and 702/19 developed in 
2004. Those classes are related to competences for analyzing though computer systems 
subjects and its chemical aspects, “wherein the data processing system or calculating 
computer is designed for or utilized in a measurement system directed to an environment of 
life or chemical compound or process in a living system” (USPC patent classification)  
Those capabilities are related to the terms of the collaborations between Abmaxis and 
Merck, in wich Abmaxis optimized an undisclosed Merck human monoclonal antibody for 
potential therapeutic use. The researches at Abmaxis were able to re-engineered and improve 
Merck antibody, Shirley Clayton, former president and CEO of Abmaxis, said that the results 
of enterprises collaboration “were able to achieve for Merck are an important validation of 
our structure-centric approach towards antibody engineering". The Abmaxis capacity is 
highly focused on biological engineering where the companies is capable of reconstructing 
compounds and improve them. 
The Abmaxis case shows two interesting facts. First, Merck’s attempt to improve its 
own platforms dedicated to antibodies treatments. Second, it shows Merck’s strategy to 
acquire companies that only complement technologies or research programs already 
developed by Merck.  
3.3.2.4 Skill contribution 
Merck’s decision to maintain or not the inventors is a case by case decision, but 
usually the company tries to maintain the key people that could incorporate the new 
technology and the desired capabilities. People, usually, are key on very specialized 
technologies that only can be ran, deployed and developed by its inventor. Whereas in areas 
where Merck is already established such as small molecules compounds the skills do not play 
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a key role, only the technology and the product
65
are key elements. The table below shows 
Merck employment of the skills it acquired from the small companies. 
Table 3.11: Acquired Small enterprises skill contribution to Merck.  
Small 
acquired 
enterprises 
Number 
of 
patents 
(A) 
Total of 
inventors 
in the 
acquired 
companies 
(B) 
Inventors 
that 
started to 
patent by 
Merck      
(C) 
Number 
of 
patents 
of the 
"new" 
Pfizer 
inventors 
(D) 
Use of 
Inventors 
(C/B) 
Small 
enterprises 
inventor 
productivity 
(A/B) 
Merck's 
new 
inventor 
productivity 
(D/C) 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme) 
183 112 12 46 11% 1.6 3.8 
Glycofi 33 13 10 18 77% 2.5 1.8 
Abmaxis 6 10 6 25 60% 0.6 4.16 
Novacardia 1 5 0 0 0% 0.2 0 
Insmed 17 27 1 1 3% 0.6 1 
Smartcells 7 8 0 0 0% 0.8 0 
Inspire 98 80 3 3 4% 1.2 1 
Source: Own elaboration 
As in all cases the inventor’s productivity increased as they move to the large 
company, the only exception on Merck case was Glycofi. The Abmaxis inventor’s 
productivity raised more than four times. Another important fact is that the enterprises that 
had prior collaborations with Merck were also the ones that contribute more with their skill. 
Then, Glycofi and the Abmaxis contribute, respectively, with 77% and 60% of its skills to 
Merck, as can be seen in the graphic below 
  
                                                 
65
 Interview information 
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Graphic 3.9: Inventors usage by Merck 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The interviews and the data have shown that Merck relies on external sources for 
innovation. Between, 40% to 50% of its projects were initiated or had the help of external 
sources being it universities, small enterprises or public research labs. Although Merck seems 
to be equal to its competitors this large enterprise does not overly rely on its acquired 
enterprises to run as standalone companies, not only that, but Merck is an enterprise that only 
acquired or collaborate with small enterprises in areas that it has already research projects. 
This enterprise does not use acquisitions to open new research lines, indeed, acquisitions for 
Merck are intended to fill some capabilities gaps. This point is further reinforced by the 
research agreement stablish between Merck and Abmaxis, as mentioned before, this 
agreement was based on the ability of Abmaxis on improving an already developed Merck’s 
technology. 
In case of Glycofi and Abmaxis, the technology developed by these two firms was 
very dependent on the people that invented it but prior to the acquisition those two enterprises 
were developing in collaboration with Merck. In these cases, again, it is possible to see how 
Merck first try to developed new capabilities and then use acquisition as mean of filling some 
gaps. 
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3.4 The Roche case 
 
3.4.1 Roche’s M&A overview 
Roche was one of the two cases analyzed without interviews. Differently from the 
other enterprises Roche is an European company, therefore, it offers a different perspective of 
how an European company behave in comparison to American enterprises. Roche has 
acquired 9 biotechnology companies; two of them had no patents. Among all acquired small 
enterprises, the largest one was Genentech, which despite being a biotech company, is not 
considered a small firm. Thus, the amount spent by Roche in M&A excluding Genetech is 
substantially lower. However, Roche still stands out as one of the most active purchaser in the 
sample. 
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Table 3.12: Roche’s acquisitions of small biotech enterprises between 2005 and 2012(U$ million) 
Enterprises 
Enterprise 
origin 
Year of 
Acquisition 
Number 
of 
Patents 
Employees 
(2012) 
M&A 
deal 
amount 
Year of 
foundation 
Revenues  
(2012) 
Collaboration 
(Year) 
Clinical 
stage of 
lead 
product 
Therapeutic 
Human 
Polyclonals 
US 2007 6 - 56 2002 - No 
Pre-
clinical 
Piramed UK 2008 4 - 175 - - Yes (2008**) 1 
Mirus Bio US 2008 32 - 125 - - No  
Arius Canada 2008 33 - 190 - - No  
Memory 
Pharmaceuticals 
US 2008 40 55 50 1998 - 
Yes (2003, 
2006) 
 
Marcadia 
Biotech 
US 2010 1 9* 530 2005 - No 1 
 Source: Own elaboration based on USPTO patent data and HBM Pharma/Biotech M&A report 
*Employees in 2010  
** Genetech had collaboration with Piramed, when Roche acquired Genentech it also inherited the partnership 
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The total spent on M&A by Roche is a small amount when compared to the 
enterprise’s R&D investment. Between 2005 and 2012 Roche spent the equivalent of U$ 1.12 
billion
66
 in M&A, which is equivalent to 12% of its total expenditure on R&D
67
 in 2012. 
Nevertheless, M&A still play an important role for Roche, especially, due to Genetech 
acquisition in 2009, a deal of U$46.8 billion.  
In terms of technology production, Roche, from 2005 to 2012, obtained 2301 
patents
68
, an average of 328 patents per year. The six companies acquired added 115 patents 
for Roche, an average of 14 patents per year. Indeed, Roche capability of producing patents is 
much higher than the amount of patents obtained through acquisition. 
The comparison between costs and technology production is also instructive. Roche’s 
set of patent, from 2005 to 2012, were obtained with an R&D investment of U$ 67.997 
billion
69
. In contrast, by investing US$ 1.53 billion on M&A, Roche manage to acquire                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
115 patents. The expenditures on M&A represents only 1,6% of the total investment in R&D 
for the same period. Nevertheless, these 1,6% “generated” 115 patents, which represent 35% 
of the 328 patents
70
 obtained by the enterprise own research efforts. Thus, the company could 
with only 2% of its R&D expenditures (input), obtained 35% of the output, which are the 
patents. This example shows once again the efficiency that M&A represent. This overview 
shows that an M&A investment generates technology more than proportionally generated by 
R&D.  
  
                                                 
66
 The M&A amount refers, only, to the acquired small biotech enterprises that had at least one patent at USPTO. 
67
 In 2012, Roche has invested 8,475 billion of Swiss francs on R&D. This amount is equivalent to U$ 8,921 
billion. The exchange rate used was of US$ 1 for 0,95 Swiss francs. The exchange rate was consulted on April 
27
th
 from 2015.  
68
 At the Patft USPTO database 
69
 In order to analyze the M&A efficiency, this study makes a simplification, in which, R&D and M&A 
expenditures are inputs and patents are outputs. This oversimplification does not encompass the innovative 
process complexity; however, this example only plays a comparative role between M&A and R&D. 
70
 This number is the average patent per year, the calculation was based on the total of patents issued by Roche 
from 2005 to 2012. 
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3.4.2 Overall contribution analyses: The Roche Case  
 
3.4.2.1 Prior contribution  
Roche has directly established a research agreement with two acquired enterprise, 
Piramed and Memory Pharmaceuticals. The research agreement with Piramed was different 
because it was as an outcome of Genetech acquisition, therefore, Roche was obliged to 
continue the research agreement. Roche and Piramed agreement allowed this large enterprise 
to construct capabilities and compounds related to cancer and inflammatory diseases. The 
successful results obtained through the research agreement could be understood as a starting 
condition for Roche acquiring Piramed.  
The agreement between Roche and Memmory pharmaceuticals was focused on 
developing certain promising compounds. Roche and Memory Pharmaceutical research 
agreement has changed several times over the years. The agreement was first set in 2003 
aiming to create PDE4 inhibitors that could help the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease, 
schizophrenia, respiratory disease and drug abuse. In 2005 Roche decided not to further 
develop two compounds MEM 1414 and MEM 1917, for Alzheimer’s disease, but Memory 
amended the agreement and started to develop those compounds by its own. In case Memory 
manage to develop successfully those compounds; Roche could take is preferential position in 
the agreement and commercialize the products.  
In 2006 Memory achieved a set of defined preclinical milestones, in the research 
agreement, for other component named MEM 63908. This component was dedicated to 
diseases in the central nervous system, including Alzheimer disease and schizophrenia. Due to 
advances in the preclinical development of MEM 63908, Memory pharmaceutical receive a 
U$ 2.3 million research funding for clinical trials. In 2008, Roche expanded its research 
agreement with Memory for further developing up until phase IIa another molecule, named 
MEM 3454, the total value of this agreement expansion was almost U$ 23 million. All 
commercial rights and late clinical trials are under Roche guardianship.  
As shown above, Roche, as all other enterprises, divided the research agreement in the 
same way. The large enterprise gives financial support and conducts the late clinical trials; the 
small enterprises have the idea and the initial clinical trials. The initial clinical trials stages are 
a way of testing how promising a new compound or technology can be. If the new technology 
is able to survive those first steps it will probably have a greater chance of success. Passing 
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through initial clinical trials certainly reduces the investment risk for the large pharmaceutical 
enterprise.  
3.4.2.2 Technical Contribution 
As have been seen so far, technology displays an important role in the acquisition of 
small enterprises. The majority of M&A are driven, mostly, by technological aspects. The 
first step will cover the direct technological contribution that a small acquired enterprise could 
offer to the large pharmaceutical enterprise. 
Table 3.13: Acquired small enterprises’ direct technical direct technical 
contribution to Roche.  
Acquired enterprises 
Number of 
Patents 
(A) 
Patents used as 
reference 
(B) 
Patents generated by 
Roche using the small 
enterprises' patents 
(C) 
Patent 
Productivity 
(C/B) 
Piramed 4 4 13 3.25 
Therapeutic Human 
Polyclonals 
6 0 0 0 
Arius 35 5 11 2.2 
Mirus-bio 37 12 7 0.58 
Memory Pharmaceuticals 42 0 0 0 
Macardia 1 0 0 0 
Source: Own elaboration 
Roche has referenced patents from Piramed, Arius and Mirus-bio in its own patents. 
Although, this large enterprise has not use a high proportion of the small enterprises patent 
portfolio, the patents used had a high productivity rate, with the exception of Mirus-bio. For 
instance, Roche has used five Arius’ patents as references for 11 patents of its own and this 
large enterprise has also referenced 4 patents of Piramed in 13 of its own patents. The high 
productivity rate of Piramed and Arius are an indication of how useful is their technological 
development for Roche 
The indirect effect of technical contribution can be captured by the technological 
evolution of Roche within the technological knowledge set held by the acquired small 
companies. This evolution process is captured by the table 3.14 that shows when and at what 
rate Roche has incorporated the technical knowledge set held by the acquired small 
biotechnology enterprises. 
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Table 3.14: Roche’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to the 
acquired biotech firms.  
Decades 
Enterprises acquired by Roche from 2005 e 2012 (year of acquisition) 
Therapeutic 
Human 
Polyclonals 
(2007) 
Arius 
(2008) 
Piramed 
(2008) 
Mirus-
Bio 
(2008) 
Memory 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2008) 
Marcadia 
Biotech 
(2010) 
2000 
onwards 
27% 10% 0% 4% 10% 0% 
1990 27% 57% 0% 35% 18% 25% 
1980 27% 7% 100% 27% 34% 0% 
1970 0% 17% 0% 22% 31% 0% 
1960 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 
Classes not 
developed 
18% 10% 0% 12% 5% 75% 
Source: Own elaboration 
Roche has developed a very similar technical knowledge set to its acquired firms; the 
company shows a low rate of patent classes and subclasses not developed. In general Roche 
started to construct its technical knowledge set in the 1970s, this process got more intense 
during the 1980 and the 1990s, but it has slowed down from the 2000s onwards. Interestingly, 
the more intense period of technical development is also the time that Biotechnology started 
to take off. 
Roche present similar patterns, of technical knowledge set evolution, to Merck. Those 
patterns encompass low rate of not developed classes and intense technical knowledge set 
construction over the 1980s and 1990s. In that sense, Roche like Merck may behave using the 
small biotech companies to fill in some capability gaps, the enterprise does not relies on 
M&A to start research on new therapeutic areas.  
Some companies can be highlighted according to its technical contribution. During the 
1990s, Roche developed 57% of a similar technical knowledge to Arius. Therapeutic Human 
Polyclonals (THP) was the enterprises that had a similar technical Knowledge set most 
recently developed by Roche, being 27% of it developed between 2005 and 2012. Finally, 
Macardia Biotech is the only enterprise that the majority of its technical Knowledge set was 
not developed. Below, is the table on which companies are divided according to their 
contribution to patenting activity of Roche. 
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Chart 3.4: Acquired small enterprises division according to their indirect 
technological contribution 
 
Technological Contribution 
 
Weak Intermediate Substantial 
Enterprises 
Marcadia 
Biotech 
Mirus-Bio, 
Memory 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Piramed 
 
Therapeutic 
Human 
Polyclonals, 
Arius 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
As the table above indicates, three (3) of the small enterprises acquire by Roche have 
an intermediate technical contribution; two (2) were classified as having a substantia 
contribution and one (1) of the acquired enterprises were classified as having a weak 
contribution. A high rate of intermediate contribution was expected due to the similarity with 
Merck case. Nevertheless the small companies substantial contribution can be better 
understand when each case is analyzed separately, as will be done in the following sections. 
3.4.2.3 Therapeutic Human Polyclonals 
The Therapeutic Human Polyclonals (THP) is a US company, founded in 2002 and 
purchased in 2007. THP had six patents issued at the USPTO, 54% of a whole similar 
technical knowledge set was developed by Roche from 1990s up to 2012. The graph below 
shows this process in a year basis.  
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Graphic 3.10: Roche’s development of a similar technical knowledge to 
Therapeutic Human Polyclonals. 
 
            Source: Own elaboration 
Even though, some classes had been developed in the 1980s, most of THP’s 
knowledge set was developed by Roche from the 1990s onwards. The period from 1990 to 
2006 had an intense development of classes. Some important information can be drawn by 
looking the last develop class and subclass developed by Roche. 
The class that has been developed more recently by Roche was 800/14. The class 800 
comprises a typical biotechnology class group. The subclass 14 encompass the incorporation 
of different genetic material into a cell, this being a typical feature brought by the molecular 
biology, as shown in Chapter 1. Before being acquired, THP conducted researches dedicated 
to antibodies, this enterprise was an 
"emerging biotechnology company focused on research in the field of human 
antibody technologies. THP has developed a unique transgenic mammalian platform 
to create human antibodies. The technology will enable the generation of both 
monoclonal and polyclonal antibody therapeutics with enhanced efficacy”71 (Roche 
press release, 2007) 
THP was a company specialized in biotechnology platforms. 
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 Available at: http://www.roche.com/media/store/releases/med-cor-2007-04-02.htm 
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THP acquisition shows Roche interest in incorporating platforms technology to its set 
of capabilities. So far, all large pharmaceutical companies are trying to create methods and 
technologies for using antibodies, produced through platforms technologies. Among all large 
pharmaceutical companies in this study sample, at least one small enterprise was acquired due 
to a platform technology. Indeed, biotech platforms are indeed extremely promising, 
especially because through it the large enterprise can develop a large set of new compounds 
for several therapeutic areas.  
3.4.2.4 ARIUS 
Arius was a Canadian company, founded in 1999 and purchased in 2008, this 
enterprise has 33 patents filed at USPTO. According to the methodology, Arius had a 
substantial contribution to the technological knowledge of Roche, 67% of a similar technical 
knowledge set to Arius was developed through the 1990s and 2000s onwards. Below is the 
graphic that show this development in a year basis.  
Graphic 3.11: Roche’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to 
Arius’. 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Roche started to develop Arius’s technical knowledge set in the middle of the 1970s. 
However, the development of new classes of patents increased after 1993, especially in 1993, 
1994, 1995 and 1997. Three classes and subclasses were developed by Roche during Arius 
foundation and acquisition, those classes were: 530 / 388.2 developed at 2001; 530 / 388.7 
developed at 2005 and 424 / 183.1 developed at 2007. The classes 530/ 388.2 and 530/388.7 
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are relate one to another and they refer to synthetic natural resins that bind to specific agents 
such as bacteria and protozoa (pathogens). Subclass 388.2 classifies proteins that can bind to 
specific normal or mutant (like cancer cells) targets such as microorganisms, amical cells, and 
cell-surface. The other subclass 388.7 encompass proteins that can only perform a 
hematopoietic bind. Those two classes together can be seen as a very specific kind of protein 
that bind to another cell in a very particular way. Class 424/183.1 is related to drug production 
where subclass 183.1 is related to antibodies.  
According to Roche in a statement released in July 2008: 
“ARIUS is a biotechnology company discovering and developing the next 
wave of antibody therapeutics to treat cancer and other diseases. At the core of the 
Company is a unique, proprietary FunctionFIRST technology platform that 
generates and selects therapeutic antibodies based on their activity. This antibody 
generation engine has enabled ARIUS to develop a pipeline of more than 400 
antibody drug candidates”72 (Roche press release, 2008) 
Both THP and Arius researched related fields dedicated to the production of 
antibodies. The acquisition of these two companies shows Roche attempt to build and 
enhances competencies on biotech platforms. A platform as a technology for producing new 
compounds can increase the economics of scales from drug discovery activities. As was seen 
so far, a successful platform could be a promising technology that drives acquisitions, so 
being Arius and THP dedicated to this technology makes them a good target for acquisition.  
  
                                                 
72
 Available at: http://www.roche.com/media/store/releases/med-cor-2008-07-23.htm 
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3.4.2.5 Skills contribution 
In the previous session, only the technical nature of knowledge was observed. Roche 
seems to be incorporating platform technologies in its capabilities. However, to create new 
capabilities and fully incorporate new technologies a set of skills is necessary. Those skills 
could be developed during a research agreement or by incorporating the key people that 
developed the mentioned technology. Therefore, large enterprises can use the small business’ 
inventors as a source for creating new capabilities. In that case, small enterprises skills set 
could be a great contribution to the large pharmaceutical enterprise.  
Table 3.15: Small enterprises skill contribution to Roche Skills contribution of 
smack acquired forms to Roche.  
Small acquired 
enterprises (year of 
acquisition) 
Number 
of 
Patents 
(A) 
Total of 
inventors 
in the 
acquired 
enterprises  
(B) 
Inventors 
that 
started 
patented 
by Roche  
(C) 
Number 
of 
patents 
of the 
"new" 
Roche's 
inventors  
(D) 
Use of 
inventors 
by Roche 
(E=B/A) 
Small 
enterprises 
inventor 
productivity 
(F=A/B) 
J&J's new 
inventor 
productivity 
(G=D/C) 
Therapeutic 
Human Polyclonals 
(2007) 
6 4 0 0 0% 1.5 0 
Piramed (2008) 4 24 24 102 100% 0.167 4.25 
Mirus-Bio (2008) 32 25 19 78 76% 1.28 4.1 
Arius (2008) 33 14 5 11 36% 2.35 2.2 
Memory 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2008) 
40 26 0 0 0% 1.53 0 
Macardia (2010) 1 2 0 0 0% 0.5 0 
Source: Own elaboration 
All the inventors that started to issue patents for Roche produced a total of 191 patents. 
When Roche acquired all small companies it obtained 115 patents. This fact shows the 
employment of inventors that once worked for the acquired company is an important source 
for patent generation. In addition, as the other enterprises cases have shown the inventors 
productivity really increase after they move from the small enterprise to the large. The 
inventor’s productivity increase is another fact that shows how the skill set of small company 
can contribute to the large pharmaceutical.  
Three companies stand out in the use of its inventors by Roche, those are: Piramed, 
Mirus-Bio and Arius. The chart below shows the use of Roche's skills of these three 
companies. 
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Graphic 3.10: The use of inventors by Roche  
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Despite using the skill set of only three companies, Roche uses it intensively. In the 
case of Piramed, Roche used 100% of the small company skill set; 76% in Mirus-Bio case and 
36% in Arius case.  
Some correlations can be drawn, Arius was enterprises classified as having a 
substantial technological contribution to Roche. Piramed had a research agreement with 
Roche that allow this large enterprise to acquire important capabilities related to cancer 
treatment, also, the inventors were extremely important for Roche as shown in graphic 3.12. 
Although, Mirus-bio was classified as having an intermediate technical contribution to Roche, 
this small enterprise had a great amount of its technical knowledge (39%) developed recently 
by Roche, on the edge of being classified as a having a substantial contribution to Roche. 
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3.5 The Abbott-Laboratories case 
3.5.1 Abbott-Laboratories’ M&A overview 
 
Abbott-Laboratories was the less active company regarding M&A. The company 
acquired only two small biotechnology firms during 2005 and 2012. The table below shows 
the companies bought by Abbott-Laboratories. 
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Table 3.16: Abbott-laboratories’ acquisition of small biotech enterprises between 2005 to 2012 (US$ milions)  
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Enterprise 
Acquisition 
year 
M&A 
deal 
amount 
Patents 
M&A 
deal 
amount 
Enterprise 
origin 
Employees 
(2012) 
Foundation 
Revenues  
(2012) 
Collaboratio
n (Year) 
Clinical stage 
of lead 
product 
KOS 2006 450 16 450 US 1361 1988 150 No - 
Facet 
Biotech 
Corp. 
2010 3,700 17 3,700 US - 2009 
 
No - 
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From 2015 to 2012, Abbott-Laboratories has spent on M&A, with small biotech 
enterprises, a total of US $ 4.15 billion
73
 dollars. This amount is almost the same as the 2012 
enterprise’s R&D expenditures (US $ 4.32 billion). Those acquisitions brought 33 patents to 
Abbott Laboratories’ portfolio.  
From 2005 to 2012 Abbott-laboratories have invested US$ 24.2 billion in R&D and 
740 patents were issued, an average of 92 patents per year. The cost of each patent for 
Abbott-laboratories was almost US$ 32.7 million per patent. Considering just the 
acquisitions, Abbott-laboratories obtained 33 patents in 8 years, an average of 4 patents a 
year. Those 33 patents were obtained through the expenditure of US$ 4.15 million, an average 
cost of US$ 125 thousand per patent. Through this simple input and output model is possible 
to realize that M&A are, for Abbott-laboratories, a way of acquiring new technologies at a 
lower cost.  
In addition, comparing the outputs of R&D and M&A as investments; M&A 
represents only 1,7% of the whole R&D investment made from 2005 to 2012, but it generated 
44% of what was generated through R&D; i.e Abbott-laboratories obtained 33 as direct result 
of M&A and 740 as R&D product. Therefore, M&A, in this case, is an investment that 
generates more than proportional results when compared to R&D.  
 
3.5.2 Overall contribution analyses: The Abbott-Laboratories Case 
3.5.2.1 Prior contribution 
Abbott-Laboratories had no research agreement with any of the acquired small biotech 
companies mentioned above.  
3.5.2.2 Technical contribution 
Abbott-laboratories is an American large pharmaceutical company, this enterprise has 
not acquire a several small biotech enterprises as its competitors. At first, this fact could 
indicate an enterprise with a different behavior. In addition, Abbott-laboratories has not used 
any of its acquired enterprises patents as references.  
  
                                                 
73
 The M&A amount refers, only, to the acquired small biotech enterprises that had at least one patent at USPTO. 
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Table 3.17: Acquired small enterprises direct technical contribution to Abbott-
Laboratories’ development of the small enterprises’ technical knowledge set  
 
Enterprises acquired by 
Abbott-laboratories 
from 2005 to 2012 (year 
of acquisition) 
Decades Kos (2006) 
Facet 
(2010) 
2000 5% 32% 
1990 39% 36% 
1980 18% 20% 
1970 8% 0% 
Classes not 
developed 
30% 11% 
                                             Source:Own elaboration  
 
According to the table above, Abbott-laboratories has only recent dedicated it research 
efforts in the same patent classes that compose Kos and Facet technical knowledge set. 44% 
of Kos’ technical knowledge set components were developed by Abbott-laboratories during 
the 1990 and from 2000 onwards, other great amount (30%) of Kos’ technical knowledge set 
components was not developed yet. The development of a similar technical Knowledge set to 
Facet is even more recent, being 32% of it developed only from 2000 onwards. The amount of 
not developed patent classes is smaller for Facet (11%). According to the study methodology 
the two enterprises could have had substantial technical contribution to Abbott-Laboratories’ 
R&D. The chart below show the enterprises according to its possible technical contributions. 
Chart:3.5: Acquired small enterprises division according to their indirect 
contribution 
 
Contribution 
 
Weak Intermediary Substantial 
Enterprises 
  
KOS, 
Facet 
               Source: Own elaboration 
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Although Abbott-Laboratories have acquired few small biotech enterprises, this Big-
Pharmaceutical company has recently incorporated the technologies and competences that 
those small companies had. In the next sections of this study we will analyze more deeply the 
relation built between these two small enterprises and Abbott-laboratories.   
3.5.2.3 KOS-Pharmaceuthical 
KOS was a company founded in 1988 and purchased in 2006. The company was 
specialized in medicines dedicated to cholesterol. The chart below shows in a time 
perspective the development of a similar technical knowledge to Kos set undergone by 
Abbott-laboratories.  
Graphic 3.13: Abbott-Laboratories development of the technical knowledge set of 
Kos-Pharmaceutical. 
 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
Abbott-laboratories have developed a large quantity of classes within Kos technical 
knowledge especially in the 1990s. In the 2000 this process has slowed down. There is 
development peak and a slow decrease from 1992 to 1996. The period that Abbott 
laboratories have more intensively develop the same classes as Kos started in this enterprise 
year of foundation. Therefore, within the same technical knowledge set, these enterprises had 
a similar technological evolution; these companies were researching and building similar 
technological capabilities at the same time. This similarity can be seen as complementarity 
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between these enterprises research activities, in that sense, Kos acquisition could fill some 
capabilities gaps or complement competences already developed by Abbott.  
Regarding promising technologies, by the time it was acquired, Kos, had already 
developed an efficient drug for increasing HDL (good cholesterol) levels, this medicine is 
called Niaspan. After acquiring Kos, Abbott-laboratories were able to enter the branch of 
drugs dedicated to cholesterol treatment. That is one more example of acquisition lead by one 
promising technology. In addition this technology has boosted Abbott pipeline and helped the 
enterprise to diversify. The knowledge obtained from Kos was also important to stablish a 
partnership between Abbott and AstraZeneca in the research and production of a single pill 
able to control cholesterol (Abbott Laboratories Annual Report, 2006). 
The patent classes developed by Abbott-Laboratories after Kos acquisition were 
important to show in which areas KOS offers its contribution to Abbott technical evolution. 
Among all classes that compose Kos technical knowledge set, two of them, were developed 
after Kos acquisition. Those classes, 514/254.07 and 521/142, encompass respectively the 
production of drugs and synthetic resins. The subclass 254.07 designates a very specific kind 
of molecule that binds to another through non-ionic bonds. The subclass 142 denotes a 
specific way of producing or treating cellular polymers. 
 Polymers are large molecular chains that could be produced by cells
74
. These two 
patent classes show technological capabilities related to produce molecules able to bind to fat 
molecules. By using the lock and key model of chemical bindings, Abbott-laboratories could 
develop compounds for cholesterol treatment and KOS not only helped enhancing this 
enterprise’s’ competences but also the small company acquisition brought a new compound 
and allow Abbott to enter in a new therapeutic area. Abbott Laboratories used Kos compound 
and competences to create a new research line in the enterprise.  
 3.5.2.4 Facet Biotech 
Facet Biotech is the other company that could have substantially contribute to Abbot-
Laboratories’ R&D and patent activity. Facet Biotech was founded in 2008 as a spin-off from 
PDL BioPharma, the enterprise was acquired in 2010. Facet Biotech was focused on 
diagnosing and elaborating drugs against cancer. Most patent classes developed by Abbott-
laboratories that compose Facet technical Knowledge set were developed in a recent period of 
time as it is possible to see in the graphic below. 
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 Cholesterol molecules are a type of Lipids that is a polymer 
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Graphic 3.14: Abbott-laboratories development of a similar technical Knowledge 
set to Facet Biotech. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
The graphic above indicates that the classes and subclasses, developed by Abbott-
Laboratories started in 1980. Through the years, Abbott Laboratories have developed the 
same technical knowledge set components of Facet. The years of 1988 and 2003 had the most 
intensive developing activity. In those years Abbott had respectively development 6 and 4 
new classes. From 1990s onwards the development of classes were more scarce but constant. 
The most recent classes developed by Abbott-Laboratories were classes 424/134.1 and the 
class 435/69.6.  
Class 424 refers to drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions in which the 
subclass 134.1 indicates the production and uses of antibodies to treat diseases, for Facet we 
could conclude that the enterprise is researching antibodies to be used in the treatment of 
cancer. The class 435 encompasses chemistry, molecular biology and microbiology this class 
encompasses the biotechnologies. The subclass 69.6 indicates the use of recombinant DNA to 
produce proteins especially blood proteins 
Abbott-Laboratories acquired Facet in an attempt to enhance its immunology and 
oncology capabilities. By the time it was acquired, Facet had developed important 
Foundation Year (2008) 
Acquisition Year (2010) 
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compounds, such as the Daclizumab, a phase II investigational biologic intended to treat 
multiple sclerosis and a oncology compound in early- to mid-stage development.  
According to the graphic 4.7.2.1, the newer classes developed by Abbott laboratories 
are dedicated to ways of enhancing the immunology system through antibody related 
medicines and treatments, the enterprise aims on oncology by developing proteins. The 
capabilities brought by Facet could, indeed, contribute to Abbott-Laboratories research 
activities. 
3.5.2.5 Skills contribution 
The technical knowledge is only a part in the innovative process, as mentioned before 
the skills also play an important role in the enterprises ability to innovate. The technical 
analyses showed that Kos-pharmaceuticals and Facet-Biotec had the potentials to 
substantially contribute to Abbott-laboratories R&D and patent activities, but this analyses 
only encompasses the technical domains. The analyses of skills can be summarized in the 
chart below: 
Chart 3.18: Small enterprises skill contribution to Abbott-Laboratories 
Small acquired 
enterprises  
Number 
of 
patents 
(A) 
Total of 
inventors 
in the 
acquired 
companies 
(B) 
Inventors 
that 
started to 
patent by 
Merck ( 
C) 
Number 
of 
patents 
of the 
"new" 
Pfizer 
inventors 
(D) 
Use of 
Inventors 
(C/B) 
Small 
enterprises 
inventor 
productivity 
(A/B) 
Abbott's 
new 
inventor 
productivity 
(D/C) 
KOS-
Pharmaceuthicals  
16 14 1 1 7% 1.14 1 
Facet-Biotech 17 30 18 45 60% 0.5 2.5 
      Source: Own elaboration 
The inventors that began to issue patents having Abbott-laboratories as home company 
issued a total of 46 patents, a higher number of patents than those obtained just with the 
acquisitions of these two enterprises
75. The Kos’s inventor productivity stayed stable; while 
Facet inventors productivity became five times higher as they move to Abbott.  
An enterprise that is able to use the acquired company skills could deal better with the 
new technology and assimilate it faster. In that matter, the usage of inventors is a way to see 
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 The acquisition of KOS and Facet gave 33 patents for Abbott-laboratories. 
147 
 
how Abbott-Laboratories used the Kos-pharmaceutical and Facet-biotech skills embodied in 
their inventors as shown in the graphic bellow.   
Graphic 3.15: Inventors usage by Abbott-Laboratories  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Even though the two small enterprises bought by Abbott-Laboratories contribute to the 
Big-Pharma innovative process its usage of inventors are rather divergent between KOS and 
Facet. Abbott-laboratories do not use a great percentage of KOS’s inventors it uses only 7%, 
but Abbott has used 60% of Facet’s inventors.  
 For Abbott-Laboratories there is relation between high skill usage and not developed 
classes. For instance, the skill usage of Abbott-Laboratories from Kos-Pharmaceutical is 
lower than the one of Facet-biotech, also, Abbott-laboratories has a higher rate of classes not 
developed from Kos than Facet. Therefore, the employment off skills work towards 
developing capabilities; the less Abbott-laboratories uses the skill from a small company, its 
abilities to developed the small enterprises technical knowledge set is reduced.    
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Chapter 4 The Analyses of the Overall Contribution Elements and the 
Relevance of Skills Contribution 
 
 
This study tried to summarize into an overall contribution process the many forms 
which the small biotech enterprise can, through acquisitions, potentially generate new 
technological competences in large pharmaceutical enterprises. This process is composed by: 
(i) prior contribution, (i) direct and (ii) indirect technical contribution and (i) skills 
contribution. Although the enterprises are very different from each other one can propose 
some general interpretations. The next step is to build relations between those variables.  
The interviews have strongly supported that acquisitions of small technological 
enterprises are mainly driven by promising technologies, new for the Big-Pharma. 
Accordingly, new pieces of knowledge, be they technology or competences, are what lies 
behind an acquisition. A new set of knowledge for the Big-Pharma could be new patents in 
new classes and subclasses. Therefore, the use of new knowledge by one enterprise can be 
observed when a large pharmaceutical enterprise is using the acquired enterprise patents as 
reference to its own patents, or, when Big-Pharma are patenting in new patent classes that 
compose the small acquired enterprises’ technical knowledge set. That fact is only encompass 
the use of technical knowledge. For the large enterprise handle this new technology the 
acquiring firm needs to incorporate the key people that developed this same technology.  
One can state that a clear case of successful contribution, would be an enterprise that 
had: (i) prior contribution; (ii) direct technical contribution; (iii) substantial indirect technical 
contribution and (iv) skill contribution. In other words, a clear case of successful contribution 
is the one in which the small enterprise has contribute in all of the overall contribution 
components. The only case where that happened was the acquisition of Abmaxis (acquired by 
Merck).  
Therefore the Abmaxis case must be highlighted, this was considered a successful 
acquisitions
76
 in which Merck had a prior contribution. This Big-Pharma has used 5 of 
Abmaxis’ patents as reference and the enterprise was classified as having a substantial 
technical contribution. The acquired small enterprise had a high rate of skills contributions, 
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where 60% of its inventors issued patents under Merck’s name. This enterprise leaves no 
doubt that it has really contribute to Merck. The case of Abmaxis have three important 
outcomes for this study. First it proves that the general contribution elements are relevant. 
Second, when the small enterprise has contribute in all of them is almost certain to be a 
successful case, as happen to Abmaxis. Third, the case shows the importance of skills, 
because, Abmaxis has a high rate of skills contribution.  
Certain components of the overall contribution could indicate the large enterprises’ 
commitment on internalizing developing the competences held by the acquired small 
enterprises. Arguably, a Big-Pharm is more committed on developing and incorporating the 
small enterprises competences at the moment it uses the enterprises patents and by using the 
small enterprises’ skills.  
When Big-Pharma are using the small enterprises patents to produce their own patents, 
the large enterprises are giving a clear sign that the technology developed by the small 
enterprise is useful to their technological development, i.e. the large pharmaceutical enterprise 
is tying up part of its technological development into a piece of technical knowledge develop 
outside of its borders.  
The use of inventors made by the acquiring large enterprise also goes in the same 
direction but it shows an even strong commitment. By using the acquired small enterprises’ 
inventors the Big-Pharma is trying to internalize the element that give the small biotech 
companies its innovative dynamics. Key people have other important roles in the acquiring 
firms, besides allowing the enterprise to master the new technology. One is to keep 
researching related subjects that were the acquisitions drivers. The other is to “update” the 
Big-Pharma knowledge. The new research conducted by the new inventors will be interesting 
for the companies
77, by doing this, the inventors will be “updating” the Big-Pharma’s 
knowledge towards the knowledge held by the small acquired enterprise. As new inventors 
are incorporated and through their research activities, they are able to incorporate the new 
knowledge into the Big-Pharma, therefore changing the firm’s technological evolution. 
These two kinds of contribution are not clear cases of successful contribution. 
Nevertheless, when they happen one can understand that the Big-Pharma is willing to 
incorporate the competences held by the small enterprise. Direct technical contribution and 
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 some exceptions may happen like the case of Sirna and Covx 
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skills contribution enables the large enterprise to incorporate in its technical knowledge set the 
similar competences held by the small acquired enterprises.  
In order to observe the aspects mentioned above, the table below (table 4.18, pg. 147) 
show the studies summary results. There is a recurrent pattern in the overall contribution 
process, a combination of: prior contribution to a certain level of direct technical contribution 
and an intermediate or substantial indirect technical contribution associated with more than 
10% level of skills contribution
78
.  
  
                                                 
78
 There were, also, cases in which occurs:  (i) prior contribution, (ii)weak technical contribution and 
(iii)inventors’ usage below 10% 
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Table 4.18: Study Summary Results 
 
    
 
Technical Contribution   
Acquiring 
Big-
Pharma 
Acquired 
Enterprises 
Acquisition 
year 
Prior 
Contribution 
Direct 
(patent 
used as 
reference) 
Indirect 
Skills 
(inventors 
usage) 
Pfizer 
Vicuron 2005 Yes 0 
Intermediate/      
Substantial 
13% 
Idun 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 No 1 Intermediate 0% 
Bioren 2005 No 0 Weak 33% 
Rinat 
Neuroscience* 
2006 No 2 Substantial 51% 
Coley 2007 No 34 Intermediate 15% 
Biorexis 2007 No 0 
Weak/            
Substantial 
0% 
CovX** 2008 No 1 Weak 0% 
Serenex 2008 No 0 Weak 0% 
Encysive 2008 No 0 Intermediate 32% 
FoldRx 2010 No 0 Intermediate 0% 
Icagen* 2011 Yes 2 Intermediate 12% 
Excaliard 2011 No 0 Weak 0% 
J&J 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 No 1 Weak 24% 
Omrix 2008 Yes 6 Weak 0% 
Respivert 2010 Yes 0 Inermediate 0% 
Crucell 2011 Yes 0 
Weak/            
Substantial 
1% 
Corimmun 2012 No 0 Substantial 0% 
Alios* 2014 No 1 Weak 26% 
Merck 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme)** 
2006 No 35 Intermediate 11% 
GlycoFi 2006 Yes 26 Intermediate 77% 
Abmaxis* 2006 Yes 5 Substantial 60% 
NovaCardia 2007 No 0 Intermediate 0% 
Insmed 
(Biologics) 
2009 No 0 Intermediate 3% 
SmartCells 2010 No 0 Intermediate 0% 
Inspire 2011 No 1 Intermediate 4% 
Roche 
Therapeutic 
Human 
Polyclonals 
2007 no 0 Substantial 0% 
Piramed 2008 Yes 4 Intermediate 100% 
Mirus Bio 2008 no 12 Intermediate 76% 
Arius 2008 no 5 Substantial 36% 
Memory 
Pharmaceuticals 
2008 Yes 0 Intermediate 0% 
Marcadia 
Biotech 
2010 no 0 Weak 0% 
Abbott-
Laboratories 
Kos 2006 No 0 Substantial 7% 
Facet 2010 No 0 Substantial 60% 
 
The rate of enterprises that had a prior contribution is low, only 27% of the whole 
acquired enterprises. Acquisitions preceded by collaborations are seen as an ideal process for 
*Cases pointed out as success by the interviews 
**Cases pointed out as unsuccessfull by the interviews 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
S 
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acquisitions
79
. Nevertheless, the acquisition process sometimes resembles a bidding process in 
which there is no time for collaboration. In addition, sometimes, collaborations calls the 
attention of other competitors
80
 that are trying to create the same competences. Therefore, in a 
moment of rush, when all the competitors are trying to acquire the same target, a more slow 
process based first in the collaborations and then acquisition is rather difficult.  
By excluding the small group of enterprises that had prior contribution, it is, also, 
possible to establish another overall contribution pattern, composed by: direct technical 
contribution, intermediate or substantial technical contribution and skills contribution. The 
table 4.18 above shows that technical contribution is almost always associated with skills 
contribution. From all the cases, that had direct technical contribution, 67% of them had also 
intermediate or substantial technical contribution and some level of skills contribution. In 
other words 89% of the cases that had some level of skill contribution were also classified as 
having intermediate or substantial technical contribution. Skills and technical contributions 
are closely related because is necessary key people to develop certain kinds of technology.  
 The general analyses above conducted indicate the importance of skills in the process 
of contribution. But, in order to build less general conclusions and show evidences that 
support the hypothesis of the study the results will be presented giving emphasis in each 
component of the overall contribution. Finally it will be presented only the cases that were 
pointed out as successful acquisitions. By doing this this study will try to show a pattern of 
success in the contributions process associated with strong evidences that support the initial 
hypothesis.  
Before presenting the overall contribution components individually it is necessary to 
review the hypothesis constructed for this study, that is: acquired small biotech enterprises 
do not contribute all in the same way, but large enterprises that are capable of using the 
small emprises inventors are the ones that are more efficient on incorporating the 
technologies and competences of the acquired small biotech firm.  
The first part of the hypothesis was strongly supported by the summary results. The 
table above and the chapter three allow to attest that small enterprises contribute in different 
ways for the Big-Pharma. As small enterprises develop different types of technology, which 
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 During the interviews this point was stressed. All Large-pharmaceutical enterprises aim to get as much 
information as possible by collaborating first with a small biotech enterprise  
80
 Another point mentioned in the interviews. 
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are the main acquisition drivers, the biotech enterprises are giving different types of 
contribution to its acquiring company. There is no uniform contribution, some enterprises 
contribute more in terms of technology and other in terms of skills, the contribution varies 
according to small acquired enterprise. In addition, each small enterprise technical knowledge 
set is different from each other, therefore each acquiring firms incorporate different pieces of 
knowledge into its knowledge base. The second part of the hypothesis that encompasses the 
skills contribution was, until now, only partially supported, as mentioned before, it is 
necessary to analyze further each overall contribution component.  
4.1 Prior contribution 
 
Although prior contribution is not very common among the acquired small enterprises, 
it is, still, an important component that, as stressed several times before, allows the enterprise 
to build competences together. Below, it is shown all the cases in which prior contribution has 
occurred. 
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Table 4.19: All the prior contribution cases 
        
Technical Contribution 
 
Acquiring 
Big-
Pharma 
Acquired Enterprises 
Acquisition 
year 
Prior 
Contribution 
Direct 
(patent 
used as 
reference) 
Indirect 
Skills 
(inventors 
usage) 
Pfizer 
Vicuron 2005 Yes 0 
Intermediate/               
Substantial 
13% 
Icagen* 2011 Yes 2 Intermediate 12% 
J&J 
Omrix 2008 Yes 6 Weak 0% 
Respivert 2010 Yes 0 Inermediate 0% 
Crucell 2011 Yes 0 Weak/Substantial 1% 
Merck 
GlycoFi 2006 Yes 26 Intermediate 77% 
Abmaxis* 2006 Yes 5 Substantial 60% 
Roche 
Piramed 2008 Yes 4 Intermediate 100% 
Memory 
Pharmaceuticals 
2008 Yes 0 Intermediate 0% 
*Acquisitions pointed out as successful ones by the interviews 
** Acquisitions pointed out as not successful ones by the interviews 
Source: Own elaboration 
The acquired enterprises of J&J have a higher rate of prior contribution, probably due 
to J&J’s size, as a large enterprise and highly diversified, J&J, has several subsidiaries in the 
pharmaceutical sector, so the enterprise has a higher probability of establishing research 
agreements. Therefore it is not surprising that J&J has a higher rate of prior contribution.  
Another important fact, about J&J, is the correlation between prior contribution and 
the lack of skill contribution. Considering that prior contribution is a way of large enterprises 
to construct competences together, and gather information about the enterprise, this 
correlation may suggest that the enterprise uses its research collaborations to incorporate part 
of the acquired firm’s knowledge. The competences constructed during the collaboration 
period makes J&J less sensitive to skills contribution, because the enterprise was able to 
incorporate important pieces of knowledge before the acquisition.  
In a more broad view, from all the acquired small enterprises in this study only 9 of 
them had a prior contribution. Among them 5 had a direct technical contribution and 6 had 
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contribute in skills. That shows a close relation between prior contribution to direct technical 
contribution and skills contribution. 
This relation can be explained by the possible outcomes of a research agreement. As 
enterprises conduct their research together important pieces of knowledge that will become 
technology and competences. The technology is represented in the patents and the developed 
technology is used by the enterprise in its routines. The use of the new developed techniques 
to produce more advanced techniques is captured by the patents that were used as referenced. 
Therefore when enterprises are collaborating the use of each other patents is easier because 
companies are sharing knowledge during their collaboration. 
The relation between prior contribution and skills is also explained by the dynamics of 
collaboration. During collaboration the Big-Pharma has access to the key people that 
developed the desired technology, so in a future acquisition the persons responsible for 
developing and upgrading the successful technologies will be ones that the Big-Pharma will 
desire to hire. 
As heavily stressed, prior contribution is important in the overall contribution, but the 
success of a contribution does not depend heavily on prior contribution. In fact, is not always 
possible to establish a research agreement with all enterprises before they are acquired. 
Sometimes, several large pharmaceutical enterprises are interested in the same target, 
therefore, making impossible the establishment of a cooperation. There are elements in the 
overall contribution that are more determinant in the success of a contribution  
 
4.2 Indirect technical contribution 
 
Another important element in the overall contribution is the indirect technical 
contribution. The indirect technical contribution as mentioned in chapter 2 is a potentiality. In 
order to turn this potential state into reality it is necessary, for the enterprise, the ability to 
develop a similar technical knowledge set to its acquired small enterprises. This study 
considered that enterprises classified as having substantial technical contribution are the ones 
that could possibly add more to the Big-Pharma technical knowledge set. In the table below 
(table 4.20 pg. 153) is shown all the cases classified as having substantial technical 
contribution. 
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An important observation is needed regarding indirect technical contribution. Chapter 
3 has showed that the enterprises are different form each other, especially regarding indirect 
technical contribution. J&J was most different enterprises regarding this aspect. Nevertheless 
the J&J case allows to explain, weak technical contribution as a stock of knowledge. It is 
possible to establish a process in which the acquiring enterprises (in this case J&J) uses these 
stock of knowledge that transforms weak contribution into substantial contribution, for then 
became intermediate contribution. As time goes by, the knowledge acquired depreciates as it 
is used, concurrently, as contribution evolves from weak to substantial, knowledge becomes 
useful. But the acquiring enterprise ability to transform this stock of knowledge into useful 
knowledge depends on certain enterprises capabilities. J&J can, through its owns resources, 
incorporate this new knowledge, but, when it uses the acquired enterprises inventors this 
process is faster and easier, not only that, but the new inventors can keep researching, at J&J, 
related subjects that drove the acquisition. 
Table 4.20:  All the substantial contribution cases 
        Technical Contribtuion 
 
Acquiring 
Big-Pharma 
Acquired 
Enterprises 
Acquisition 
year 
Prior 
Contribution 
Direct 
(patent 
used as 
reference) 
Indirect 
Skills 
(inventors 
usage) 
Pfizer 
Rinat 
Neuroscience* 
2006 No 2 Substantial 51% 
J&J Corimmun 2012 No 0 Substantial 0% 
Merck Abmaxis* 2006 Yes 5 Substantial 60% 
Roche 
Therapeutic 
Human 
Polyclonals 
2007 no 0 Substantial 0% 
Arius 2008 no 5 Substantial 36% 
Abbott-
Laboratories 
Kos 2006 No 0 Substantial 7% 
Facet 2010 No 0 Substantial 60% 
*Acquisitions pointed out as successful ones by the interviews 
Sources: own elaboration 
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The table 4.20 above shows the use of patents and skills, hence the interest of Big-
Pharma to turn the potential state of a substantial technical contribution into new 
competences. In that sense when Big-Pharma are not using patents neither skill from its small 
acquired enterprises the enterprise demonstrate its lack of interest in the competence set of the 
small acquired enterprises. Therefore, when substantial contribution and weak contribution 
(as a stock of knowledge) is not associated with direct technical contribution or skill 
contribution the potential state of this element cannot be fulfilled, thus characterizing an 
unsuccessful contribution case. 
 
4.3 Direct Technical contribution 
 
 The direct technical contribution indicates a clear interest of the Big-Pharma in its 
small acquired enterprises technologies. In simple way, if an enterprise use others enterprise’s 
patents to generate its own patents, this fact means that the specific technology expressed in 
the patent is important for the Big-Pharma.  
 Below (see table 4.21, pg. 155) the study compile all the cases in which was observed 
direct technical contribution. Based on the next table the study tried to build some relations 
encompassing direct technical contribution. 
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Table 4.21: All cases of direct technical contribution  
 
    
 
Technical Contribution   
Acquiring 
Big-
Pharma 
Acquired 
Enterprises 
Acquisition 
year 
Prior 
Contribution 
Direct 
(patent 
used as 
reference) 
Indirect 
Skills 
(inventors 
usage) 
Pfizer 
Idun 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 No 1 Intermediate 0% 
Bioren 2005 No 0 Weak 33% 
Rinat 
Neuroscience* 
2006 No 2 Substantial 51% 
Coley 2007 No 34 Intermediate 15% 
Biorexis 2007 No 0 
Weak/            
Substantial 
0% 
CovX** 2008 No 1 Weak 0% 
Icagen* 2011 Yes 2 Intermediate 12% 
J&J 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 No 1 Weak 24% 
Omrix 2008 Yes 6 Weak 0% 
Alios* 2014 No 1 Weak 26% 
Merck 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme)** 
2006 No 35 Intermediate 11% 
GlycoFi 2006 Yes 26 Intermediate 77% 
Abmaxis* 2006 Yes 5 Substantial 60% 
Inspire 2011 No 1 Intermediate 4% 
Roche 
Piramed 2008 Yes 4 Intermediate 100% 
Mirus Bio 2008 no 12 Intermediate 76% 
Arius 2008 no 5 Substantial 36% 
*Acquisitions pointed out as successful ones by the interviews 
** Acquisitions pointed out as not successful ones by the interviews 
Source: Own elaboration 
The table above shows all the cases in which the Big-Pharma had use one of the small 
acquired enterprises patents as reference to its own patents. There is a relation between direct 
technical contribution and skills contribution. 
That relations can be explained based on Hohberg (2016), the authors points out for an 
inventors path dependency that makes them research always the same subject. In that sense, 
large pharmaceutical enterprises are using its small acquired enterprises patents because the 
inventors are researching related subjects in the Big-Pharma.  
159 
 
There is also a relation between intermediate technical contribution and direct 
technical contribution. As Big-Pharma uses the small acquired enterprises patents, the large 
pharmaceutical company is changing its technical knowledge in direction of the small 
enterprises’ one, the continuous use of patents transforms the potentials in the technical 
knowledge base into new competences. 
All the cases in which direct technical contribution has occurred have shown the Big-
Pharma interest in incorporating the acquired small enterprises technologies. Not only that, 
but, shows the Big-Pharma’s interest in further developing the technology constructed at the 
small biotech enterprise. 
 
4.4 Skill Contribution 
 
The last component in the overall contribution is the skills contribution. Below are the 
acquisitions in which Big-Pharma had employed the small enterprises’ inventors and they had 
applied at least one patent at USPTO. In other words, the table shows the use of skills made 
by the large pharmaceutical companies. 
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Table 4.22: All cases of skills contribution 
    Technical Contribution  
Acquiring 
Big-Pharma 
Acquired 
Enterprises 
Acquisition 
year 
Prior 
Contribution 
Direct 
(patent 
used as 
reference) 
Indirect 
Skills 
(inventors 
usage) 
Pfizer 
Bioren 2005 No 0 Weak 33% 
Rinat 
Neuroscience* 
2006 No 2 Substantial 51% 
Coley 2007 No 34 Intermediate 15% 
Encysive 2008 No 0 Intermediate 32% 
Icagen* 2011 Yes 2 Intermediate 12% 
J&J 
TransForm 
Pharmaceuticals 
2005 No 1 Weak 24% 
Crucell 2011 Yes 0 
Weak/            
Substantial 
1% 
Alios* 2014 No 1 Weak 26% 
Merck 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme)** 
2006 No 35 Intermediate 11% 
GlycoFi 2006 Yes 26 Intermediate 77% 
Abmaxis* 2006 Yes 5 Substantial 60% 
Insmed 
(Biologics) 
2009 No 0 Intermediate 3% 
Inspire 2011 No 1 Intermediate 4% 
Roche 
Piramed 2008 Yes 4 Intermediate 100% 
Mirus Bio 2008 No 12 Intermediate 76% 
Arius 2008 No 5 Substantial 36% 
Abbott-
Laboratories 
Kos 2006 No 0 Substantial 7% 
Facet 2010 No 0 Substantial 60% 
*Acquisitions pointed out as successful ones by the interviews 
** Acquisitions pointed out as not successful ones by the interviews 
Source: Own elaboration 
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As was seen so far, the individual analyses of the overall contributions elements shows 
that they are all related to Skills contribution, there is no component that is not associated and 
that could be considered without the skills contributions. 
Skills contributions are, also, mainly related to Prior contribution
81
 (when it happens), 
direct technical contribution, substantial and intermediate indirect technical contribution. 
Skills show themselves as an important element that could be considered a condition for the 
success contribution to happen. Without skills the enterprise is not able to incorporate to its 
technical knowledge the same competences held by the acquired small enterprise. In addition 
the skills contribution is a clear indication of the Big-Pharma commitment in developing 
related capabilities to its acquired small enterprises. 
Direct technical contribution and skills contribution have a clear relation between each 
other. According to Hohberger (2016), inventors have a path dependence, they tend to keep 
researching related subjects regardless the place they are. Therefore, when an inventor move 
from one enterprise to another he will keep using the patents that he has developed in his 
former enterprise, because using his older patents is necessary for researching related 
subjects. The scientist path dependence shed some light on the relation of direct technical 
contribution and skills contribution. 
Based on all that was discussed so far, skills contribution are some kind of first 
condition for the contribution to happen. Because based on the skills usage the Big-Pharma 
can use directly the patents of the acquired small enterprises and the inventors can build new 
competences based on the their previous knowledge accumulated on acquired small 
enterprise. 
  
                                                 
81
 J&J is the only excepetion 
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4.5 Successful and Unsuccessful Cases 
 
The interviews were very important for this study. They worked as a basis for better 
building the overall contribution process. Throughout the interviews the enterprises stressed 
out what acquisitions they consider to be successful or unsuccessful. This particularity could 
give some more depth in the analyses of the overall contribution elements. 
The enterprises answers regarding what they judge as successful or not are binary, 
then, the several details and meanderings that encompass an acquisition are not captured. 
Nevertheless, by focusing only on these cases one can infer a “general pattern of success” in 
the overall contribution process. This attempt will start by the analyses of table 4.23, below. 
 
Table 4.23: Successful and unsuccessful cases of acquisition according to the 
interviewees 
     
Technical Contribution 
 
Acquiring 
Companies 
Acquired 
companies 
Sucessful 
Acquisitions 
Acquisition 
year 
Prior 
contribution 
Direct 
(patent 
used as 
reference) 
Indirect 
Skills 
(inventors 
usage) 
Pfizer 
Rinat 
Neuroscience 
Yes 2006 No 2 Substantial 51% 
Icagen Yes 2011 Yes 2 Intermediate 12% 
Pfizer CovX No 2008 No 1 Weak 0% 
J&J Alios Yes 2014 No 1 Weak 26% 
Merck 
Abmaxis Yes 2006 Yes 5 Subtantial 60% 
Sirna 
(Ribozyme) 
No 2006 No 35 Intermediate 11% 
Roche Piramed* Yes 2008 Yes 4 Intermediate 100% 
*Chosen as a successful case based on the methodology 
Source: own elaboration 
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The table above shows that almost half of the successful cases had a prior contribution 
to the Big-Pharma. Research done in collaboration may work as a selection environment. 
When Big-Pharma is establishing its agreements on research, the large enterprises is trying to 
gather information about its partner (Higgins and Rodrigues, 2006). Those information will 
allow the large pharmaceutical enterprise to see if the small enterprise’s technology fits to its 
needs. The collaborations outcomes may also determine a future acquisitions, for example, 
collaborations that generate new technologies may lead to the acquisition of the small firm.  
The technical contribution shows an interesting pattern among the success cases. First, 
all the enterprises have directly contributed to their acquiring firms. In terms of indirect 
technical contribution, all the enterprises had an intermediate or substantial indirect technical 
contribution, being half of the sample classified as having substantial technical contribution
82
. 
As stressed during the interviews, the main driver of acquisitions between Big-Pharma and 
small biotech enterprises are promising technologies. By using patents of its acquired small 
companies, the large pharmaceutical companies are showing how useful is the technic 
described in the patent. In addition, a substantial indirect technical contribution shows a recent 
interest of large pharmaceutical enterprises in new competences. 
Other element that all the success cases have in common is the skills contributions, all 
acquiring large pharmaceutical enterprises have used the acquired small enterprises’ inventors 
in a rate above 10%. The enterprise that had lowest skill contribution is Icagen that 
contributed with 12% of its inventors. 
Skills contribution are the unanimous factor among the success cases. That fact 
reinforces the hypothesis of the study. Although all other factors are important as shown in 
the chapter 3, new technologies cannot be mastered without the people that developed, this 
fact still shows how important skills are in the pharmaceutical industry and how it is 
combined with technical knowledge in order to improve the R&D activities. Skills are the 
means of enabling enterprises to create new competences, through skills the Big-Pharma are 
able to generate patents in new classes.  
There are some individual cases that could be highlighted. Three small enterprises 
acquired by Pfizer, being them: Icagen, Rinat Neuroscience, and CovX. Icagen is a case in 
which two patents were used as reference by Pfizer, the small enterprise had intermediate 
                                                 
82
 Alios was classified as having weak technical contribution. As stressed before, the weak technical contribution 
can potentially become substantial technical contribution depending on how the large enterprise is going to 
develop its technical knowledge set. 
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technical contribution, it also had skills contribution, in which 12% of its inventors had issued 
a patent for Pfizer’s. Mostly important, Icagen was pointed as a case of success during the 
interviews.  
Icagen was acquired in 2011 and in 2015 the enterprises was disinvested, during this 
four years, Pfizer was able to exploit the desired competences held by the enterprise, as the 
enterprises was not able to contribute anymore to Pfizer, the Big-Pharma decided to disinvest 
its acquisition. Two of Icagen’s patents were used as reference showing a strong indication 
that at least part of Icagen knowledge was useful. A closer look at Icagen’s indirect technical 
contribution can further support this evidence.  
Table 4.24: Pfizer’s development of a similar technical knowledge set to Icagen.  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In the 1990s Pfizer has developed 20% of a similar technical knowledge to Icagen, 
these amount of knowledge contains in it some important techniques and just a small amount 
of Icagen’s technical knowledge was not developed. In order to assimilate these new 
competences Pfizer employed just a fraction (12%) of Icagen’s skills.  
Icagen also had a Prior contribution to Pfizer, the research collaboration that Pfizer 
had with Icagen were also useful for Pfizer to develop competences related to Icagen. The 
process of incorporating Icagen’s knowledge started in Pfizer before the acquisition, this 
process has started during these enterprises collaboration. 
 Rinat Neuroscience (RN) was already analyzed in chapter 3 (see pg 76).RN is a 
successful case of acquisition, therefore Pfizer was able to incorporate the new competences 
and technologies brought by RN. In addition, RN is a stand-alone research facility of Pfizer, 
this enterprise is still generating knowledge.  
Decade Icagen 
2000 
onwards 
7% 
1990s 20% 
1980s 30% 
1970s 36% 
Classes 
not 
developed 
7% 
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In the overall contribution process, RN has technologically contribute in a direct way, 
two of its patents were used as reference and, indirectly, the enterprises was classified as 
having a substantial technical contribution to Pfizer. A substantial technical contribution 
means that Pfizer has very recently developed a similar technical knowledge set to RN. The 
full and successful incorporation of this new technics was made through a high usage of RN’s 
inventors (51%).  
When the two successful cases (Icagen and RN) are analyzed, two variables stand out, 
direct technical contribution and skills contribution. In addition, the indirect technical 
contribution show that RN’s technical knowledge set is newer to Pfizer than Icagen’s 
technical knowledge. Pfizer had to employ a larger effort in order to incorporate the new 
knowledge of RN, that is why Pfizer has used more RN’s inventors. More inventors means 
higher efforts in directions of RN’s knowledge.  
CoVx is an important case that shows the relevance of skills in the overall contribution 
process. At first, CoVx draw Pfizer’s attention especially because the competences this small 
enterprise had, but, in the end it turned into an unsuccessful case, although, this enterprise had 
all the conditions to be a successful acquisition.  
CoVx had a direct technical contribution, but, none of its former inventors were able 
to produce a single patent for Pfizer. Although, the enterprise could have technologically 
contribute to Pfizer, their skills were not exploit. This fact by itself explains why CovX was 
an unsuccessful case. Without the key people Pfizer was not able to incorporate and update its 
knowledge towards CoVx competences. In addition, Pfizer was not able to build any kind of 
prior contribution, that fact also did not allow Pfizer to gather the proper information, about 
CovX, that could facilitate the post-acquisition process into a more effective contribution.  
In the case of J&J, the acquisition of Alios is highlighted. This small enterprise had a 
direct technical contribution, J&J has used one patent of Alios as reference, the enterprise was 
classified as having a weak technical contribution and Alios was the enterprise that had the 
highest skills contribution rate among J&J acquisitions. The skills contribution is what makes 
Alios different from the other acquired companies of J&J.  
Although, Alios is a very recent acquisition its former inventors have already 
produced patents for J&J. The former inventors of Alios could possibly make the weak 
technical contribution of this enterprises change over the years and become substantial, those 
inventors are extremely important on updating J&J’s knowledge towards the competences 
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developed by Alios. The pattern of success showed by this small enterprise makes clear the 
importance of skills in the process of contribution, because this is the difference of Alios from 
the other acquisitions cases. So, the skill contribution is an element that allowed the 
acquisition of Alios to be successful. 
In the Merck case, two acquisitions should be highlighted, Sirna and Abmaxis. The 
case of Abmaxis was classified as a clear case of contribution success, this evidence is further 
corroborated because during the interviews Abmaxis was pointed out as a case of success. 
Sirna was considered a unsuccessful acquisition, but Sirna may be considered an 
untypical case. What makes Sirna a not typical case? The first important observation is that 
Sirna was at first a successful acquisition. Sirna is a case much more similar to Icagen 
(acquired by Pfizer) than a typical unsuccessful case such as Covx (acquired by Pfizer). Sirna 
had interesting capabilities for Merck, “one key factor was Sirna's intellectual property (IP) 
base in RNAi. Sirna is the only other licensee of the key Tuschl patents on RNAi 
technology”83. This small enterprise had promising technologies, but Sirna’s disinvestment is 
due to two important movements.  
First Merck has exited from the RNAi technologies reducing its research programs in 
an attempt to be more focused on lesser therapeutic areas
84
, not only that, but Merck has 
restructured its whole R&D on 2013
85
. Second, Sirna acting as a stand-alone company, got 
too much diverse from Merck, making difficult for Merck to assimilate the new technologies 
and knowledge produced by Sirna. In the end, the changes carried out by Merck made Sirna 
not interesting. 
In the case of Roche it is possible to see a close relation between direct technical 
contribution and skills contribution. All enterprises that have contributed in a direct 
technological way have been, also, classified as having intermediate or substantial technical 
contribution. But, skills contribution is what draws more attention. Roche has high usage of 
inventors, when compared to the other enterprises  
                                                 
83
 A billion dollar punt: Merck's acquisition of Sirna Therapeutics is a gamble, but gambling may not always be 
such a bad thing in: Nature Biotechnology 24, 1453 (2006). Available at: 
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v24/n12/full/nbt1206-1453.html accessed on: 03/11/1016  
84
 Interview information.  
85
 Sirna was desinvested and bought by Alnylam in 2014 
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 There are three enterprises that could be highlight, these enterprises are: Piramed, 
Mirus-Bio and Arius. Piramed has contributed in all variables of the overall contribution 
process, like Abmaxis (acquired by Merck). Piramed had a prior contribution, Roche has used 
4 of its patents as reference, the enterprise was classified as having intermediate technical 
contribution and 100% of Piramed’s inventors had issued one or more patents for Roche. 
Mirus-bio is almost like Piramed, but this enterprise had no Prior contribution and Roche has 
used 76% of its inventors. Finally, Arius had a substantial indirect technical contribution and 
36% of its inventors were used by Roche. 
Although no interviews were conducted with Roche, this study methodology allows to 
infer that Piramed can be classified as successful case of acquisition, this enterprise has 
contributed in all variables fulfilling all the pre-conditions that the other success cases had. In 
a summarized view, Piramed is very similar to Abmaxis (acquired by Merck) and Icagen 
(acquired by Pfizer).  
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Conclusion:   
 
 
 This study started on its primary objective that was: establish a general view of how 
the small acquired biotech companies can contribute to the large pharmaceutical 
enterprise that acquired them; this process was named overall contribution (see pg. 5). 
This objective was built over the observations that today’s pharmaceutical industry has 
changed its R&D into a highly complex and multidisciplinary activity, where small biotech 
enterprises are becoming increasingly important in bringing new capabilities to the old and 
well-succeeded Big-Pharma. 
 The new capabilities are incorporated by the Big-Pharma through interactions that 
enable the small biotech enterprise to contribute to the large pharmaceutical enterprise. As 
biotechnology becomes a complementary technique and, in some cases, a substitute 
technology in the pharmaceutical industry’s R&D, the small enterprises can contribute to 
large pharmaceutical enterprises by building technologies and capabilities that will be used to 
enhance the Big-Pharma’s research productivity and efficiency. As this process evolves R&D 
becomes even more multidisciplinary.  
Technology complementarity, between pharmaceutical industry and biotechnology, is 
a condition for contribution being possible. However, the basis of contribution are set both on 
technology and on the way the pharmaceutical industry is organized. These two elements can 
mold the enterprises behavior.  
The biotechnology industry is organized, mainly, on start-ups, this has strong 
influence on how large pharmaceutical enterprises may access the complementary capacities 
held by the small biotech firms. As a consequence, the industry evolution has shown that Big-
Pharma interact mainly through collaborations and acquisitions with small biotech companies.  
 Therefore, small biotech enterprises can contribute to large pharmaceutical enterprises 
when these small companies are acquired by the Big-Pharma. Contribution is a process whose 
outcome is mainly the incorporation of new capabilities and the enhancement of already 
existent capabilities. But, this process it not autonomous it has to go through some key 
elements that define the overall contribution.  
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The main assumptions of the analysis developed on the overall contribution process 
was drawn from the study theoretical background. First, the discussion on the evolution of the 
Pharmaceutical industry’s R&D made evident that the Big-pharm are incorporating new 
technologies, especially biotechnologies, in their drug discovery activities and that small 
biotech enterprises form a sector specialized in such activities. Therefore, the overall 
contribution process must encompass an interaction between small biotech companies and 
large pharmaceutical enterprises.  
Second, the theory also gave sustainability for the main elements in the overall 
contribution process. Collaborations allow the large enterprise to gather information about the 
small biotech enterprise and to build competences together. Those kind of contributions are 
prior to the acquisition, therefore, the contribution made through collaborations are called 
prior contribution. 
Finally, acquisitions enable two kinds of contribution, being one related to technology 
and the other related to skill. The technological contribution encompass the techniques, they 
can be direct when the large acquiring enterprise use the patents of the small acquired biotech 
enterprise as reference in future patents.  
Technical contribution could also be indirect, when two enterprises unite their 
knowledge base. Through this union new combinations of knowledge are possible and new 
techniques are created. Nevertheless, the indirect contribution depends on how different the 
firm’s technical knowledge base is. Extremely different technical knowledge bases are 
impossible to be united and extremely similar knowledge bases when united do not create 
anything new. Lastly, skills contribution is when the large pharmaceutical enterprises employ 
the key people from the acquired firm. 
The elements that compose the overall contribution process are an attempt to translate 
the theoretical propositions into a methodological analyses. Therefore, chapter two proposed 
an overall contribution analysis based on the theoretical findings of chapter one. In that sense 
the overall contribution is composed by: (i) prior contribution; (ii) direct technical 
contribution; (ii) indirect technical contribution and (iii) skills contribution. 
 The study was able to build some important conclusions. The most general conclusion 
in this study is the evidence that pharmaceutical R&D has been facing a process of becoming 
networked and specialized. Through the bibliographic and the interviews it was possible to 
confirm that over the years large pharmaceutical enterprises are relying on external sources 
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for innovations. There is a clear change in the way Big-Pharma is doing its R&D. In the 1930s 
almost all R&D was done by the enterprise alone. Nowadays, enterprises actions have shown 
changes in the way the Big-Pharma conduct their R&D.  
The extensive use of external sources of innovations are corroborated by Big-
Pharma’s scouting team, which are dedicated, only, to search promising new technologies 
among small companies, in addition, the number of alliances and acquisitions are growing 
steadily.  
The interviews conducted in this study have shown an increasing process of 
specialization in R&D. Large pharmaceutical enterprises are using small biotech enterprises 
as sources of ideas, often, small biotech enterprises are acquired at early stages of 
development (see table 2.2, pg. 60) and even without any molecules and leads. These 
enterprises are acquired due to its technologies dedicated at finding and identifying targets 
and new molecules. The small biotech enterprises are extremely specialized in the first steps 
of research, whereas the large pharmaceutical enterprises are the ones who carried out those 
ideas into the clinical trials and also conduct them. The Big-Pharma is using its ability and 
financial power to conduct clinical trials in an efficient way while the lesser rigidity of small 
enterprises allow them to produce more innovative technologies. In the end, the process of 
specialization makes the small enterprises focused in the first steps of research while the Big-
Pharma are extremely specialized and efficient in running the clinical trials. 
By conducting the overall contribution analyses on the selected sample the study was 
able to support its hypothesis that is: small biotech enterprises do not contribute all in the 
same way, but large enterprises that are capable of using the small emprises inventors 
are the ones that are more efficient on incorporating the technologies and competences 
of the acquired small biotech firm. Chapter three and four have shown that Big-Pharma 
behave differently from each other, regarding acquisition options and the contribution 
process. The small enterprises also behave differently from each other, some enterprises have 
had greater technical contribution while other have contribute more extensively in skills. 
 In the end all the cases have shown a particular relation between direct technical 
contribution and skills contribution, both do not work alone, they must be combined in order 
to the large pharmaceutical enterprise internalize and develop the competences and 
technologies developed by the small enterprise. The relation between these two overall 
171 
 
contribution components shows the Big-Pharma’s commitment in incorporating the 
competences held by the acquired small enterprises.  
 The possibility to compare the success cases between each other and with the not 
successful ones could further corroborate the importance of skills contribution. By analyzing 
the success cases one could infer that the success is linked to skills contribution, especially 
when inventor’s usage is above 10%. Skills contribution are of extreme importance to build 
new competences based on acquired enterprises, it is though skills that Big-Pharma can 
generate new knowledge. 
 During the study the importance of skills contribution in the construction of new 
competences was shown. Although, there are other factors - such as companies which 
contributed but have not been acquired and inventors that were employed regardless the 
acquisitions of the enterprises they worked before - which have not been explored in this 
study. The study showed that contribution skills are an undeniable condition in mergers and 
acquisitions aimed at building new competences in large companies. In this process, the direct 
technological contribution was also important. 
In the research process, the direct technical contribution was an additional element that 
proved significant. This process reveals that large companies can use purely technological 
elements (patents) for developing and producing new technologies. However, direct technical 
contribution is limited by technological obsolescence. The direct technical contribution 
consists of one of the overall contribution elements that are not comprehended by the 
hypothesis array. One can argue that the process of technological obsolescence - enhanced by 
extensive use of technology - is in itself a factor that in the medium and long term can 
strengthen the relevance of skill contribution in the overall contribution. 
In turn, skills are a contribution that could be employed several times and in different 
areas. Arguably, inventors can acquire new knowledge and could interact with different 
researchers, those interactions may change what the inventor knows, by employing their new 
knowledge, inventors, can work on related subjects and also modify technologies. In this 
specific point it is possible to say that skills can be more relevant than other elements of the 
overall contribution. 
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As became clear, this study is not focused on policies and on the Brazilian context
86
. 
Nevertheless, the results and analyses presented in this study can give a good start on thinking 
about policies implications and firm’s strategies to deal with this changing industry. In this 
brief part, dedicated to policy implications and firm’s strategies, the Brazilian context will be 
put aside at this part the study will try to suggest broad ideas of policies regardless the 
country’ context. That is possible because these are just insights for policies and strategies 
implication. In addition, those insights can be seen as future research agendas where policies 
must be designed considering countries contexts and peculiarities together with industry 
behavior, organization and patterns of technical change. 
The policy implications will, in a general way, indicate how government can foster the 
creation of R&D capabilities in the national pharmaceutical enterprises and the strategy 
suggestions will show some ideas of how enterprises can enhance its R&D capabilities and 
become more technologically competitive.  
In this general policy design the government should foster the creation of star-ups and 
high-tech small enterprises. For example, Brazil has few start-ups, whereas, there are several 
large pharmaceutical enterprises that are not consolidated on the first stages of R&D, 
especially, the drug discovery activities. Therefore, the process of fostering start-ups should 
be focused in small enterprises located at upstream positions in the value chain. Foster start-
ups is not enough the government should also create mechanism for these two actors interact 
through collaboration or to acquisitions   
Another important action that governments should foster is the incorporation of small 
enterprises into large enterprises. This combinations of State incentive to boost technological 
development through the university infrastructure will be a way, of countries creating ways of 
enhancing their national innovation system interaction. In this series of policies it must be 
granted some kind of direct incentive for enterprises to keep the small enterprises inventors 
and key people.  
Through the overall contribution analyses one can suggest some enterprises strategies 
dedicated to pharmaceutical firms. In order to enhance and build new technological 
competences, large pharmaceutical enterprises should acquire small biotech enterprises. In 
addition, the enterprises should create a scouting team dedicated to search technologies that 
                                                 
86
 For better understanding the Brazilian context see: Hasenclever et al., 2008; Torres, 2015; Gadelha e 
Maldonado, 2008; among others) can be better understand  
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could be incorporated by them this will help choosing a small biotech that could give an 
effective contribution.  
The study has some limitations as a result of being focused in the relations between 
the large pharmaceutical enterprises and small biotech companies. As a consequence, the 
study lost part of the general view about interactions between enterprises of different sizes. 
The enterprises analyzed were only the acquired ones and the contributions that are outcomes 
of an acquisition. However, there are interactions that goes beyond acquisitions, enterprises 
may have research agreements that do not lead to an acquisition, inventors move from one 
enterprise to another, etc. Also, the study is considering the effect on one way, i.e. the 
contribution of small biotech enterprises to large pharmaceutical enterprises. In this study it 
was not considered the effect on the other way around, or how Big-Pharma can contribute to 
small biotech enterprises. 
Some elements in the overall contribution brought some limitations for understanding 
this process. The period that the small enterprises were acquired and the analysis of their 
contribution are too close in time. Maybe the use of a greater time lag between the acquisition 
and its contribution would make the contribution process more visible (especially in the Alios 
case). 
The difference in size between the firms may hide the real effects of the contribution. 
Large pharmaceutical enterprises are extremely larger than the small biotech enterprises, in 
that sense, the effects of a small biotech enterprise may be diluted over the large enterprises 
patents and technologies, making more difficult to see the real effects of an acquisition. One 
possible way to correct this problem is to increase the number of interviews.  
The technical contribution has the same limitation as the one find in all studies that are 
analyzing the enterprises’ knowledge base. Knowledge in the same way as capital becomes 
old i.e. it has a rate of depreciation that is not easy to be calculated. Technology in the form of 
a patent will also become old and face a depreciation, but, the rate of depreciation was not 
considered in this study. 
Considering the limitations and some questions opened during this study it is possible 
to suggest some future research topics. Chapter 1 has showed two interesting lines of 
research. One is to further explore how the organization of the biotechnology sector into start-
ups has made easy for large enterprise to incorporate biotechnology competences into its 
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R&D though acquisitions. The other is to explore the university as a selection environment of 
research projects that may become a start-up. 
As an important outcome, this study methodology should be tested in other sectors, 
high-tech and low-tech ones, so then it will be possible to see how small enterprises can 
contribute in different kinds of sectors. Another important subject for future research is to 
formalize the overall contribution process. 
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ANNEX 1 
 
 
Questions asked in the interviews 
 
 
First Part: Interviewee role in the enterprise research structure 
 
1.  What is your role in the enterprise’s processes of research alliances and mergers and 
acquisitions, regarding small biotech enterprises? 
 
Second Part: Collaborations  
 
2. Does this enterprise uses external sources, such as other enterprises and universities, in 
its innovative process? 
 
3. How common is the establishment of research partnerships with small enterprises at 
this enterprise ? 
 
4. What drives this enterprise to engage in research collaboration with a small enterprise? 
 
5. How is research collaboration between this enterprise and a small biotech firms 
usually divided? Each enterprise has a well-defined task? 
 
6. What makes a collaboration with a small biotech firm successful?  
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Third Part: Acquisitions  
 
7. Does research collaboration and acquisitions of small enterprises have different 
objectives? 
 
8. For this enterprise, how is the process of choosing and acquiring a small company 
conducted? 
 
9. What features this enterprise brings to the research activities and what features the 
small companies bring? 
 
10. What kind of small enterprises characteristics call this enterprise attention in order to 
engage in an acquisition? 
 
11. After the acquisition of a small biotech enterprise, what this enterprise would maintain 
of that small enterprise structure?  
 
12. Could you give examples of successful acquisition and unsuccessful ones? 
 
13. Did you have a direct participation in any of these cases? Could you talk about it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
